/kloc-the influence of China's capitalist development on the country in the late 20th century.

In the feudal society of China, the feudal lords' separatist regime was abolished earlier, serfdom was transformed into tenancy earlier, and land was freely bought and sold earlier, so the productivity developed rapidly. 1 1 century to13rd century, China's agricultural production, basic handicraft production and many scientific and technological departments were at the advanced level in the world, and its business was prosperous, so it was called a developed feudal society. Because it is a developed feudal society, the feudal economic structure is very solid, self-sufficient and complete, and the contradiction between urban and rural areas is not sharp. It has long been a centralized country with relatively strict superstructure. Therefore, the capitalist relations of production germinated late and developed slowly. A survey of the germination of capitalism in China shows that the germination of capitalism in China took place in the 16th and 17th centuries, that is, Jiajing and Wanli in the Ming Dynasty. Before this, there were some cases of wage labor engaged in commodity production, but it can only be regarded as an accidental and pre-existing phenomenon. The germination of capitalism refers to a new production relationship, not something, which cannot be proved by examples. This new production relationship can only appear at the end of feudal society when the production, circulation and social and economic systems develop to certain conditions. It is a social production relationship, not a relationship between individuals, so its appearance must be diversified, indicating the arrival of an era. According to this standard, in the 16 and 17 centuries, only some silk weaving workshops in Suzhou and Hangzhou and some iron smelting furnaces in Foshan, Guangdong Province have the nature of workshops and handicrafts, which can be positively proved. In other handicrafts, there are some signs of budding capitalism, but the lack of direct historical evidence, or the scope is too small (such as summer socks in Songjiang), can be ignored. By the18th century and the beginning of19th century, that is, during the years of Ganjiang and Jiaqing of the Qing Dynasty, the seeds of capitalism in China had developed. There are some handicrafts that can be directly proved: in some places, tea, tobacco, oil and wine are made; Sugar, paper and block printing in some places; Silk industry in some cities in Jiangsu and Zhejiang; Cotton textile printing and dyeing industry in some cities in Jiangsu: timber harvesting industry in southern Shaanxi; Iron smelting and casting industry in Foshan, Guangdong and southwestern Shaanxi; Porcelain industry in Jingdezhen, Jiangxi; Coal mining in western Beijing and Boshan, Shandong; Sichuan well salt industry and Hedong pond salt industry; Shanghai junk shipping industry. During this period, businessmen's leading production became an important form of capitalist germination. However, in the silk industry, there are few other forms of merchant employers except accounting offices. Here, we exclude businessmen who control production by purchasing in advance, borrowing money and generally exchanging raw materials for finished products, that is, the first three of the five forms of package buyers mentioned by Lenin in the Development of Russian Capitalism. Because this kind of merchant activity based on buying, selling, lending and exchanging does not constitute capitalist relations of production. For example, exchanging cotton for cloth means "timely valuation" (Nanxun Town Records, volume 24, recorded around 1809), that is, it is valued at the market price, but the procedure of weighing silver and changing money in the canal is omitted. Different from wool textile in western Europe, it is worth noting that the cotton textile industry, the most important handicraft industry in China, has not sprouted capitalism. This is probably related to productivity. Capitalist family labor forms such as "releasing yarn and collecting cloth" and "releasing machine and collecting cloth" in China cotton spinning handicraft industry only became popular after the appearance of machine-made yarn in the early 20th century. In the embryonic period of Chinese capitalism, the main form of businessmen dominating production is not the merchant employer system, but the merchant employer system, that is, the merchant employee production. This is the most common in the agricultural product processing industry. The difference between it and the workshop handicraft industry is that in the merchant employer system, the merchant's investment has not been transformed into industrial capital. However, in the whole germination of capitalism, the handicraft industry still plays an important role, such as mining, iron smelting, porcelain making, bran making, paper making, etc., but it has developed relatively completely in Sichuan well salt industry. The capital of handicraft industry in these workshops also comes mainly from businessmen and partly from landlords. Workshop manual owners differentiated from small producers were still the main body in the late Ming Dynasty and gave way to businessmen in the Qing Dynasty. Here, we exclude the small business economy in which owners participate in labor and employ a small number of workers or apprentices. This small business owner economy has always been very popular in China. It used to be regarded as capitalism, and the so-called "upper petty bourgeoisie" was unscientific. In agriculture, in the late Ming dynasty, there were some signs of landlords and employees operating, but in the early Qing dynasty, this phenomenon was rare. There were a large number of exiles in China in the past dynasties, so freelancers appeared very early. With the increase of agricultural employees in Qing dynasty, the paternalistic personal bondage of "employees" was gradually lifted. However, capitalist relations of production cannot directly come from freelancers. Capitalism requires workers to be employed by capital, not landlords. Although they sell some products, they are still what Marx called "disguised" labor purchase, and their essence is still the production of use value, because they sell products to meet higher life enjoyment. The rich peasants' economy developed quite well in the Qing Dynasty, and many families helped farmers get rich. Most of them make the transition to renting land when they become rich. In the management stage of rich peasants, most of them are small owners or what we call "old-style rich peasants" in modern times. This old-fashioned rich peasant production relationship is basically feudal, not capitalist. Apart from renting land and hiring employees, they rarely invest in agriculture, and their wealth is basically not converted into capital. But this does not mean that there is no budding capitalism in agriculture; In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, there were the following direct proofs. Merchants in Fujian tea-producing areas rent mountains or buy gardens to grow tea; The squatters in Shanghang mountain area of Fujian hired people to open mountains for farming; Orchards run by some landlords in Guangdong and Fujian; Wealthy shed people in mountainous areas of southern Anhui rent mountains for farming; Private pharmaceutical factories and fungus, mushroom and mushroom factories in Fuyu shed of Sichuan and Shaanxi; Wealthy tenant farmers in northeast reclamation area recruit for reclamation. If there is no direct historical evidence to prove the germination of capitalism in agriculture, it cannot be concluded that it does not exist. But it can always be said that the seeds of capitalism in agriculture are extremely fragile, so that after the Opium War until the beginning of the 20th century, when we evaluated the level of capitalist development in China, agriculture was often ignored. Before the Opium War, the capitalist sprout of handicraft industry only existed sparsely; To what extent, it is still difficult to estimate quantitatively. It should also be mentioned that in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the development of handicraft industry in China was mainly not in urban handicraft industry, but in peasant household handicraft industry, especially cotton textile handicraft industry. This affected the growth of capitalist seeds, but strengthened the firmness of feudal economic structure. The Historical Role of the Germination of Capitalism This is by no means to say that the emergence of the germination of capitalism has no effect on China's later economic development, or that it can be ignored in the study of China's modern economic history. At the beginning of this century, there was a theory that China's capitalism was produced under the influence of foreign capitalism after the Opium War, that is, the so-called foreign theory or transplantation theory. At first, it was because before Das Kapital was introduced to China, people didn't understand the meaning of capitalist relations of production, but thought that capitalism was factories with towering chimneys and rumbling steam engines. According to this understanding, the bourgeois revolution in the west, as some bourgeois scholars have said, is rooted in the Renaissance or other spiritual reasons. Later, people learned about the history of the three stages of capitalist development, but they did not find that China had a workshop handicraft period as long as two or three hundred years as Western Europe. Therefore, foreign scholars' theories contributed to the erroneous conclusion of denying China's bourgeois-democratic revolution and became the argument of China's Trotsky theory. History transplanted capitalism. This is the case with "Capital", Volume I, Chapter 25, "Modern Colonial Theory". At that time, European colonists had to transport funds, machines and means of subsistence to Australia or the United States together with workers before they could set up factories. When I got there, the biggest worry was that I couldn't find employees, and even the workers quickly left the factory and became independent farmers with their own land. This goes on to say that it is a real colony and a virgin land opened by free immigrants. However, China is not a virgin land to "resist capital inflow". She has sprouted capitalism. When the Western invaders came to China, they met ready-made workers, including highly skilled workers. In fact, the first foreign-funded factory, Guangzhou 1845, was built by purchasing the mud dock of the former China Handmade Shipyard. The same is true of the foreign-funded shipyard later established in Shanghai. They also use skilled workers from China to implement the contract system. In 86 1 year, Zeng Guofan founded Anqing Inner Ordnance Institute, the first westernization military industry, which was also established on the basis of workshop handicraft industry. Shanghai Changfa Machine Factory, the first modern industry of national capital, was originally a handicraft workshop. 1869 adopted lathes and became a machine industry. No matter foreigners, westerners or businessmen, they have no difficulty in recruiting female workers when they start to run silk mills or cotton mills. Because women left home and entered the factory, it paved the way for the germination of capitalism, which was solved at a court meeting in the early years of Guangxu. Before World War II, a theory of long-term stagnation of feudal society in China was popular abroad. Some of this theory is based on the prejudice of western bourgeoisie, and some is based on the misunderstanding of "Asian mode of production". Therefore, the emergence of capitalism in China and the modernization of China are concentrated on the invasion of foreign capitalism. After World War II, this stagnation theory went bankrupt. However, in the 1960s and 1970s, various "underdeveloped economics" about modern China appeared in foreign countries, especially in the United States. Some of these theories, such as "traditional equilibrium stage" theory and "advanced equilibrium trap" theory, are almost copies of stopband theory. They also hope that foreign capitalism can "take off" or upset the balance of China's economy. All these theories have neglected or fundamentally denied the existence of capitalist bud in China feudal economy. Therefore, its exposition is not historical, but based on logical reasoning or simple "human-land" econometrics, and rarely involves the evolution of production relations. Recently, there is a theory abroad that the so-called seeds of capitalism appear several times in different places, which is not directly related to the establishment of capitalist production mode. In China, some people think that the germination of capitalism since the Ming and Qing Dynasties was interrupted later; There is no inheritance relationship between the establishment and germination of modern industry. This interruption theory has no clear basis. The germination of capitalism is a new production relationship in feudal society, which has the vitality of new things; Since it came into being, unless there is irresistible force, it will not die out, but will lead to a new mode of production. When we look at the bud of capitalism, we should look at its continuity and direction. If there were no latecomers, such as iron smelting in the Song Dynasty, it would not be the starting point of a new production relationship. In western Europe, capitalism sprouted in some cities along the Mediterranean coast and some cities in the Nordic lowland countries, and then declined. This is because the trade routes between East and West have changed, or because the Dutch fleet was defeated and replaced by Britain. For the industry and commerce in these cities, this is an irresistible force, because the seeds of capitalism in these cities initially developed by relying on overseas trade. China's iron smelting industry, such as Foshan, later declined because the iron ore in Guangdong dried up. The copper mining industry in Yunnan has not recovered so far. Another example is the timber mining and transportation industry in southern Shaanxi, where the old forest was cut down because it was only cut down and not planted, and together with the local pharmaceutical factory and paper mill, it declined due to ecological damage. These are irresistible forces. After the Opium War, some traditional handicrafts were destroyed by imperialist commodity aggression. But this kind of destruction is often exaggerated. In fact, this kind of destruction is mainly in the peasant family handicraft industry without the germination of capitalism, not in the independent handicraft industry. According to Comrade Ru Ren's investigation, among the 32 traditional handicrafts, 7 declined after the Opium War, and 10 continued to be maintained, and 15 made great progress, making a transition to the machine industry. In addition, there are ten emerging handicrafts. That is to say, in the development of capitalism in China, the process from simple cooperation to workshop handicraft industry and then to large machine industry also exists, but there is no workshop handicraft industry period. In the early Qing Dynasty, among the dozens of handicrafts sprouting from contraceptive capitalism, only kicking and cutting tobacco and block printing were destroyed after the Opium War, and the rest (except the above-mentioned Foshan iron smelting, etc.). ) has been maintained, and nine of them have transitioned to the machinery industry, representing the mainstream of capitalist germination.