The causes of the Chechen war

The First Chechen War (1994- 1996)

Chechnya is one of Russia's 89 federal entities, located in the North Caucasus, covering an area of about 20,000 square kilometers. Chechnya is rich in oil, and it is also the hub of oil and gas pipelines and railway transportation to all parts of Central Asia, and its strategic position is very important. 1.20 thousand population, most of whom believe in Islam, which is very different from Russia which believes in Orthodox Church in race and culture. As a result, Chechen independents emerged one after another. 199 1 1 dudayev was elected president of Chechnya. 1 1 In, Chechnya declared its independence from the Russian Federation and established an independent Chechen Republic, which triggered a protracted Chechen crisis. Because dudayev pursued a policy of confrontation with the central government of the Russian Federation in Chechnya and recruited soldiers to build its own armed forces.

1994 12. The Russian government sent troops to Chechnya to stop the separatist activities of Chechen gangs, and the first Chechen war broke out. From the outbreak of the war in1February 1994 to the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya in1February 1996, 2837 Russian troops were killed, 337 were injured 13270, 337 were missing and 432 were captured. Lost five planes, eight combat helicopters, and more than 500 tanks, armored transport vehicles, infantry fighting vehicles and armored reconnaissance vehicles; Chechen militants killed 15000 people, wounded and captured 40000 people. The west estimates that the death toll of Russian troops exceeds 1 10,000. Russia's most painful failure is that large-scale military operations failed to achieve their goals, laying a curse for future terrorist activities.

When attacking Grozny, the Russian army fought street battles with dudayev elements, and the front line was too long. Sometimes the distance between Russian troops and Chechen armed forces is only tens of meters. At this time, when Russian aviation provides fire support, the aiming and bombing accuracy of pilots and navigation guides is particularly high. The actual combat results are regrettable. According to Russian airborne troops and infantry who participated in the attack in Grozny, buildings that have been completely captured by Russian troops are often attacked by their own aerial bombs and out-of-control rockets due to large aiming errors, inaccurate guidance and many accidental bombings, resulting in huge losses. However, the Russian air force played a very important role in the battle to capture Grozny.

199565438+1At the beginning of October, Su -24 bomber launched KAB- 1500L laser-guided aerial bomb, which destroyed two road bridges leading to the eastern suburb of Grozny on the Argon River in one fell swoop. Car thieves have been transporting reserves to the war zone through these bridges. The camera control data show that this laser-guided aerial bomb has high precision and excellent bombing effect. The use of high-precision weapons ensures that Russian aviation can continuously and accurately attack small targets such as car bandits' bunkers, armored equipment and even Grozny's facilities under bad weather conditions. In order to ensure the night reconnaissance in the war zone, Tu -22M3 also regularly threw flares over Grozny, which to some extent suppressed the sabotage activities of small subversive teams of dudayev gangs behind the Russian army at night.

Here, the most successful example of Russian air force aviation precision strike is the bombing of Grozny City Defense Center and dudayev Presidential Palace. When the Russian army captured Grozny, it wanted to keep the infrastructure in the city intact, especially the presidential palace. But after paying the price of blood, it finally understood that it was absolutely impossible to capture the Chechen capital without effort. The Russian army was forced to launch a brutal street battle with the car bandits, captured every building and every block, and gradually advanced. At this time, the necessity of destroying the illegal armed headquarters is self-evident. Therefore, before the Russian Federation troops broke into the center of Grozny, the aviation began to carry out a devastating and precise attack on the Chechen presidential palace.

The presidential palace is the office building of the Grozny State Council of the former Soviet Union. Because it is located in the Caucasus earthquake-prone zone, the building is very strong and has strong seismic performance, and there are 500 militants hidden inside. The fire bombing carried out by Russian artillery failed to achieve the expected results, so they decided to use air force fighters, BETAB-500 bombs and S-24 heavy uncontrolled rockets capable of destroying reinforced concrete bunkers. 65438+1October 17- 18, as long as the weather conditions improved and were suitable for combat flight, Russian attack planes began to bomb the presidential palace, and the result accurately hit the underground command bunker in dudayev under the building. Dudayev himself escaped outside the city. Later, when satellite telephone communication was used in mountainous areas, the signal was intercepted by Russian troops and waited in the air 1 plane.

When the Russian army bombed the presidential palace in Chechnya, it did not announce the specific casualties of car bandits. But the casualties will not be too small. The underground bunker alone killed at least 130 car robbers. More importantly, the air raid on the presidential palace dealt a heavy blow to the psychology of the car bandits. The radio communication intercepted by the Russian army showed that the recalcitrant militants in the presidential palace began to panic and retreated without fighting, leaving only a few snipers guarding them, trying to shoot a cold shot and mutually assured destruction with the Russian army.

65438+ 10/9, Grozny's capture ushered in a major turning point. The reconnaissance battalion of the 20th Volgograd Guards Division of the Russian Army captured the presidential palace and eliminated the latent snipers. Dudayev molecules evacuated from the city center and continued to fight in the so-called "defensive rear", that is, the south and southeast of Grozny, Cartaya Ma and Heihe River, but their morale was obviously low. The illegal Chechen weapons assembled in Minut Square in Grozny were attacked by a series of artillery and air strikes by Russian troops, and the main force of dudayev elements began to evacuate the Chechen capital and fled to the southern mountainous areas. In order to make full use of this favorable fighter, the Russian Air Force front-line aviation and army aviation controlled the road where car bandits tried to break through and escape from Grozny, destroying two armored transport vehicles and more than 50 trucks and cars carrying militants.

After the ground troops captured the North Grozny airport, Russian helicopter troops immediately began to deploy at this airport. 65438+ 10 18, the first Russian military transport plane landed at this airport. The airport has been operating at full capacity since the beginning of February.

Of course, Russian aviation operations are not limited to Grozny. 65438+1On October 25th, 18 Su -25 attack planes destroyed underground ammunition and military stores of Russian elements in four silos of the former intercontinental ballistic missile position of the Russian strategic rocket army northwest of Bamut. Another large ammunition depot north of Arsh village was also destroyed by Russian Su -25 fighters, and the effective forces and armored equipment of Chechen militants were also attacked by air in the assembly area of Shali town.

However, 65438+1October 25th was also the darkest day for helicopter pilots of a certain regiment of the Army Air Force. On that day, two Mi -24 helicopters were shot down and two pilots were killed.

Russian air force fighters succeeded in minimizing losses. 12 attack plane was hit by ground anti-aircraft fire, but it was only damaged to varying degrees. Finally, all of them returned to the airport safely, in which 1 aircraft stabilizer was hit, another 1 aircraft engine was hit, and the rest of the aircraft were hit by bullets or shells. On February 3, there were casualties for the first time. 1 Su -24 bomber flew at low altitude in dense fog and accidentally hit the mountain southeast of Cherfunaya Station, causing casualties. The cause of the accident may be the failure of the airborne navigation system. On February 4th, the 1 Su -25 fighter plane was shot down by the Chechen-Ola air defense system, and the pilot Major Bayev successfully ejected. His fate is unknown, and he is likely to be killed by militants on the spot after landing.

On February 6th, the Russian Federation troops crossed the Sunzha River with little resistance, and soon eliminated the "defensive rear" militants. In the battle to attack the car bandits in Grozny's last resistance center, the Russian army actively used aviation units to violently bomb Heihe and Cartaya Ma's consolidated defense areas, especially in Heihe area where the car bandits had strong air defense cover. For the first time, in order to avoid losses, the helicopters of the Army Air Force used tactics that were not stipulated in the previous operational regulations: launching an S-24 uncontrolled rocket when the aircraft was in an upturned state, increasing the missile range to 6-7 kilometers, and carrying out attacks outside the kill zone of dudayev's molecular air defense weapons. Of course, using this tactic will reduce the hit accuracy, but the hit accuracy of ammunition is still very satisfactory when attacking ground targets. After that, the Marine Corps began to use this tactic widely.

Air force front-line aviation and army aviation usually work together to carry out combat missions. On February 10,1Mi -24 helicopter and six Su -25 attack planes carried out a series of attacks on the car bandits' fortifications in the fortified area of Heihe River. Army helicopters not only attack pre-selected targets, but also bomb temporary targets under the call of ground troops, freely hunting various enemy targets. Similar raids are risky because hunting operations are usually carried out in enemy-occupied territory. For example, the Mi -24 squadron independently searched and destroyed the target three times during the operation in the Gujemes area. The first two times were very successful, destroying 1 armored transport vehicle, 1 self-defense artillery system and 1 ammunition depot. However, in the third operation, the militants who had already stood guard fought back. Three helicopters were hit by the intensive fire of ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns and light weapons, and were seriously damaged. Among them, 1 made an emergency landing at a Russian position, and then retired early because the damage was too serious to be repaired. Fortunately, there were no casualties.

At the beginning of March, the Russian army completely liberated Grozny and its suburbs and drove the militants to the southern mountainous areas, which ushered in a temporary calm situation. We can briefly summarize the previous fighting situation. From 1994 12 1 to1995 March 17, Russian air force aviation destroyed 2 65 enemy coach fighters, 3 helicopters, 20 tanks, 25 armored transport vehicles, 6 self-defense systems and/kloc-in Chechnya. During this period, two fighters of the Russian Air Force crashed, and the 14 fighter was hit by ground anti-aircraft fire and suffered combat damage. All the damaged fighters returned to the battle ranks after maintenance. Russian aviation also destroyed a large number of enemy targets in the active combat stage before mid-June, 1995, which also suffered heavy losses. In the first three months alone, five helicopters (two Mi-8s and three Mi-24s) were completely lost and nine pilots died.

1From March 6 to March 20, 1995, the situation in Chechnya was relatively calm. Russian troops occupying Grozny pushed near Yagon. However, instead of attacking argon in time, Russian troops tried to negotiate with dudayev. The Russian authorities soon realized that the militants had no sincerity in peace talks at all, but only used the negotiation time to gain precious breathing time and redeploy and consolidate their defensive positions. The North Caucasus Cluster Command of the Russian Federation foresaw that the two sides might resume war at any time, and immediately strengthened the troops in Chechnya and its nearby border areas. The number of military helicopters deployed at Mozdok, Beslan and North Grozny airports increased from 55 to 65,438+005, of which 52 were Mi -24 helicopter gunships.

In order to prevent car bandits from replenishing reserve personnel and enhance their strength, the front-line aviation and army aviation of the Russian Air Force have repeatedly carried out missile and bomb attacks on the assembly areas of dudayev elements in Shari, Ataji, Mesker-Ewart and Misha-Ewart. On March 2 1 day and night, the Russian army launched an attack. That night, the northern cluster motorcycle infantry and marine corps surrounded the city of Argonne. On March 22nd, Chechen militants, under the cover of tanks, attempted to lift the Russian siege of argon from the sand and Gujermes. Russian Air Force attack planes and helicopter gunships immediately took off to participate in the war, launched "strike" guided missiles to destroy nine tanks and armored vehicles of car bandits, and launched S-8 uncontrolled rockets to kill and kill a large number of car bandits and infantry. Dudayev suffered heavy casualties, unable to confront the Russian army head-on, and fled in succession. On March 23rd, Russian troops liberated Yagon. On March 30th, Russian troops liberated Gujermes, the second largest city in Chechnya.

Different from attacking Grozny, when argon and Gujermes were liberated, the actions of Russian aviation did not cause great damage to the city, but only targeted at the fire support points and armored equipment positions in the suburbs. Dudayev molecules also wisely gave up tenacious resistance and street fighting tactics that may cause heavy casualties, and retreated to mountainous areas with little resistance, breaking them into pieces and engaging in sneak attacks.

On March 3 1 day, Russian troops captured Shali City after fierce fighting, and the main force of the car bandits 1 tank regiment deployed here was basically eliminated. In order to avoid civilian casualties, Russian troops attacked the city without using aviation.

In April, the meteorological conditions over Chechnya improved greatly. The dense fog in winter begins to disperse, and most of the time is tomorrow. The sun is shining, and Russian attack planes and helicopter gunships can show their talents. On April 8-9, helicopter gunships of the army and air force intensively attacked the integrated defensive position of Abkhaz battalion, a bandit gang from dudayev, in the southeast forest area of Samashki village. In mid-April, Russian troops launched a fierce offensive against Bamut village, where 750- 1000 militants were hiding. The bandits are well-equipped, with armored transport vehicles, field guns and mortars, and the fighting is cruel. On April 15, the Russian army failed to charge the village for the first time, and the troops involved in the storm were madly counterattacked by the militants occupying the commanding heights and were forced to retreat. On April 17, Army aviation and frontline aviation began to bomb the car bandits' bunkers and support points in and around Bamut village. The car bandits suffered heavy losses, gave up their resistance and fled to the mountains. On June 5438+08, Russian troops occupied Bamut village, and the local elders negotiated with Russian commanders to ensure that illegal militants would not enter the mountain village again, and the Russian troops immediately withdrew from the village.

From the battles in Shari and Bamut, we can find the new characteristics of Russian aviation: try to reduce the participation of aviation in the war and try to avoid the casualties and property losses of innocent civilians. The ground forces usually attack the target without air force pre-attacking, and only when they are resisted will they call attack aircraft and helicopter gunships to provide fire support. However, although this new combat practice has obviously reduced civilian casualties, it has increased Russian losses at the expense of Russian soldiers' blood. 1at the end of may, 1995, when the main battle was transferred to a mountainous area with relatively sparse population, the Russian army abandoned this tactic and increased the combat use of aviation again.

After fighting in April, Russian troops controlled all the plains in Chechnya under the Great Caucasus Mountains. On April 26th, President Yeltsin signed an order to suspend the use of force in Chechnya to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the victory of the Great Patriotic War. The ceasefire period is from April 28th to May 12.

Like the previous ceasefire negotiations, dudayev elements made full use of this rare breathing space to replenish their troops and consolidate their positions, and never gave up the opportunity to attack Russian checkpoints and convoys. The Russian army did not relax its vigilance, and the aviation continued to patrol and reconnaissance flights over Chechnya. On April 30, Russian aviation was attacked by militants while patrolling over Jilliane village in southeastern Chechnya. 1 mi -24 helicopter was hit by anti-aircraft fire. The pilot tried his best to fly the seriously damaged helicopter out of the area controlled by the bandits and forced it to land in Dagestan. The pilot was not injured and the helicopter was completely scrapped. The second similar incident here was not so lucky. On May 5, two Su -25 attack planes patrolled Benoy village. Major Sarabeyev was flying over a hill with a Su -25 pilot at low altitude when the carjackers suddenly attacked the hillside with DSHK machine guns. The bullet penetrated the unprotected cockpit cover glass and the pilot was killed on the spot. The plane crashed vertically and hit the ground instantly.

During the Russian ceasefire, dudayev secretly mobilized a large number of troops to Grozny. On May 14, mortar and recoilless guns began to bomb the Russian-occupied Chechen capital in an attempt to recapture Grozny. The Russian army immediately launched a counterattack. On June 5438+05, the federal army repelled the invading militants with the support of aviation fire.

On May 15, Russian troops went deep into the mountains of Chechnya and launched a large-scale offensive in an attempt to completely defeat the militants. Russian troops and car bandits fought fiercely in Shatoy, Viyansk, Shali, Olehovo, Sheren-Evat and Nozai-Evat. With the help of the mountain, Chechen militants stubbornly resisted and tried their best to stop the Russian attack. In order to support the ground forces' offensive in the Shatoy area, Russian aviation used helicopters to airborne special forces behind enemy lines for the first time.

In late May, Russian aviation launched a larger-scale combat operation in Chechnya. Su -25 attack planes, Mi -24 helicopters and Mi -8MT helicopters of the internal security forces carried out fierce air strikes on the positions and support points of militants, destroying bandits' armored equipment, ammunition depots and command posts. Su -24M bombers use a large number of high-precision weapons such as KAB-500L, KAB-500KR laser and TV-guided bombs to carry out precise strikes against car bandits. On May 2, 1,1Su -24M bomber launched 1 KAB-500KR navigation bomb in the southwest of Yi village in Dagu-Bolto, destroying the building occupied by a group of militants in one fell swoop. On May 24th, the 1 Su -24M bomber fired two KAB-500L guided bombs at an altitude of 4,000-5,000 meters and a flying speed of 800-900 km/h, which directly hit the target and completely destroyed the secret ammunition depot of car thieves in a cave in the south of Zuonei Village.

During this period, helicopter pilots of the Army Air Force completed 5-6 combat flights every day, which was unprecedented for Russian pilots in any military conflict after World War II. In addition to providing fire support for attack force on the ground, the helicopters of the Army Air Force also actively participated in the combat mission aimed at destroying the terrorist subversive group of dudayev elements that infiltrated the rear of the Russian army. On May 24th, in such an operation, 1 Mi -24 helicopter was shot down near the town of Chechnya-Ola, and 1 pilot died on the spot.

After the militants retreated to the mountains in southern Chechnya, the command post was built in Weijieno village, and the Russian aviation's precise attack on the command post of car bandits in Weijieno village was a classic. On May 28th, Russian Air Force 1 Su -24 bomber fired 1 KAB-500 guided bomb, which accurately hit the left wing of the headquarters building of Chefei. On May 3 1 day 12, two Su -24 bombers carried out air strikes again. The first bomb completely destroyed the club building 70 meters away from the headquarters building, where dudayev elements installed a high-powered radio station, and the second bomb razed the headquarters building to the ground. Two other precision strikes destroyed special parts of the village and the building of the police station. On May 3 1 day, Russian Su -25 fighters also intensively bombed the positions of car bandits in Agung and Vicensk Canyon.

On June 1-2, Russian troops surrounded the village of Weijieno from two directions, and airborne troops used Mi -8 helicopters to drop air suddenly behind the village, cutting off the bandits' retreat. On June 3, Russian troops captured the last strategic stronghold of the car bandits. After the Battle of Weijieno, the car bandits lost their headquarters and the last 1 heavy armor, the unified command system was broken, and the illegal armed forces were divided into two areas: Shatoy and Nozai-Ewart.

On June 4th, when attacking Nozai-Ewart, another 1 Mi -24 helicopter of Russian army was shot down, and the pilots Captain karpov and Captain Hotchka Chev died. On June 9th, militants shot down another Mi -8 transport helicopter, killing Major Malikov and Captain Szche Gerloff.

1in the early summer of 1995, the main battle of the first Chechen war was coming to an end. Dudayev's army, which lost its unified command, was disintegrated and gradually became a lone gang, unable to coordinate its actions. Some militants began to hand over their weapons voluntarily, and the car bandits only controlled the last mountain center in Chechnya 12: Shatoy.

On June 1 1, Russian Federation troops began to attack Shatoy. In order to cooperate with the attack of ground troops, Mi -8 transport helicopter dropped tactical airborne troops behind enemy lines under the cover of Mi -24 armed helicopter. On June 12, the helicopter 1 Mi -8, which was transporting weapons and ammunition for airborne troops, was attacked by ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns carefully disguised by car bandits. The helicopter caught fire in the air, and the pilot miraculously landed the helicopter safely and ran out of the dangerous area before the helicopter exploded. This Mi -8 helicopter also became the last helicopter lost by the army in the first Chechen war.

/kloc-On the night of June, 2003, Russian motorcycle infantry and airborne troops descending from the sky surrounded Shatoy and launched a charge. The panicked car robbers realized there was no point in fighting back and evacuated along the mountain road in the dark. /kloc-in June of 0/4, Russian troops captured Shatoy, and the Russian flag was raised high. So far, the first active war in Chechnya has basically ended. After that, the Russian army did not launch a large-scale war. However, the battle to hunt down the remaining troops of dudayev scattered in mountainous areas and disarm the car bandits lasted for 1 year. On June 28th, 1996, President Yeltsin flew to Chechnya and declared that the war was over and the victory belonged to Russia.

After the first Chechen war, Chechen militants changed their operational strategies, adopted guerrilla tactics, planned terrorist attacks, waited for an opportunity to make a comeback, and played a cat-and-mouse game with Russian troops. Since then, the North Caucasus has entered a state of no war and no peace before the Second Chechen War.

1999 basaev, known as the "Wolf of the Caucasus" in the First Chechen War, was not satisfied with the de facto independence of Chechnya and demanded greater freedom in the North Caucasus. To this end, he publicly clamored for the establishment of death squads to "liberate Dagestan" and "liberate the whole Caucasus", and on July 4 of the same year, he led more than 200 "Chechen independence" militants to sneak into Dagestan and sneak attack the post of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, thus igniting the fuse of the second Chechen war. On August 7, he commanded more than 5,000 militants to gather at the border between Dagestan and Chechnya and attack the Russian army in two ways, in an attempt to defeat the Russian army in Dagestan after expelling the Russian army in Chechnya, so as to realize the goal of Chechnya and Dagestan separating from Russia and establishing an independent Islamic fundamentalist country.