Why did Northeast China decline and Guangdong rise?

Population factors of the rise of Northeast China in history

At the beginning of Qing Dynasty, after Manchu people entered the Central Plains, there were only 400,000 people left in the northeast. In the seventh year of Kangxi (1668), the Qing court regarded the northeast as a land of Longxing, and restricted the Han people from moving to farm. Since then, Northeast China has entered a 200-year "ban". Shandong and other places are "sparsely populated", and droughts, floods, military disasters and banditry continue. Due to the pressure of livelihood, a large number of refugees "rushed to the East".

After the rise of tsarist Russia, the Qing government had to lift the "ban" imposed on Northeast China for more than 200 years at 1860. "Qilu people from Zhao Yan came here" and "merchants from all provinces flocked to gather", so "the land is divided, the people gather, and the image of prosperity is gradually different"

After the Meiji Restoration, Japan quickly became an industrialized power, and the Soviet Union became the second largest economy in the world after 193 1 year. Russia and Japan, two rising industrial powers, have brought unprecedented development opportunities to neighboring northeast China, attracting mainland immigrants like pumps. The population of Northeast China increased from 3.3 million in 187 1 year to 40 million in191year and 1940. The population proportion in Northeast China has increased from 0.9% in 1870 to 7.8% in 1940.

From 1870 to 1940, Russian population increased by 12 1%, Japanese population increased by 1 12%, and the United States, a big immigrant country, increased by 230%, while China only increased by 45%, but in the northeast. It can be said that at that time, Northeast China was the region with the fastest population growth in the world, which was unique in human history. The comprehensive quality of immigrants was good (high proportion of young and middle-aged people, good physical fitness and strong pioneering spirit).

Rich population resources "flour" is made into delicious "bread" under the "rolling pin" in the northeast, which has become the most developed area in China. During the period of 1943, the coal output in Northeast China accounted for 49%, pig iron accounted for 87%, steel accounted for 93%, electricity accounted for 78%, and railways accounted for 42%. 1942, the urbanization level in northeast China reached 23.8%, equivalent to the national level 1986. 1945, Northeast China even surpassed Japan to become the first economy in Asia.

After 1949, China's international trade was interrupted and the population flow was less. However, as the "eldest son of the Republic of China" (including some areas formerly belonging to Jehol Province), the population of Northeast China has continued to increase, and the proportion of the total population in China has risen from 7.64% in 1953 to 9.05% in 1982. During this period, the population flowing into the Northeast was basically concentrated in Heilongjiang (which should be the development of the Great Northern Wilderness), while the population of Liaoning was still losing.

Due to the redistribution of the national economy, the first-Mover advantage of the Northeast economy has gradually lost, and the proportion of the economy in the country has dropped from 1978 to 14.0%, but the per capita GDP is still 1.55 times the national average.

The core factor of the decline of Northeast China is population.

There are many reasons for the decline of Northeast China, such as the high proportion of planned economy and state-owned enterprises, and the "great inertia of big ships", which makes it difficult to turn around. In addition, the Soviet economy went downhill. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian economy declined for a long time, and the geographical advantage of Northeast China was lost. The trade volume between China and Russia is not large, and there are few trade opportunities in Northeast China. Although the trade volume between China, Japan and China and South Korea is large, due to North Korea's obstruction, economic and trade opportunities have not flowed into the Northeast.

But the core reason for the decline of Northeast China is the population factor. The proportion of permanent residents aged 20-39 in Northeast China began to decline from 1982, from 198 1/kloc-0.1%to 8 of 20 10 and 20 15. On the one hand, Northeast China can't "produce" population like Jiangxi and Guangxi, and on the other hand, it can't "attract" population like Yangtze River Delta.

There is no population outflow in Northeast China, but the fertility rate is extremely low.

Many people believe that the decline in the proportion of labor force in Northeast China is due to the outflow of population. In fact, before 20 10, whether it is the total population or the young population, the population in Northeast China is still a net inflow. In 20 10, the young population aged 20-39 in Northeast China also flowed into 0.4%.

In fact, Jiangxi, Guangxi and other provinces have high population mobility and a large number of labor outflows. However, due to the high fertility rate, the proportion of young laborers staying in this province has remained stable and even increased.

However, due to the long-term low fertility rate, the proportion of young laborers in Northeast China is declining. People see that all parts of the country are Northeasters and mistakenly think that it is the outflow of Northeasters. In fact, there are people from all over the country in the northeast.

In recent years, the northeast economy has declined. Has the population flowed out? According to the census data over the years, from 20 10 to 20 15, there was a slight inflow from Liaoning. Jilin and Heilongjiang have a slight outflow, both less than 0. 1 percentage point. Generally speaking, the population loss rate in Northeast China is still very low.

The proportion of registered population aged 20-39 in Northeast China has been declining because of the long-term low fertility rate. To maintain the intergenerational change of population, developed countries need a fertility rate of 2. 1 (the number of children per woman), while China needs a fertility rate close to 2.3 at present. The fertility rate in Northeast China began to decline in the late 1960 s, and the decline rate in 1970 was also greater than that in the whole country. 1980 is lower than the replacement level of 2.3, which is earlier than the whole country 1 1 year.

To revitalize the Northeast, we must encourage fertility. 1980. It is too late to revitalize the Northeast, and there is no "human" power.

Why don't northeast people want to have children?

There are several reasons for the low fertility rate in Northeast China:

First, the level of urbanization in Northeast China is high. The urbanization rate in Northeast China reached 23.8% in 1942, while the national urbanization rate was only about 10%. 1975 The national average urbanization rate was 17.37%, and Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang were 36.47%, 32.34% and 36.48% respectively. In 20 10, it was 49.7% in China, 62. 1% in Liaoning, 53.4% in Jilin and 55.4% in Heilongjiang. 1980 When the one-child policy was implemented, the fertility rate in Northeast China was lower than the replacement level. That is to say, in 1980, Northeast China should not only implement the one-child policy, but also take measures to prevent the fertility rate from falling too fast.

Second, the quality of urbanization is not high. As an old industrial base, Northeast China has a high proportion of planned economy. Since the reform and opening up, the proportion of northeast economy in the whole country has been declining, a large number of workers have been laid off, and many people have a hard life. Although the per capita GDP of Northeast China is higher than that of the whole country for a long time, the expenditure of cities is higher than that of rural areas, and the per capita income of cities and towns in Northeast China is lower than that of the whole country. For example, 201541yuan, the per capita disposable income of cities and towns in Jilin Province is lower than the national average 19 109 yuan. In 20 12, the per capita disposable income of urban residents in Heilongjiang province was 17760 yuan, ranking third from the bottom in the country, only higher than Qinghai and Gansu.

Third, the inheritance of traditional fertility culture is poor. Many places in the south have ancestral graves and ancestral halls for thousands of years and hundreds of years, and the traditional fertility culture is well preserved. Most of the Northeast are descendants of immigrants, and the traditional culture has a shallow foundation.

Fourth, the government attaches great importance to family planning, and there is a large population in the northeast system, so there is no condition and willingness to have more children.

Fifth, because the Northeast is the "eldest son of the country", two generations have formed excessive trust in the country, the national policy is deeply rooted in the hearts of the people, and the concept of raising children to prevent old age is weak. Many people firmly believe that "providing for the aged depends not on children but on the government", and there is no need to raise children.

Sixth, the marriage rate is low, the divorce rate is high, the age of marriage and childbearing is late, and the proportion of older unmarried men and women is high.

For these reasons, people in Northeast China have become accustomed to the one-child policy, and the concept of having fewer children is deeply rooted. Young people in Northeast China want to be super-born. The biggest obstacle many people face is not the Family Planning Commission, but the parents of both sides. Many old people would rather dance square dance than bring their grandchildren. After 20 14, there are many eligible people in Northeast China, but the application rate is very low. The number of people born in 20 15 is less than that born in 20 10. The population policy of ethnic minorities in Northeast China is relatively loose, but the fertility rate is also very low.

In contrast, the fertility rate of registered population in Guangdong is much higher than that of the whole country. From 65438 to 0973, family planning was fully implemented in China. After 1978, the one-child policy was implemented in some areas, and the one-child policy was implemented in 65438-0980 provinces. However, Guangdong has implemented a relatively loose population policy. According to the census of 1982, the fertility rates of Guangdong 1979 and 198 1 are 3.0, 3.0 and 2.9 respectively, and the national fertility rates are 2.7, 2.4 and 2.3 respectively.

1On February 2, 980, Guangdong promulgated the Regulations on Family Planning in Guangdong Province, which is the first local regulation on family planning in China, explicitly allowing the birth of a second child. Later, Ren, who was in charge of Guangdong, also had a forward-looking population thought. He said that China's biggest resource is human resources. Only by emancipating the mind can the population burden become a national strength advantage.

1986 Guangdong province revised the provisions of 1980. While tightening the "one child" policy, the rural second child policy is still maintained, and the provisions of 1992 and 1997 also retain the rural second child policy. In other words, Guangdong's one-and-a-half-child policy is earlier than the whole country; When the one-and-a-half-child policy has been implemented in rural areas across the country, Guangdong has implemented a comprehensive second child policy.

It was not until 1998 that Guangdong revised the regulations and cancelled the second child policy.

Compared with the national fertility rate, the second child policy has enabled the registered population in Guangdong to give birth to more than 5 million in 198 1- 1998, which has the youngest population structure in China.

Looking at the economic prospects of various places from the perspective of labor structure

The decline in Northeast China has not bottomed out, Sichuan and Chongqing have rebounded, Guangdong has maintained its lead, and the advantage of the Yangtze River Delta has gradually lost.

The total population of Northeast China and Sichuan-Chongqing region is equivalent, with 654.38+009 billion people, which is comparable. The proportion of permanent residents aged 20-39 in China decreased from 198 1% in Northeast China to 8. 1% in 20 10. In the same period, Sichuan and Chongqing dropped from 9.8% to 7.2%, even more than the Northeast. However, the proportion of Sichuan-Chongqing economy in the whole country began to rise in 2006, and the economic growth rate has been ahead of the whole country in recent years. However, the proportion of Northeast China's economy in the country continues to decline, and the economic growth rate is at the bottom of the country. This can also be explained from the perspective of population.

The decline in the proportion of young labor force in Northeast China is due to too few children, while the decline in Sichuan and Chongqing is due to the outflow of labor force. For example, at 20 10, the young and middle-aged laborers aged 20-39 in Sichuan and Chongqing lost 20%. However, these laborers who go out to work still send money home to raise their children and protect themselves from old age, and still contribute to the domestic demand and economy of their hometown.

Moreover, in recent years, the labor force in Sichuan and Chongqing has begun to return. From 20 10 to 20 15, the labor force in Chongqing has been returning, which is the biggest driving force for Chongqing's economic growth to lead the whole country in recent years. The outflow of labor in Sichuan has also begun to slow down and the return has increased. In the northeast, no one sends money back and no one can return it.

In 20 10, the registered population aged 0- 19 in northeast China only accounts for 6.0% of the whole country, which means that even if the outflow of labor force can be curbed, the proportion of golden-aged labor force aged 20-39 will still drop from 7.6% in 20 15 to 6.0% in 2030, and the economic proportion will continue to decline. The population structure in Northeast China is the oldest, and the population crisis broke out first. In the future, the economic vitality is far lower than that of the whole country, and the potential of population outflow is growing. Without effective measures, the outflow of young labor will make the aging northeast worse.

In 20 10, the registered population aged 0- 19 in Sichuan and Chongqing accounted for 8.8% of the whole country, which means that the reserve labor resources are relatively rich. The proportion of Sichuan-Chongqing economy in China has rebounded from 5.4% in 2006 to 6.3% in 20 15 and 6.5% in 20 16. In recent years, the economic growth rate has been ahead of the whole country. "One Belt, One Road" puts Sichuan and Chongqing in a favorable position in the international trade system. Sichuan and Chongqing can not only curb the outflow of population, but also attract the inflow of labor. In 2030, the proportion of economy in China will rise to at least 1978 7.4%, and may even exceed 8.5%.

Looking at Guangdong and the Yangtze River Delta (Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang) from the same perspective, the proportion of migrant workers flowing into the Yangtze River Delta is lower than that of Guangdong. On the young "productive" labor force, the Yangtze River Delta is not only lower than Guangdong, but also lower than the whole country.

Guangdong not only attracts population, but also "produces" population, which makes the proportion of young labor force and economy in the country increase continuously. The young population structure will make Guangdong's economic vitality surpass that of the whole country for a long time.

In the Yangtze River Delta, foreign labor just made up for the decline in the proportion of local labor in the country. The aging of population structure is higher than that of the whole country, and the economic vitality is lower than that of the whole country, which makes it less attractive to the outflow population. It is estimated that in 2030, the total population of the Yangtze River Delta will drop to 1 1.0%, and the proportion of people aged 20-39 will drop even more, and the per capita GDP advantage will continue to decline. In 2030, the total economic output will probably be lower than 15%, or even only 13%.

Looking at the economic prospects of various places at the median age

The median age is the age of people who rank the whole population by age, which is at the midpoint. Because the more young people in an economy, the stronger the innovation vitality of the economy, so the median age actually reflects the innovation vitality and affects the technological progress rate of the economy, thus affecting the potential growth rate of the economy.

In 20 15, the five oldest countries in the world were Japan, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Greece, with median ages of 46.6, 46.2, 45.9, 44.0 and 43.6 years respectively. The median age of these countries in 195 1-20 15 is negatively correlated with the economic growth rate. The population data adopts the China program of the United Nations World Population Outlook -20 15 revised edition, and the economic growth rate adopts the data compiled by the World Association for Large Enterprises Research.

Generally speaking, the economic growth rate of countries decreases with the increase of the median age, which is a general trend. After the median age in Germany is over 35, the economic growth rate also decreases. However, due to different industrial structures, the GDP growth rate of different countries is different under the same median age. Germany is a model that can maintain economic growth despite aging. One of the reasons is that when other European countries moved their enterprises abroad because of labor shortage and coveting cheap labor in developing countries, Germany was able to keep its enterprises at home, maintaining the competitive advantage of the real economy and having a low unemployment rate. However, the manufacturing industry in Greece is shrinking rapidly and the unemployment rate remains high. Japan and Italy are between Germany and Greece.

However, due to labor shortage and structural aging, the proportion of industrial labor in Germany and Japan is also declining, from 40.9% and 34.4% in 199 1 to 28.0% and 25.8% in 20 13. Germany is highly dependent on immigration, but now there is an immigration crisis.

Relatively speaking, Japan and Germany are getting rich first and then getting old, so they are relatively easy to deal with aging; While Greece and China (especially in Northeast China) are getting old before they get rich, and they are helpless in the face of rapid aging. The median age of Greece, Northeast China and China was over 38 in 2009, 2009 and 20 15 respectively. Based on the constant international yuan of 1990, the per capita GDP is only 1 1, 8 17 dollars respectively. However, when the median age of Japan, Germany and the United States is over 38 in 1992, 1993 and 20 15, the per capita GDP is $65,438+09,472, $65,438+06,536 and $3,365,436 respectively.

Some scholars believe that China still has the advantage of being a latecomer. In fact, the advantage of backwardness only gives the possibility and space for catching up, and to successfully use the advantage of backwardness to achieve economic growth requires the support of a considerable number of young laborers. If there is not enough young labor, backwardness is not an advantage, but a disadvantage. Greece is an example.

1950, the median age of Greece is four years younger than that of the United States, and the proportion of per capita GDP equivalent to that of the United States has increased from 20% in 1950 to 50% in 2008. However, in 2008, the median age of Greece was 3.9 years older than that of the United States, and in 2038 it will be 10 years older than that of the United States. The gap between its per capita GDP and that of the United States has widened again since 2008, which is only 37% of that of the United States in 20 15, and will continue to decline.

The same is true in Japan, where 1950 is 8 years younger than the United States. With its young population structure, the proportion of per capita GDP equivalent to that of the United States has increased from 20% in 1965438 to 85% in 1 year. However, the median age of Japan surpassed that of the United States in 1969 and was five years older than that of the United States in 1992. It can't catch up again, and the income gap with the United States has widened again. In 20 15, the per capita GDP dropped to 69% of that of the United States, and it will continue to decline.

1979, the median age in the United States was 30 years old, while that in China was 22.7 years old, 7.3 years younger than that in the United States. The population structure is younger, and the income gap between the two countries is narrowing. The per capita GDP of China has increased from 4.4% in 1980 to 32% in 20 15. However, in 20 15, the median age of China began to surpass that of the United States. In 2030, China was 45 years old and the United States was only 40 years old. In 2050, China was 56 years old and the United States was only 42 years old. This means that China's per capita income will be less motivated to catch up with the United States, and the gap with the United States will widen again around 2030.

The oldest population structure in China is the Northeast and the youngest is Guangdong. In 20 15 years, the national median age was 38 years old, and Guangdong was 34 years old (the registered population was 34 years old); Northeast China is 43 years old, equivalent to the level of China in 2027 and Guangdong in 2032. Jilin and Heilongjiang are both 42.6 years old, and Liaoning is over 44 years old. In 20 15 years, only Japan, Germany and Italy have a median age over 44.

The industrial structure in Northeast China is far inferior to that in Japan and Germany. In 20 15, the economic growth rates of Liaoning, Heilongjiang and Jilin were 3.0%, 5.7% and 6.5 respectively, which was quite dazzling. However, the report released by CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection mentioned that "there was once a widespread problem of economic data falsification in Liaoning Province", and the economic growth rate of Liaoning in 20 16 was only -2.5%.

The median age of Northeast China will surpass Greek, German and Japanese in 20 17, 2022 and 2027 respectively, and become the most aging region in the world. It can be seen that the economic prospects in Northeast China are very bleak. The aging in Northeast China is about 12 years ahead of the whole country, which means that the national economic prospect is not optimistic.

Even if every effort is made to encourage childbearing, the median age in China will be close to 45 in 2030. Age structure affects social mentality, Guangdong is the most open and Northeast is the most conservative. Judging from the demographic structure, the social mentality of the whole country will continue to be "northeast".

If you ask the Northeast to pursue the same economic growth rate as Guangdong, you will not catch up even if you are panting, but you will be exhausted; It may also drive local governments to falsify economic data like Liaoning Province in previous years, leading to local financial crisis. As the aging population spreads across the country, economic data fraud will also spread across the country, and the central government will not be able to grasp the real economic situation of the country. Therefore, it should be governed by "people", not across the board.

The oldest Northeast must be "healthy" and its economic structure should be optimized in order to maintain economic growth under the harsh population structure like Germany. If the Northeast can explore an effective "way of keeping in good health", it will also be of reference significance to the whole country.

The youngest Guangdong economy can still "sprint" for several years. It can also be seen from the situation in Guangdong that encouraging childbearing in China may not have an immediate effect on the economy in the near future, but it will inject sustained vitality into the economy and society in the next few decades and will change all levels of society.

To revitalize the Northeast, we should start with revitalizing the population.

At present, Taiwan Province Province, Korean, Hongkong, Japanese, Italian and German are all in deep crisis of low fertility rate, but the crisis in northeast China is more severe. The situation in China is also very serious.

According to the statistical bulletin of national economic and social development in 20 15, the peak year of the birth of two children alone is 20 15, which not only failed to give birth to more than 2 million people as scheduled, but also gave birth to 320,000 fewer people.

The fertility rate in China 1 is the lowest in the world, because the one-child policy for more than 30 years has completely destroyed the population structure and population ecology and changed people's concept of fertility. Moreover, all economic and social policies and urban planning in China are planned around the family structure of the only child. Even if family planning is stopped, these economic and social policies and urban planning models will continue.

It is difficult to encourage childbearing in Chinese mainland. In order to effectively improve the fertility rate, we must adjust the whole economic model, education model, cultural model and urban construction model, reduce housing prices, reduce urban population density, enhance fertility willingness, increase children's welfare, establish a sound care system and reduce the cost of family rearing.

These reforms are more difficult than the economic reforms of 1979, which will have a greater impact on society in the next few hundred years. To revitalize the Northeast, we should start with revitalizing the population, and the fertility rate should be an important evaluation index for revitalizing the Northeast. Only when the population has recovered its ability of sustainable development can it be shown that the economy of Northeast China has embarked on the road of sustainable development.