About the Battle of Bekaa Valley

1in June, 1982, in order to completely eradicate cross-border terrorist activities, Israel sent ground troops into Lebanon, codenamed "Peace in Galilee". The development of the incident, as estimated by Israel in advance, spread from Lebanon to the surrounding areas and turned into a multilateral conflict.

In the initial stage of this operation, the Israeli Air Force created a feat of destroying the opponent 19 surface-to-air missile company and shooting down a large number of enemy planes without injuring a single soldier. IAF (Israel Air Force) takes advantage of its opponents' weaknesses by obtaining real-time information, giving modern air defense systems a scare.

This month (June 2002) marks the 20th anniversary of the victory of the IAF in the Bekaa Valley. As a turning point in the death duel between air force and air defense force, IAF has gone down in history. Israel has a small-scale and high-quality air force, and launched an epic raid in the "Six-Day War" in June 1967, with a total of 3,300 sorties. IAF swept the air forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, wiped out 400 enemy planes on the ground and in the air, and became famous in World War I. Since then, the armies of these three Arab countries have been driven back from Sinai, the Golan Heights and the West Bank of the Jordan River.

Although IAF maintained its advantage in the war of attrition from March 1969 to mid 1970, the Egyptians still caused a lot of trouble to IAF in Sinai after they were equipped with a large number of advanced weapons such as Soviet-made aircraft and missiles. The first thing the Israelis have to face is the advanced Soviet SAM (surface-to-air missile) system. Although during this period, the Indian Air Force destroyed some Egyptian Sam missiles sporadically, but the losses were heavy. Tony Mei Sen, former deputy commander of the Royal Air Force (Major General of the Royal Air Force), commented that the exchange rate of IAF for enemy planes was about 1 40, while that for Sam was 2: 4! "。 Obviously, Sam has replaced fighter planes as the protagonist of air defense in Arab countries.

The Soviet-made "Sam -6" mobile short-range ground-to-air missile system that brought great trouble to the Israeli Air Force.

The October War.

As early as 1973 in the "October War", things had begun to take shape. 1973 10.06, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack, and IAF faced increasingly severe ground fire-"denser than anywhere in North Vietnam" (Air Force University report 1978).

Although Egypt has only 20 sets of mobile Sam systems, supplemented by 70 sets of SA-2 and 65 sets of SA-3, there are only 2,500 anti-aircraft guns and more than 3,000 sets of SA-7 shoulder-launched missiles, including 34 Sam companies from Syria. IAF pilots not only have to compete for air superiority, but also provide close ground support for ground troops trapped on the east bank of Suez Canal. During this period, the second leader of IAF was David Ivry (1967, who joined the war as a pilot and recently served as the Israeli ambassador to the United States). He recalled, "You don't have any time to destroy the other side's air defense forces, and you have to support the ground at any time with very intensive air defense firepower, so we lost a lot of pilots."

Three days before the war, IAF lost 50 planes in 1 220 sorties, and the loss rate of nearly 4% was unbearable, almost comparable to the loss of the US strategic air force when it first attacked Germany. Although the losses gradually decreased with the improvement of the war situation, 53 A-4 Skyhawks (A-4 Skyhawks, IAF had 170 during the war) and 33 F-4 Ghosts (F4 Phantom, 177) were killed by the opponent's SA-6.

The aircraft was damaged to varying degrees, but the other air defense forces gradually entered the state, effectively preventing the Israeli Air Force from carrying out emergency close air support, while the Egyptian air defense forces successfully interfered with the Israeli Air Force's counterattack in supporting the Israeli ground forces. The desperate struggle of Israeli pilots finally ushered in the dawn, and the war situation on the east bank of the canal gradually developed in favor of Israel. 101October 14, Egypt invested in the reserve team in Sinai to promote the anti-aircraft fire circle. However, in one day, Egypt lost 28 fighter planes, and the Israeli air force and ground forces joined forces to stop the Egyptian offensive. An Egyptian commander later said, "Once my troops rushed out of Sam's air defense umbrella, IAF would immediately cause us unbearable losses."

The war lasted for several days until the two sides reached a ceasefire agreement, and the Israeli army had crossed the canal and defeated its opponents on many fronts. The lessons of the war clearly tell the Israelis that the Israeli Air Force must change their tactics. Even in the final stage of the war, IAF was still trying to deal with SAM, and as a result, five F-4 ghosts were lost in one attack.

F-4 "Ghost" made great sacrifices to explore the tactics of suppressing Sam missiles.

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A devastating loss.

For Ivey, the loss of the International Astronautical Federation is devastating. "In the last stage of the war," he said, "we planned to rally and fight a beautiful battle", but after learning that "the F-4 ghost of IAF can't effectively deal with Sam", the military leaders' feelings can be imagined. SAM successfully prevented IAF from attacking intruders, and even protected surface-to-surface missiles like SS-2 1, which can attack targets in Israel. Ivy believes that the position of air power in the future war has been questioned, and the record of 1973 has cast a shadow on IAF-not to mention the air forces of other western countries. Can fighters still fight against integrated air defense systems in future wars? Ezer Weizman, a former IAF commander, even said pessimistically that "the wing of the fighter plane has been broken by SAM".

It is clear that whether IAF can fight effectively in the future depends on whether it can find ways to quickly and systematically eliminate the other side's fixed or mobile air defense firepower. For Ivey, the lesson of 1973 is clear: "We must give Sam an answer!" "

Peace between Egypt and Israel has been maintained for several years, but the issue of Sam is still a pain in IAF's heart. 198 1 year, Israel shot down two Syrian helicopters, which were attacking pro-Israel Christian militia groups in southern Lebanon. In response, Syrian Sam forces began to enter the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. At this time, Ivey has become the commander of the Indian Air Force, and he has carefully studied Syria's actions with great interest. "In our view, Syria has crossed a red line by sending Sam's troops into the Bekaa Valley," Ivey said. It threatens Israel's air superiority in the border areas of Lebanon, hinders the reconnaissance of the Israeli Air Force and provides air cover for ground troops.

The Camp David Agreement of 1978 and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement of 1979 have laid the foundation for all this. According to the treaty, troops will withdraw from Sinai Peninsula on 1982. "The actual situation is very subtle," Ivey said. Sam in Bekaa Valley is undoubtedly a great temptation, but IAF is facing a more severe challenge, that is, the atomic energy reactor in Ausilla, Iraq! On June 7th, 198 1, 14 Israeli fighter planes destroyed the reactor on the outskirts of Baghdad in a dazzling and perfect raid. Now it's Syria's turn. A year later, Palestinian guerrilla activities became more and more rampant, attacking Israeli immigrants across the border, shooting at Jewish settlements in Galilee and even launching rockets. Solving Sam in the Bekaa Valley became the primary task of IAF.

Israeli Defense Minister Sharon, with the support of Prime Minister Ariel Bei Jing, plans to send ground troops into Lebanon to destroy the PLO (Palestine Liberation Front), while deterring the Syrian army and covering the pro-Israel Christian militia to expel the PLO troops. The battle in the first week became the most striking battle in the 1980s, and it will carry the history of the Air Force forever.

Hunting begins.

On June 6, under the cover of Israeli air force fighters, attack planes and helicopters, Israeli ground forces began to enter southern Lebanon and swept the PLO stronghold. At first, the Israeli army advanced quickly, like a bamboo all the way. Later, it was blocked by Jiejin and needed air support urgently. In this way, Israeli warplanes will enter Sam's range in the Bekaa Valley.

Ivey and his headquarters in Tel Aviv are closely watching Syria's reaction. The basic principle of this war is to "do everything possible to avoid direct war with Syria", with special emphasis on Ivy. Sam is located at the junction of Bekaa Valley and Syria, and the Syrian army, PLO guerrillas, Israeli helicopters and rescue forces have all squeezed into this area. "Sometimes there were more than 100 fighters in the sky in this area," Ivey recalled. "It was almost saturated." For an area of only 65,438+0,500 square miles, communication and command are obviously extremely important, so Ivey takes command personally.

Originally planned to attack the Sam position of 14. However, Ivey got the news on Tuesday, June 8th, when the Israeli Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (RPV) reported that another five SA6 troops were moving from Glen Heights to Bekaa Valley. Ivey said: "Now they have deployed intensive anti-aircraft fire in the Golan Heights to prevent Israel from infiltrating into Damascus." . "We found them this morning, and the intention of this action is very obvious." This relocation shows that Syria has no intention to launch a full-scale war, otherwise Syria will deploy missiles in the direction of Damascus. All these help Ivey to make up his mind to destroy the Syrian Sam in Lebanon without all-out war with Syria.

On the morning of Wednesday, June 9, Ivey revised the action plan and included five newly arrived SAM companies as targets. He plans to start the operation at noon, but he must wait for cabinet approval. Just after 10 in the morning, the cabinet gave the green light, and Ivey had to postpone the operation until 2 pm. "Before the attack, we found that there were a large number of Syrian troops in the border area, but the Syrian air force did not dispatch. They tried to avoid air combat, "Ivey commented. "They have died in our hands enough.

The cooperation between the E-2 early warning aircraft (the picture shows the U.S. E-2) and the UAV gives the Israeli Air Force an information advantage.

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"Free shooting zone"

When the Israeli air force arrived at their nest at 2 pm, the Syrians ordered all the empty planes to return to the battlefield and land. When the last Syrian plane landed and skidded off the runway, the Syrian commander made sure that they were free to fire and destroy everything flying in the air.

"Syrians are full of confidence in their air defense forces. Why should air force fighters take risks again?"

Ivey directed his attack fleet to Sam's lair, which consisted of SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6. "This is a real challenge," Ivey said. The key of the plan is to collect information and data about SAM in advance and the characteristics of Syria's action in order to take advantage of its technical defects. Intelligence gathering plays a very important role. Before the war, Israeli drones had detected Sam's radar and communication frequency. Samson M. Hersh, published by 199 1, said that in May of 1982, Israel obtained a lot of data about samson frequency and radar coverage through a series of covert operations, which later played a key role in this war.

Attacking Sam's position in broad daylight requires a high level of communication, command and intelligence. How to make the attack fast and deadly-launching missiles outside the defense zone will provide a pre-emptive strike for Israeli pilots. After repeated consideration of the whole plan, Israeli pilots have been practicing attacking simulated Sam positions repeatedly in the Negev desert for several months. IAF will use barrage jamming to cut off the communication between air defense forces and fighter planes and command posts. "You must know when to interfere and when not to," Ivey said. "When you want to cover the fighter to perform a task, you must release the interference; On the contrary, when you want to collect information, you can't interfere, you must listen carefully. " At the same time, IAF fighters also carry jamming silos to deceive SAM radar.

In order to successfully carry out the attack, Ivey needs to be able to directly understand the battlefield situation. E-2C Hawkeye Early Warning Aircraft transmits radar images to IAF communication headquarters in Tel Aviv through downlink data link, and then directly sends them to Ivey. UAV provides real-time image relay. Israel has a squadron of drones, which Ivey thinks is far from enough, especially at night, but it is enough to ensure that two are in the air at any time and update the position of the Syrian Sam position in real time. "We always follow them because they are mobile," Ivy added. "We followed them, and they are all 19 companies. That morning, we knew exactly where they were. Yes, there is no doubt that none of them have escaped. "

At the same time, the Indian Air Force established a two-way voice channel between Ivy and the pilot. This real-time communication, command and intelligence mode is still a brand-new attempt for modern warfare. It transmits what Ivy called "real-time intelligence" from the ground command to the pilots.

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F-4 ghost will play a major role in the ground attack, and F- 15 and F- 16 will seize the air superiority to cover the attack fleet. UAV first enters to induce SAM radar to turn on, and then F-4 launches high-speed anti-radiation missiles to destroy these radars. Because the target position has been calibrated in advance, the attack is carried out very quickly, which reduces the exposure time of the aircraft to the other side's air defense fire, and the high speed of the air-to-ground missile ensures that the attack aircraft can leave quickly and safely. Soon these SAM units will "evaporate one by one".

Two hours later, IAF wiped out 19 Sam company, and there was no loss. At that time, the Indian Air Force had laser-guided bombs, "but we didn't use them in this operation," Ivey explained. "They are too slow, but after you have eliminated the anti-aircraft fire, you can go back and aim slowly with laser-guided bombs and completely destroy the rest."

82-0 (score: 82-0)

After the attack began, the Syrian air force suddenly found itself completely out of position, so it took off the first batch of fighters 20 minutes later, trying to intercept the Israeli attack fleet and prevent them from continuing to attack. So helicopters, drones, fighter planes, early warning aircraft and electronic warfare finally evolved into a group fight of air power.

"You seemed to be conducting a concert," Ivy recalled. "It's not just the attack plane that attacks Sam, but the fighter plane intercepts MIG. Once they are in the same area, you must conduct a concert. Of course, you can't play the piano and drum at the same time, but air combat and ground attack are completely different concerts. "

In the command center, Ivey can arrange the threat order of the other side through the radar image of E-2C and the radar image of F- 15. IAF pilots use VHF band radios, hoping to maintain voice and data communication with the command center.

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Ivey's tactic is to command a four-plane formation to enter the attack zone once, one at a time, and each air battle lasts 1 to 2 minutes. Ivy won't send more than four planes into the attack zone. "It doesn't matter whether we can kill all MIG planes," Ivey explained. "At least you can guarantee that you won't hit your own people by mistake." For Syrians, this is a desperate massacre, both tactically and psychologically. Carefully arranged no-load jamming completely cut off the contact between Syrian MIG -2 1 and MIG -23 and the ground. Ivey described how the confidence of Syrian pilots gradually collapsed. When they took off, they knew nothing about the target and the interception route. They tried to do something, but it didn't produce any effect. "We slowly caught them one by one." Ivy recalled that each attack could destroy two or three four-plane formations in Syria. "The more they come, the weaker their confidence. Psychologically, you keep failing and failing. Once you start losing, you always think, it's my turn next time. Am I destined to be planted here? " Israeli pilots kept their advantage to the end. "What I can tell you is that in the first half hour, we shot down 26 MiG fighters." Two hours later, Ivy recalled the attack fleet. Until the ceasefire came into effect at noon on Friday, IAF shot down 82 enemy planes without losing a single soldier.

The Syrian Air Force is equipped with the Soviet MIG -23 variable swept wing fighter (the picture shows the Soviet fighter).

The Israeli Air Force has the best heavy air defense fighter F- 15A in the world.

After destroying Sam in the Bekaa Valley, IAF can finally support the ground troops' attack with great fanfare. Subsequently, Israeli attack helicopters used towed missiles to attack Syrian tanks, while fighter planes used laser-guided bombs to counter tanks. "We destroyed many tanks," Ivy added. "We stopped an armored force from the north at night." When the armored forces of the two armies clashed head-on, IAF F-4 and A-4 used MK82 and MK83 with laser guidance devices to attack Syrian tanks at night.

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Real-time aiming

Two weeks later, Ivey finally got another chance to verify the real-time instruction system, this time for some small Sam troops. After suffering setbacks, Syria sent some Sam troops to Lebanon. An F-4 was lost in Sam's ambush. The attack came from Syria, not Lebanon. Ivy immediately ordered a counterattack and destroyed three of the four Sam companies. The key to victory is that IAF keeps tracking these SAM units. "In a sense, it's like a hunt," Ivy declared. "Our drones have been tracking these surface-to-air missiles continuously. These Sam troops sometimes hide in villages, and we will continue to track them until they leave cities and densely populated places and destroy them. "

The image sent back by the drone will be drawn on the map with good coordinates, and then the pilot who is very familiar with the terrain here will be informed. After constant running-in, this system can finally enable Ivey to transmit information to every specific pilot in time. "This is the so-called real-time calibration communication," Ivey explained. "I can talk to every pilot by voice. Sometimes I even know their names, especially his son.

Changes in war (changes in war)

Compared with the tragic air battle of 1973, the 46-hour Israeli battle of Bekaa Valley is a milestone in large-scale joint air operations, which proves that even the cunning mobile Sam system can not escape the precise coordinated air strikes. "Sam's fiasco has greatly impacted the strategic situation", and this one-sided victory has brought synthetic air power back to the center of the modern war stage. The battle of Bekaa Valley emphasized the importance of electronic warfare and careful planning and coordination. Ivey was able to spot the sudden appearance of Sam's troops and immediately give an alarm to the attacking fleet, which fully shows that for air combat, skilled real-time operation is as effective as careful planning in advance.

For the Israelis, the victory in the Bekaa Valley gave Syria a great deterrent, while for the Indian Air Force, this victory helped it regain its position in the army. This campaign has changed the strategic pattern of the Middle East to a certain extent, and continuing to be an enemy of the Israelis in the air is tantamount to death. Ivy quoted the Syrian Defense Minister's summary of the battle in the Bekaa Valley. "In view of the absolute superiority of the Israelis in air power and electronic warfare, the next war will be a pure' ground-to-ground' war, and there will be no more' ground-to-air' scenes." So Syria and Iraq began to purchase Scud missiles. For senior Soviet generals in Moscow, the battle of Bekaa Valley was undoubtedly a blow-top Soviet weapons were smashed to pieces. 199 1 year, when Ivey visited Czechoslovakia, the Czech defense minister happened to be in Moscow in 1982. He told Ivey that the battle of Bekaa Valley made Soviet generals understand the technological superiority of the West, and people's confidence in the Iron Curtain of Warsaw Pact collapsed with those Sam.

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At the same time, the battle of Bekaa Valley technically became the foresight and model of 199 1 Gulf War. From this, the US Air Force learned how to find the flaw of the other side's integrated air defense system, how to conduct real-time command in the ever-changing battlefield, and how to use laser-guided bombs to deal with tanks. The offensive spirit and superb technology of the Israeli Air Force make air power once again a legend of kings.

About Journal of American Air Force Association: Rebecca Grant is the president of IRIS Independent Research Institute in Washington, D.C., and worked under Rand-Air Force Secretary and Air Force Chief of Staff. Grant is also a member of the Eaker Institute for Aerospace Policy, which helps the Air Force Association to formulate publishing policies and conduct research. Her latest book was published in April 2002, The Unexpected War.