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What is the origin of the household registration management system? The possibility of canceling the household registration system in the future?

In the period of economic transformation, with the rapid development of the national economy, China's industrialization has advanced rapidly, which has effectively promoted the development of urbanization. However, due to the lagging reform of a series of institutional arrangements for household registration management, rural diseases with industrialization ahead of urbanization have been bred. To some extent, this has weakened farmers' market contribution, led to effective social demand and insufficient employment, and dragged down the modernization of the national economy. Therefore, this paper intends to compare and analyze the historical origin and international equivalent institutional arrangements of China's current household registration system in order to provide theoretical basis and experience reserves for the deep-seated reform of the household registration system.

First, the historical origin and realistic comparison of the household registration management system in China

At present, China's household registration management system is deepening reform along the direction of market economy, and has achieved certain results. However, its basic framework has not been fundamentally adjusted, and it still has the basic characteristics of social division, dual reinforcement, hierarchy, heredity, tradeability, super stability and functional diversity. Why don't other centrally planned economies and developing countries adopt China's household registration system for population management? The root cause mainly lies in the unique historical and cultural landscape and realistic national conditions bred by China's Asian mode of production, which cannot surpass the traditional behavior forged by thousands of years of history.

First of all, the objective object of household registration system management is the citizen subject who has been influenced by oriental civilization for thousands of years and has been baptized by modern civilization intermittently since modern times. In 1950s, in order to realize the strategic goal of enriching the people and strengthening the country, the country must take the road of industrialization. However, facing the way of thinking and behavior of Socialism with Chinese characteristics's citizens, we have to consider the particularity of China's civil society behavior when introducing the Soviet socialist system model born in the soil of European civilization.

Secondly, although the designers, decision-makers and executors of the household registration system have received more or less Marxism-Leninism education from western civilization, their thoughts and behaviors are more influenced by China's traditional history and culture, and they have great inertia. Based on the above two points, we can find the historical origin of the current household registration system from the traditional social system arrangement in China.

A well-defined account. In the traditional society of China, there have been privileged households, civilian households, base households and other categories, and their household registration status has gradually decreased, with clear boundaries. Among them, privileged household registration is the most typical official household in Song Dynasty. You can enjoy the following privileges: shadow pay, that is, the qualification to be an official, reduction or exemption of certain taxes, removal of officers from their posts, and reduction of punishment. On the other hand, the current household registration management system requires urban hukou when recruiting national civil servants, and citizens engaged in the tertiary industry can enjoy certain tax breaks, similar to official hukou. It is worth noting that the official household, as a privileged household, disappeared in all previous dynasties after the Song Dynasty. Folk households are the household registration owned by civilians and are in the main position, including folk households, artisans, stoves and shops. In these household registrations, the social status of civilians in different household registrations is basically the same. However, the social status of lowly households is lower than that of civilians, including military households, registered households, miscellaneous households, musicians, beggars, etc., but only a few. In contrast, although the current hukou structure in China is not as clear as that in the traditional society, we have to admit that there are levels of urban hukou and rural hukou. The difference is that the rural hukou with lower status is the main body.

(2) hereditary hukou. Hereditary system is an important feature of the traditional society in China, which permeates many aspects of social management. The registered permanent residence is naturally branded as hereditary, which is highlighted by the hereditary characteristics of military households, craftsmen and miscellaneous households. Military households are hereditary from generation to generation, in order to achieve the purpose of "Jpua being a soldier". During the Three Kingdoms period, the sons of military families were hereditary soldiers, and the daughters only got married within the scope of military families, which formed the institutional restriction of household registration on marriage. Investigating the marriage choice objects of contemporary youth, there are also a large number of urban and rural hukou matching phenomena. Although it is not stipulated by the system, it is a social custom and becomes one of the important conditions for people to choose a spouse. This invisible social system arrangement has set up marriage obstacles from family and society for the free love of urban and rural youth. In this way, a high wall has been built between rural youth and urban youth, and most of them are looking for partners in the same household registration. In fact, the hereditary and social division of the current household registration system has constituted an invisible institutional restriction on the right to freedom of marriage given to citizens by our constitution. In the Northern Dynasties, miscellaneous households with various performing arts skills and their children were required to inherit their father's business and were not allowed to go to school for education. Artisans mainly refer to all kinds of craftsmen. The Tang government made a famous regulation on the hereditary nature of craftsmen mastered by the government: "Once a skilled child joins a craftsman, he has to join other professions." The purpose is to require them to take turns to serve in the official service, but allow craftsmen to pay for the service. Throughout the contemporary rural hukou, except for a few ways such as taking exams, most children inherit their parents' rural hukou. Even if they go to work in cities, their rural hukou determines that they must pay legal compulsory labor every year, otherwise they can be exempted from compulsory labor. There seems to be an invisible umbilical cord between craftsmen in Tang Dynasty and contemporary farmers.

(3) Integrating social security and population statistics. The household registration system is generally for population statistics and management, and has no direct relationship with social security. However, in the Baojia system in Qing Dynasty, household registration management was endowed with important social security functions. People of various administrative units and identities should be included in it, forming a security network that links and binds all kinds of professionals from all walks of life across the country, thus becoming an important measure for the Qing government to consolidate its ruling foundation. In contrast, the household registration management system that we formed under the planned economy system is also a social security network that connects all occupations and industries in the country. After the mid-1980s, the emergence of the ID card system replaced many social security functions of the household registration management system. Although the household registration management system formed under socialist conditions is essentially different from the Baojia system in Qing Dynasty, there is no denying its inherent historical system origin.

The above analysis shows that the household registration system in China has lasted for more than 1000 years, and there have been institutional changes throughout the dynasties, especially after the founding of New China. Although its form has undergone tremendous changes, with the continuation of history and traditional culture, some system cores have been inherited, which of course reflects the external forms of the cores in different social stages and systems.

Second, the international comparison of household registration management system in China

Although the household registration management system in China is deeply influenced by the traditional social system and culture, the national policy of reform and opening up has pushed China to the track of world development. In the future, the reform of household registration management system in China will undoubtedly draw lessons from the successful experience and failure of international social system arrangements.

(1) Developed countries in Europe and America

In western developed countries, there is no multifunctional household registration management system in China to control the flow of personnel. Most of them adopt the combination of relevant systems with clear professional division of labor to achieve the purpose of socialized population management. Let's take Canada as an example to compare and analyze the similar household registration management system arrangements in developed countries and China.

1. Institutional arrangements with similar functions

In Canada, the birth certificate provides the same information about the blood relationship within the family as that contained in China hukou, which has the function of proving the family identity of China hukou. The function of social security card is close to that of Chinese ID card, but the scope is smaller than the latter, which is mainly used for employment, unemployment allowance and pension. The combination of social security card, citizen card, health card, driver's license, credit card and birth certificate is equivalent to the combined function of China's identity card system and household registration management system. For example, when someone inherits an inheritance, one or more ID cards can be used to confirm the identity of the heir, similar to the ID cards and household registration in China. Canadian citizenship is determined by a citizen card, which can also be used for voter registration. In Canada, the so-called "green card" refers to the social insurance card, which can be used to determine the qualification of permanent residents and has the same function as the China hukou.

2. Different institutional arrangements

The differences between Canadian and China household registration systems are as follows: firstly, the former is a combination of multiple institutional arrangements with clear division of labor and single function, while the latter is a single institutional arrangement with vague division of labor and multiple functions. For example, Canada has set up four cards and two cards, realizing the similar functions of China hukou and ID card. Secondly, Canada does not have a single clear household registration system, while China has a systematic and complete household registration system. Third, Canadian citizens' welfare protection is realized through social security cards, while China closely links welfare insurance with registered permanent residence. Fourth, the Canadian birth certificate is issued by the hospital, and the copy can be kept. Originally, they were all kept by individuals, but China's household registration book was issued by the public security department and kept in this department. Fifth, Canadian public security organs do not need to know the detailed information of citizens, while China public security organs rely on household registration to provide detailed information of citizens in order to maintain public order. Sixth, Canadian permanent residents can freely choose their place of residence throughout the country without going through the formalities of moving. China permanent residents must move to registered permanent residence, otherwise they need to apply for a temporary residence permit.

Thus, the difference between China's household registration management system and developed countries in Europe and America exceeds the similarity. This is mainly due to China's implementation of the socialist system and the planned economy system, which has been influenced by the traditional social system and culture accumulated for thousands of years.

Oriental culture in Japan

Japan is an economically developed country, but the per capita natural resources are scarce, the per capita cultivated land area is narrow, and part-time agriculture is widespread. The social behavior of citizens is partly influenced by Confucian culture, which is similar to China in all aspects, but it has successfully realized the synchronous development of industrialization and urbanization. At present, the proportion of urban population is as high as 74%, and there is no "excessive urbanization disease" prevalent in developing countries. Japan also implements the household registration system, but it does not have the valve function of China's household registration system to adjust the direction and flow of urbanized population. This is because Japan's household registration is relatively simple, generally only used for marriage, birth, death, inheritance and other procedures, and has nothing to do with the labor employment system and social welfare insurance system. Daily address confirmation, moving in and out, paying local tax, election registration, national health insurance, etc. They are all handled with "resident tickets" instead of household registration.

"Resident ticket" is used to confirm the permanent residence of residents. As long as you meet a certain number of years of residence and have a fixed occupation, you can apply for registration, and there is no complicated examination and approval procedure in the transfer of domestic accounts. Because of this, combined with its extensive and important role and low processing cost, residents actively declare "resident tickets", so there is no Chinese-style "separation of people and households" in Japan, where the population mobility is much higher than that in China.

In our country, there is also a kind of certificate similar to "resident ticket" to prove the residence of irregular job seekers in cities-"temporary residence permit". The difference between the two is that the "temporary residence permit" is issued to immigrants who have entered the city for employment but have no hukou. Often, when applying for a permit every year, compared with local residents with registered permanent residence, they have to pay a higher amount of temporary residence fees, family planning fees, public security fees and other expenses, but rarely enjoy the relevant social security rights and interests. In a sense, these fees are discriminatory social identity taxes levied on specific citizens, so they are passive certificates. "Temporary" residents are only relative to local registered residents. In fact, their residence time in the "temporary" place is often longer than that in the "permanent" place-the residence time in the household registration place is generally 2-3 years, and some even as high as 10 years, but they are still temporary residents, which forms the inherent paradox of institutional logic.

The similarity between "temporary residence permit" and "resident ticket" is that they are both issued according to the residence time and employment situation of foreign residents, and they are all applied for after staying in advance without approval, and they all live in a certain place for more than 1 year. However, the status of the two certificate holders is very different between the two countries. Similar to the "resident ticket", China residents hold local hukou, but the hukou must be approved in a strict and complicated way before they can live. Except for a few cases such as graduation assignment and personnel transfer, it is almost impossible for ordinary foreign employees who move into cities, especially big cities, to obtain household registration in their cities. This is a characteristic of China that Japanese household registration system does not have.

From the above analysis, it can be seen that compared with China, the Japanese household registration system is more conducive to the formation of a society with equal status and complete structure.

(C) Developing countries in urbanization

The economic system of developing countries operates on the basis of underdeveloped market economic system and takes the capitalist development road, so the household registration management system is basically similar to that of developed countries, but it has certain particularity, but it is obviously different from that of China.

Developing countries do not have such a strict household registration management system as China. Apart from the differences in household registration management between developed countries and China, they also have their own special differences. Due to the duality of economic structure, in the process of industrialization in developing countries, there is almost unimpeded free flow between urban and rural population, which generally leads to the "over-urbanization disease" in which urbanization is faster than industrialization. However, due to China's strict household registration management system, in the process of industrialization, most of the rural labor force is confined to the land, which leads to the opposite "under-urbanization rural disease" in which industrialization is faster than urbanization. The most direct reflection in reality is the lack of effective market demand. On the one hand, due to the low proportion of urban population, the urban market capacity is limited; On the other hand, there are many farmers, but their income level is low, their purchasing power is insufficient, and they have the willingness to buy, but they can't realize it. Therefore, there is an equilibrium trap of low-level growth and high unemployment rate. This low-level production is relatively surplus, which restricts the advancement of industrialization. At present, most domestic scholars are directly or euphemistically glad that the household registration management system has saved China from the harm of "urban diseases". Although they also acknowledge the existence of "rural diseases", according to the author's point of view, they generally prefer that "rural diseases" are less harmful than "urban diseases" and more harmful to the long-term strategic goal of China's industrialization? At least, we can't compare the conspicuous urban diseases in developing countries with the unremarkable rural diseases in China, and then simply draw the conclusion that urban diseases must be more harmful than rural diseases. At present, there is a lack of specific evaluation index system and empirical research to prove this point. It is worth noting that the latent, lagging, slow-growing, extensive, persistent and ecological nature of "rural diseases" may determine that in the long run, the harm of "rural diseases" is no less than or even more than "urban diseases".

For developing countries, in order to overcome the "excessive urbanization disease", because there is no control means of household registration management system, they have designed other alternative means. Indonesia has set up a cash deposit for immigrants in Jakarta and issued them licenses to engage in various business activities. The Manila government of the Philippines stipulates that immigrants have to pay a considerable sum of money to enter public schools. These two situations lead to corruption due to rent-seeking behavior, but they cannot greatly reduce the urban population growth. African countries such as Congo, Niger, Tanzania and Zaire regularly expel unemployed immigrants from cities to reduce the harm of "urban diseases". However, these methods have not achieved obvious results.

In contrast, during the transition to the market economy system, our government, especially megacities, also encountered the threat of "urban diseases", so China began to use the household registration management system, which is almost similar to the above-mentioned means in developing countries, such as paying more tuition fees for the children of migrant workers, forcibly dismissing migrant workers, and trying to build a solid dam to prevent immigrants from flooding into megacities. In the short term, it seems that some interception effects have been achieved. But in the long run, the wall function of household registration management system, as the core of interception measures, is weakening or even disappearing in the ocean of market economy. This is proved by the fact that about 60 million migrant workers still flow to cities despite the restrictions of the household registration management system in China. In fact, the household registration management system mainly restricts the residents of small and medium-sized cities with high opportunity costs from moving to big cities and megacities. In the face of rural residents' mobility with the opportunity cost close to zero, the household registration system is the secondary factor, and the market factors such as expected income, employment opportunities and employment costs in that city are the decisive factors. At present, China is facing the "urban disease" caused by the migration of rural residents to big cities, especially megacities, just like other developing countries.

Since the household registration management system is far weaker than we thought in curbing this "urban disease", and other means adopted by developing countries have been proved to be ineffective, then we should gradually give up the fence function of household registration management system to regulate urban population flow and learn from the more successful practices of other developing countries. South Korea has taken special tax and credit measures to increase infrastructure investment in small and medium-sized cities and successfully guided industrial activities and population from megacities to small and medium-sized cities. Of course, this requires economic development to a certain stage and sufficient financial support. Indian population density and mobility are higher than China's. In 1960s, with the rapid development of urbanization, the urban population increased by about 80 million, reaching 1 100 million. Although "urban disease" has occurred to a certain extent, government departments have relatively slowed down the development of megacities, making them experience a painful period of crowding out too many people. At the same time, encourage investment in satellite cities and large and medium-sized cities in megacities, create employment opportunities, improve the urban environment, attract immigrants from megacities and rural areas, and slow down the spread of "urban diseases." As a result, two-thirds of the newly-increased urban population lives in cities with a population of less than 1 10,000, and the proportion of population in megacities such as Kolkata and Mumbai has declined.

To sum up, the defects of China's household registration management system are partly due to the planned economy system and partly due to the traditional social system arrangement. By comparing with the international community, we must face up to the decisive influence of the identity of developing countries and the market economy system on China's household registration management system, and at the same time take into account China's national conditions, so as to design a forward-looking and guiding household registration system reform plan.