Zheng Chenggong's simple message

Brief introduction of Zheng Chenggong's life

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Zheng Chenggong (1624- 1662)

National heroes in Ming and Qing Dynasties. Han nationality. His real name is Sen, also known as Fu Song, and his name is Yan Minhe. Damu is from Shijing Town, Nan 'an City, Fujian Province. A.D. 1624 was born in Hirado, Nagasaki Prefecture, Japan on August 27th. His father's name is Zheng Zhilong and his mother is Tian. His ancestral home is Deng da miao cun, Wang Peng Township, Gushi County, Henan Province. When he was a student, Emperor Long gave Zhu the surname and gave him loyalty and filial piety, so he was commonly known as the "national surname". When the Qing soldiers entered Fujian, his father Zheng Zhilong greeted him. He cried and remonstrated, and got up against the Qing Dynasty. After the Northern Expedition with Zhang Huangyan, it shook the southeast. In the first year of Kangxi (1662), he led tens of thousands of soldiers, set out from Xiamen, landed in Taiwan Province Province and Liaogang, defeated the Dutch colonists and recovered Taiwan Province Province. Zheng Chenggong died of illness at the end of 1662, and lived for 38 years.

Be loyal to your country and fight against Manchu.

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Emperor Longdi of Nanming once courted Zhu, who was the surname of the Ming Dynasty, and gave him the title of loyalty and filial piety, so he was commonly known as the surname Ye. At the age of 22, he served as commander-in-chief of the Imperial Camp of Emperor Qianlong of Nanming. In the third year of Qing Shunzhi (1646, the second year of Nanming Longwu), the Qing army conquered Fujian and Emperor Longwu of Tang Dynasty was killed. Encouraged by Hong Chengchou, a great scholar in the Qing Dynasty, Zheng Chenggong's father thought that the Ming Dynasty was over, and despite Zheng Chenggong's opposition, he went north to surrender to the Qing court alone. At this time, the Qing army plundered Zheng Jia, and his mother Tian committed suicide to avoid the humiliation of the Qing army. In the second year of Longwu (1647 65438+ 10), Zheng Chenggong formed an army in Liyu (Little Golden Gate), and the banner was titled "Loyalty, Filial Piety, Bo Zhao, General Zhu Chenggong, Minister of Criminal Affairs". Li Yong was renamed Nanming Li Yong in the third year (1649), and Li Yong made him the king of Yanping County, so some people called him Zheng Yanping. From 165 1 to 1652, we won three victories in Xiaoyingling and Haicheng (now Longhai) in southern Fujian and annihilated the main army stationed in Minqing. After that, Zhoushan in Zhejiang Province in the north and Jieyang in Guangdong Province in the south. In the 12th year of Shunzhi (1655), Du Ji, the general of Dingyuan in the Qing Dynasty, led about 30,000 troops into Fujian to attack Zheng Jun together with the troops stationed in Fujian ... Zheng Chenggong took advantage of the weakness that the Qing army was not good at water fighting and lured the Qing army to go to sea to fight. In April of the following year, his navy was completely annihilated in the waters near Weitou, Xiamen. During the period of 16 years after the uprising, Zheng Chenggong completely controlled the sea power of the small islands in Xiaojinmen and Xiamen (which were islands at that time and were not connected with the mainland). In order to do business with foreigners, raise funds and prepare military forces, he set up commercial positions in the mainland and collected a lot of information from the Qing army and the court. He sent troops several times and also negotiated with the Qing court to gain time to restore his strength. In the Qing Dynasty, Zheng Zhilong wrote to Zheng Chenggong many times at the request of the Qing court. The Qing emperor also wrote a letter conferring Zheng Chenggong as General Jinghai, but Zheng Chenggong refused to accept it. In the 14th year of Shunzhi (1657), Zheng Zhilong and Zheng Chenggong's private letters were intercepted by the Qing court, and they immigrated to Ningguta of Zheng Zhilong to collaborate with the enemy.

In the fifteenth year of Shunzhi (1658), Zheng Chenggong succeeded in the Northern Expedition170,000. The following year, he entered the Yangtze River, captured Zhenjiang and surrounded Nanjing. Later, due to China's plan to slow down the troops of the Qing army, he was defeated in Xiamen. In the seventeenth year, in haimen port (now Long Haidong), Fujian Province, more than 40,000 sailors led by the Qing general Dasu were completely annihilated, and the military power was revived.

Zheng Chenggong's most important ally-Wang Jin Li Dingguo

If Zheng Chenggong's greatest regret in his life is his relationship with Li Dingguo, the leader of the Southwest Anti-Qing Movement.

Zheng Chenggong's name is a household name, and his popularity is far above that of Li Dingguo. But perhaps few people know that Li Dingguo is the most respected person in his life, his closest strategic ally, his closest relative and an "old relative". One is the king of Xining in Nanming (the late Jin Dynasty), and the other is the king of Yanping in Nanming (the late Chao Dynasty), whose status and influence are still under Dingguo. The successful niece married the eldest son of Dingguo. Later, the Qing army attacked Yunnan and Guizhou on a large scale, and Nanming was defeated and killed with his husband. )

Zheng Chenggong's most glorious achievement in his life was not to recover Taiwan Province Province, but to fight against the Qing soldiers. One with Li Dingguo in Guangxi and Yunnan, and the other on the southeast coast, which frequently dealt a fatal blow to the Qing soldiers and supported the Nanming regime for 20 years, is a towering pillar; Forcing the Qing court to make concessions, which laid the groundwork for the later "Kangxi rule".

He is an out-and-out national hero, but not only because he subdued Taiwan Province Province, but also because he stubbornly resisted the invasion of the Qing army, provided protection for overseas Chinese in Nanyang, and founded the "Heaven and Earth Society" to leave an anti-Qing fire, which lasted for hundreds of years.

There are many articles about the relationship between Li Dingguo and Zheng Chenggong in the history circle, mostly based on the fact that both of them insisted on anti-Qing, and their achievements were far from other anti-Qing armed forces. Moreover, they exchanged letters and entered into marriage contracts, so the history books were flooded with praise, as if they were all outstanding figures who were loyal to the cause of regaining sight and went to the national disaster together.

But as far as historical facts are concerned, the plan to join hands with Guangdong was formulated by Li Dingguo. 1653, 1654 (ten or eleven years of Shunzhi), what he dreamed of was to attack Zheng Chenggong from east to west and take the first step to recover Guangdong, Guangxi and reorganize mountains and rivers. However, this is only the wishful thinking of the country, and Zheng Chenggong does not want to do so. The reason is not that he can't see that linking Guangdong is the key to the revival of Nanming, but that he puts the interests of Zheng Group headed by him in the most important position. The study of Zheng Chenggong's whole experience after joining the army shows that he is a very ambitious man. Under the situation of confrontation and national division in Ming and Qing Dynasties, his political influence is not enough to compete with the two coexisting regimes in Ming and Qing Dynasties for the people's hearts (including officials and gentry). Therefore, his strategy is that whoever can let him act arbitrarily in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, or carve land for himself, will serve him. In his own words, his ideal is to be a "phoenix" rather than a "tiger and leopard" in a trap. So he would say something like this: "If the Qing Dynasty can believe the news, it is the A Qing Dynasty;" If you don't believe your son, you are just Amin's minister. In short, you can only be a "distant servant" and not "subject to others". This is the ideological root of "comparing Korea" that he and later Zheng Jing have always put forward.

The Qing court's repeated overtures (called "peace talks" by the founder) failed precisely because he was only given a high salary and never promised him relative independence. Under this condition, Zheng Chenggong can only be a "statement". By the same token, his "always being wise" does not mean that he is willing to obey the orders of the Ming court without reservation and abide by the Minister's Day. On the southeast coast, after the death of Emperor Longwu, he "always served the Tang Dynasty" (in Zhang Huangyan), treated Lu Jianguo with courtesy and tried his best to make the soldiers belonging to Lu Jianguo obey himself. On the one hand, he hoped that the anti-Qing forces, such as Daxi and Dashun Army, which were originally in Li Yong Crescent, could hold and hold off most of the Qing soldiers to relieve their pressure. On the other hand, he is very political-minded, and foresees that if the main forces and things are deployed to attack together at the request of the state, there is no doubt that he will win, and the situation of Fujian and Guangdong fighting each other and forming one body will change.

Zheng Chenggong will not fail to consider that his relative independence will be greatly restricted, and military and political affairs must be entrusted to the court, otherwise he will be unable to escape the discussion of trespass. More importantly, he was slightly inferior to Li Dingguo in strength, title and prestige, and Li Dingguo had a closer relationship with the court in Li Yong. These factors must be in Zheng Chenggong's foresight. Therefore, no matter how correct Li Dingguo's strategy is, no matter how painstakingly he persuaded the country in order to realize the South Prosperity, Zheng Chenggong always stuck in Fujian waters like an elastic steel bar. The magnitude of the external force can only cause him to swing from side to side, and finally I will stand still in Nantianyizhu. The tragedy of Li Dingguo, the best militarist in Ming and Qing Dynasties, lies in that when he left Yunnan, he was jealous of Sun Kewang in the early anti-Qing period and could not display his talents in the battlefields of Huguang (now Hubei and Hunan) and Jiangxi; In the medium term, I have high hopes for Zheng Chenggong to join the forces in Guangdong, Fujian and the north. What he got in return was a false story. Xinhui was defeated and lost its teacher, so Nanxing Zhongxing had no hope. All he can do is to follow Zhuge Liang's example of "doing his best until he dies".

Zheng Chenggong has always attached great importance to Chaoshan, which is the main source of military food for the Zheng family. This is why Zheng Hongkui and Zheng Chenggong invaded Chaozhou many times. However, his intention is to use Chaoshan and Huizhou as their own food and troop supply places, and it is best to leave a clear area between Zheng Jun and the imperial court. It is not good for Zheng Group to destroy this firewall. So, in the case of Li Dingguo's anxiety, he blindly adopted the strategy of procrastination and procrastination. As mentioned earlier, Li Dingguo deployed the second campaign of marching into Guangzhou, and informed Yi Shi of the scheduled date of joining forces as early as six months ago. It was impossible not to inform Zheng Chenggong, who expected to play a key role in the overall strategy.

In April, after the envoy sent by Gaozhou Ding Guo arrived in Xiamen, he held "peace talks" with the Qing side and put the envoy under house arrest. It was only in August that Li Jing was appointed as the envoy of the national army. Dingguo answered "Zibu Valley has been stationed in Xingyi" (Xinxing County, Guangdong Province). According to Chen Shun, who ruled the country, he went to Guangzhou and Zhaozhou (a newly-established Zhaoqing prefecture) on August 16th, which can prove that this letter was written after August 16th. The letter said, "Since May, I have been treated accordingly by your nobles", that is to say, he. Dingguo's reply, in addition to clearly expressing dissatisfaction, is still promising to join hands. "Be careful not to ups and downs, it will delay the pavilion. You know, after October, I'm afraid it won't help the machine. " Really serious.

According to the records of the late king, Li Jing and the envoys returned to Xiamen with letters no later than the third day of September. "I must send troops to the south to serve the king." In order to keep Lu in spring and the poor in Kinmen. However, he insisted on dragging the division deadline to before 10 (15 days ago) stipulated by Ding Xin, and it was not until 10/9 that he "sent his troops south to Jin and Wang Huishi (at that time, Li Dingguo had not yet become the king of Jin). Zuo Wei Jun assisted Ming Hou Lincha as the governor of land and water, and raised every opportunity in the army; Appointed the right army, Min Anhou as the commander of the navy, led tens of thousands of troops and hundreds of warships to "conquer the south", and sent an official Lin Yunqiong to visit Jin Wang and others (the king when Anxi was founded). The book said, "Ji Qiuxing took over the glory, learned from the noble teachings, and repaired spears and halberds, which is a long-cherished wish. ..... We have inherited great teachings, and would rather endure stagnation and collapse? When Ambassador Naizun came to our camp, the south wind was prosperous, which was beneficial to the northern expedition and unfavorable to the southern expedition. ..... That is, sending troops south, your department will take Wuyang, and the headwind is not true, so it is not convenient to send troops. ..... This year in Mengdong, the north wind blew, even if Fuming Hou Lincha, Min 'an Hou Zhourui and others were in power, they would sail east (? ) means that although it is not the flag of Shunchang, it is a helping hand. The navy attacked on three sides, and the land division tried its best to catch the gang, and won the Guangdong toast without fighting. " ①

Zheng Chenggong's withdrawal from the army this time is noteworthy. First of all, Zheng Chenggong personally commanded every major battle since he took office. This battle in Guangdong is of great significance to both Nan Ming and Qing army. Li Dingguo, king of Anxi, is the coach of the Western Front. In his letter, he repeatedly emphasized the strategic significance of joining hands with Guangdong, such as saying that "Guangdong is in harmony with Fujian, Zhejiang and Zhejiang, and it is spreading." Then, why didn't he unify the troops on the western front himself? The only explanation is that he is ready to pass the buck. Second, among many generals, Zheng Chenggong chose Lin Cha as the chief prefect of the Land and Water Division, which is far-sighted. It was this Lin Cha who established the Shaowu regime and fought a civil war when the Li Yong court was just established. At this time, it is indeed the "best candidate" for him to unite his own army to meet the main force of the Li Yong court in a certain sense. Third, Zheng Chenggong is the commander-in-chief of a long-term army. In his letter to his brother Shi Zhong, he also said that he was "old with the soldiers". Moreover, when Zheng Jun fought against the Qing army, he lost several divisions because the rescue was not timely. Of course, he understands the truth that "when winning or losing, you can't send it." Then, in early September, he received a letter from the state, saying that Zheng Jun would be sent to the designated position on 10/5. Fourthly, Zheng Chenggong knew about Li Dingguo's plan to attack from east to west and recover Guangdong and Guangxi in one fell swoop from last year. During this period, Guo Ding repeatedly sent envoys to urge him to lead the troops to meet them.

In the era of navigation, maritime navigation is greatly influenced by monsoon, which is undoubtedly a fact. However, for such a long time, Zheng Chenggong's failure to send troops must not be explained by "unhealthy tendencies." Otherwise, how can you travel with Li's emissary at sea? What's more, from June to August last year (1653), Zheng Chenggong sailed south to Chaoshan Jieyang; In the second year (1655), in August, Zheng Chenggong sent his crew south to Guangdong and occupied Jieyang, Puning and Chenghai counties in September, which proved that it was not impossible for Qiu Nan to March. To say the least, when Li Dingguo plans to attack Guangdong in the second year of Shunzhi 10 (1653), Zheng Chenggong, who has rich experience in maritime affairs, should also inform Li Dingguo of the best time for maritime operations, so that the country can determine the month and date when the East and West will meet. It is not difficult for a discerning person to see that Zheng Chenggong's attitude is ambiguous. Fifth, the most striking thing is that the aid division sent by Zheng Chenggong is extremely slow, with the appearance of making a fuss and no heart of actual combat.

According to the records of the Qing dynasty archives, on the first day of October, Zheng Chenggong issued a letter, dispatched troops and dispatched troops to deploy the southern expedition; On the fourth day, he went to Tongshan (now Dongshan County) to inspect the soldiers and boatmen. "Fu Mingcha was appointed as the positive prefect, and Hou (Zhou Rui) was appointed as the deputy prefect. He had jurisdiction over 100 ships and sent them to Guangdong to meet the western thief soldiers." 122, Xu Long, deputy commander of Guangdong Navy in Qing Dynasty, reported: "There are hundreds of ships assembled in the upper reaches, and Hou Zhourui of Min 'an and Hou Lincha of Fuming have the potential to lead troops south. Gai set out on 23rd and 24th, saying that he would go to Jieshi and Guangdong. 1 1 month 19, Lin Chabu camped in South Australia to discuss military affairs. Tongshan is only one hundred miles from South Australia. Zheng Chenggong said in his letter that "the north wind rises from the east of Mongolia", which coincides with the downwind and can be reached in one day. Zheng Chenggong marched into Tongshan on October 4, and stayed in South Australia for a month and a half to discuss military affairs. Another week passed, that is, 1 1 from 25th to 27th, and Lin Cha and others led more than 300 ships into xiazhai village, Haifeng County, Guangdong Province (overlooking Xiazhai on the south coast of Haifeng County, Linhai). On the fifth day of December, Lin Cha led more than 400 ships and more than 30,000 foot soldiers to Pinghai Institute (now Pinghai, Huidong County). In the same month 14, Lincha sent a white boat to Dapeng Institute (opposite the flat sea in Daya Bay) to collect the grain and rice in the village. Here, he met the team of Li Wanrong and Chen Qice, the righteous teachers along the coast of Guangdong. According to Qing reconnaissance, Li Wanrong once entertained Zheng Jun with pigs and wine. /kloc-on 0/5, Lincha and other departments took more than 300 boats outside the Buddhist temple (more than 200 miles south of Humen and 400 miles away from Guangzhou).

As mentioned earlier, the date of Li Dingguo's defeat in Xinhui was1February 14, which was the day when some ships sent by Lin Yong went to Dapeng to meet Li Wanrong and Chen Jice's righteous teacher. At that time, Li Wanrong and others only knew that the war in Xinhui was fierce, and it was impossible to know that Dingguo was defeated. Almost certainly, it was because of their strong persuasion that Lin Cha entered the Buddhist temple from Pinghai in one day. About a few days later, they must have heard from Yi Shi, Guangdong Province that the Dingguo army was defeated and quickly retreated to the west. They waited for a long time at sea (including sending someone to ask Zheng Chenggong for instructions) and returned to Xiamen in May of the 12th year of Shunzhi (1655).

The records left by the Ming and Qing dynasties show that although Zheng Chenggong sent troops, he had no intention of participating in the war. In the Qing Dynasty, senior officials in Fujian and Guangdong provinces paid close attention to Zheng Jun's movements, and reported the date and activities of Lin Cha and others going south to the court in detail, but said nothing about the war. In other words, Lin Cha and Zhou Rui were not hindered by the Qing army and could not reach the designated position in Dingguo as soon as possible. From1October 4th to1February14th, it took two months and ten days to reach Pinghai, and some warships were sent to Dapeng Village to collect grain. However, according to records, when Lin Pei and Zhou Rui sent troops, he shared grain with the Bo family for ten months, which shows that it was not caused by lack of food. The only explanation left is that when Zheng Chenggong was ordered to do this, he personally gave the opportunity: don't pretend to do it. This judgment can be seen not only from the above-mentioned delays in Zheng Jun, but also from the archives of the Qing Dynasty and the records of Founder. It seems that Zheng Chenggong organized a large-scale trip to the South China Sea, and Li Dingguo, who organized this campaign to change the situation of the Ming and Qing wars, took the means of pretending to surrender, with very serious consequences.

After returning to Xiamen, Lin Cha and Zhou Rui from Waiji, Taiwan Province Province reported that Li Dingguo was defeated and Wuzhou was lost, so they dared not attack and returned to Xiamen. Zheng Chenggong played politics, accusing Lin Cha, Zhou Rui and others of "diligent king's aid, but the king didn't hurry, so he went back and looked." Where is the code? " You are afraid to avoid, you should do your best. Immediately ordered Zhou Rui to "cut his post and seize the title, understand the handle of his soldiers and not use it"; Lincha and others were badly degraded. In his letter to Li Dingguo, he wrote: "I came all the way last year and made an agreement with my enemy and Paoze, which was very sincere. Everything depends on man-made, everything depends on man-made, everything depends on man-made, everything depends on man-made, everything depends on man-made, but our member Li Jingfu went to Taiwan to conduct the mission and read it four times more, knowing that His Highness was worried about your father and was suffering from hatred. I don't hate that I can't relax, sweep the Pearl River and welcome the earth with my hometown. I hope the boatman hasn't arrived yet. The master has been back to work for several days. Some officers and men of your department came from Guangdong to vote. Listen to the reasons in detail. If you are arrogant, you will be defeated. It is not enough to be deeply worried about the success or failure of a strategist. However, our ship is wandering, and we can neither join forces in advance nor get backup. What is truth and guilt? The amphibious general has examined his merits, and it is known that he does not violate the former. When the people are peaceful, they are tied up and dismissed, leading an idle life, but they are mindful of their merits, otherwise they would have been punished long ago. ……"①

Zheng Chenggong was very particular about his handling of southern generals and his reply to Li Dingguo's letter. 1654 whether the East-West confrontation can be realized and Guangdong and Guangxi can win is directly related to the future of Li Yong imperial court, which is a significant strategic action. As an outstanding politician and military commander, Zheng Chenggong will never fail to see this. In his letter, he said lightly that "it is not enough to worry about the victory or defeat of a strategist" and equated the failure of key strategic intentions with the victory or defeat of a general campaign, which can be said to be red tape. The letter first criticized Li Dingguo's arrogance and frustration, and then talked about his shipmaster's "teasing" and "disobedience", aiming at blaming the other side for the failure of the campaign. We can't say that Li Dingguo didn't make the mistake of being arrogant and underestimating the enemy, but the failure of the Xinhui campaign can never be described as "arrogant and frustrated" on the issue of determining the country.

In personnel handling, Zheng Chenggong's strict management of the army is very famous in history, but only the generals who failed to stay in this fateful battle of Nanming were moderately punished. Lin Bu is the commander-in-chief of the Southern Expedition, but he puts the blame of "disobedience" on the head of Min 'an's deputy viceroy Hou, because Lin Bu is the direct general of Zheng's clique, while Zhou Ruiyuan is the general of Lu Jianguo, and the distinction between personal relationship and personal relationship is obvious. By the way, Zheng Chenggong's domineering self-determination is also fully demonstrated in his letter. According to the system of Ming and Qing dynasties, the greatest power granted by the emperor when recruiting generals was limited to the following lieutenant generals who violated temperance and could be beheaded without permission. Zhou Rui ranks among the Marquis, and the letter of success reads "read merits, or there will be Buddhism", which is completely the tone of the head of a country. In short, there is no doubt that Zheng Chenggong acted according to his own wishes when he returned to China.

To sum up, the Guangdong War planned by Li Dingguo in 1653- 1654 was the last chance for the revival of Nanming. The focus of the national plan is to contact Zheng Chenggong and cooperate with righteous teachers from all over Guangdong to destroy the Qing army in Guangdong first and then develop their grand plans. Among the three anti-Qing forces, Li Dingguo Army and Guangdong Yi Shi went all out, but Zheng Chenggong was absent, and finally fell short. Yi Shi, Guangdong Province, is quite praised for its enthusiasm for realizing the strategic intention of saving the nation. After the defeat of the New Club in Dingguo, the Governor Company of Guangdong and Guangxi, which was in charge of contacting Yi Shi, Guangdong Province, was still shouting for the confluence strategy of this matter. On June 1655, he wrote to the imperial court: "May the western division commander advance, the sails of Fujian will be lifted again, and the minister and assistant minister Guo will drum again, taking advantage of the enemy's fatigue and using my strength, eastern Guangdong will not be flat." (1) In July of the following year (1656, 13th year of Shunzhi, 10th year), Lian Zaishu said that the teachers in Guangdong and China he contacted "had a firm foothold at the seaside, ... waiting for Julian Waghann to come back, meeting with Fujian teachers and receiving this contribution". Because Li Dingguo lost a lot of equipment in Xinhui Campaign, he was anxious to welcome Emperor Li Yong to Yunnan safely, so he couldn't attend to the battlefield in eastern Guangdong. It's a great pity that the great opportunity was wasted.

Taiwan Province Province, Jin Dong

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Kangxi 166 1 year ascended the throne. Prior to this, the Zheng family handed over Huang's five strategies to eliminate thieves, including moving from Shandong to Guangdong for 20 years and cutting off economic support. Destroy coastal ships, and the inch board is not allowed to enter the water; At the same time, Zheng Zhilong, the father of success, was killed at the migration site of Ningguta (one said that he was killed at the entrance of Jingcheng, the west entrance of Fu Xue Hutong in the Yuan Dynasty execution ground); Dig Zheng's ancestral grave; Resettlement of surrendered officers and soldiers, reclamation of wasteland. Due to the new strategy of the Qing government, Zheng Chenggong and his army cut off their economic sources and faced a serious financial crisis. They had to abandon the military strategy of harassing the southeast coast based on offshore islands, and instead attacked Taiwan Province Province, which had been colonized by Portuguese, Spanish, British and Dutch who had traveled across the ocean to Asia for a long time since the era of great navigation. As a new base, on March 23rd this year, Zheng Chenggong personally led 25,000 soldiers and hundreds of warships. First, the superior forces captured Chiqian City (now Tainan City), where the Dutch army was weak in defense, and then besieged the well-defended capital, Taiwan Province provincial capital (now Anping District, Tainan City). After nine months of bitter struggle, he defeated the Dutch in 1662 with the support of Han immigrants who were assisted by his father to cross the sea in his early years, and forced the colonial governor Bayi to sign the surrender, which was on 1 February 13 in the same year (1February 6621day). So they sacrificed mountains and rivers, issued a settlement order, opened the kingdom of Dongning, established the Zheng family, owned part of the land in the south and east of Taiwan Province Province, set up Chengtianfu, and changed Tainan into the "East Capital" to show the intention of the Ming emperor Li Yong to come to the east and win the loyalty of the minister of Ming adherents. Find another way to work overseas, and fight against the Qing Dynasty overseas. In April of the same year, news came that Wang Gui Zhu Youlang died in Myanmar. Although there are other Ming Dynasty royal families in Taiwan Province, Success has decided not to establish a new emperor, but to be the master of Taiwan Province Province. Zheng Chenggong established the first Han regime in Taiwan Province. However, due to the poor sanitary conditions in tropical areas at that time, Zheng Chenggong contracted an epidemic and finally fell ill. He died in May of the same year at the age of 39. Originally buried in Taiziwei, Tainan Island, 1699 moved to Nan 'an ancestral tomb. Legend has it that Zheng Jing killed him. Emperor Kangxi wrote an elegy: "Four towns and two hearts, two islands stationed, dare to fight for half of the southeast;" The king has no one inch of land and resists his ambitions, only to know that there are lonely loyalties overseas. "

1662, he defeated the Dutch colonists who occupied Taiwan Province Province for 38 years, recovered our sacred territory, and wrote the poem "Reunification of Taiwan Province": "Ten years to recover the foundation; There are still 3,000 guests in Tianheng, and it is difficult to leave. "

Zheng Chenggong's son, Zheng Jing, continued to manage Taiwan Province Province, changing its east to Dongning. According to Chen Yonghua's proposal, transplanting the central official system of the Ming Dynasty still served the dead Ming Emperor Li Yong at home, but it was not unified with Shunzhi and Kangxi dynasties in China inland, and it called itself "the country of Dongning" abroad. This was the beginning of the founding of the People's Republic of China and achieved remarkable management results. Later, Shi Lang's disciple Zheng Chenggong attacked the Netherlands and conquered Penghu Island, so his grandson Zheng Keshuang fell to the Qing Dynasty on 1683. In order to avoid the resistance of Taiwan Province people, Zheng was dug out of all graves in Taiwan Province by the Qing Dynasty and buried in China. 1684 In April, Taiwan Province Province (then Taiwan's government) was formally incorporated into the territory of the Qing Empire, belonging to Fujian Province, consisting of Taiwan County, Fengshan County and Zhuluo County. Generally speaking, Zheng regime only existed in Taiwan Province Province for more than twenty years. However, due to its special background, it has not only attracted the attention of historians in Taiwan Province Province, but also attracted the attention of historians in China and Japan, and put forward various interesting views.