Who can help explain the cause and effect of Anbaili Uprising during Qianlong Jiaqing period?

The An Baili Rebellion is also called "the rebellion of Sichuan, Chu and an hundred Li". From the first year of Jiaqing in Qing Dynasty (1796) to the ninth year (1804), farmers in Hubei, Sichuan and Shaanxi provinces resisted feudal oppression in the form of Anbailism.

In more than nine years of fighting, An Baili Rebels occupied or breached 204 counties, fought against a large number of troops recruited by the Qing government from 16 provinces, wiped out a large number of Qing troops, killed more than 400 squadron leaders and more than 20 first-and second-class officials such as prefects, and the military expenditure of the Qing government reached 220 million yuan, equivalent to four years' fiscal revenue. The uprising weakened the Qing dynasty, and its rule gradually declined.

In the late Qianlong period, Anbaili religion developed rapidly in Chu, Sichuan and Shaanxi provinces, and the Qing court ordered the arrest of the backbone of this religion, demanding that "all religions should be captured, and no one should escape". In the fifty-ninth year of Qianlong (1794), most local religious leaders were arrested except a few people such as Liu Zhiji. Local officials seize the opportunity to extort money, and if they can't get what they want, they will be punished as cults; In addition, in order to suppress the Miao uprising in Hunan and Guizhou, taxes were extremely heavy, which led to a large number of farmers going bankrupt and unable to live. Liu Zhiji and others called for "officials forcing the people to revolt" and agreed with local leaders to revolt at the same time on March 10th of the first year of Jiaqing. Due to the accident, Yidu and Zhang Zhijiang steamed buns were launched in advance on the seventh day of the first month. Changyang, Changle (now the Five Peaks), Chi-wah Lam and Qin Jiayao rose one after another, and some people in Dangyang, Laifeng, Zhushan and Xiaogan responded by occupying Dangyang and attacking Zhushan and Baokang. On the second day of February, Zhang in Xiangyang revolted in Huanglong, Yao Zhifu and Gao Junde in Dengzhou, Henan Province revolted in Gaojiawan. In March, these three rebel armies concentrated in Lu Yan and Shuanggou, north of Xiangyang, and rapidly developed to tens of thousands of people. All the uprising teams, both men and women, "wrapped their heads in white cloth as a token." Shocked by this, the Qing court sent 7000 soldiers from Shaanxi, Guangxi and Shandong, plus more than 10000 Qing troops from Hubei and Sichuan, under the command of Bi Yuan, the governor of Hubei, Henan and Anhui, to carry out a divisional siege. A stockade was built around the White Scarf Army to defend against risks. Serenade, the Qing army broke up and the attack was frustrated. In April, the Qing court sent two thousand troops to Zhili (now Hebei) and Shanxi. At the same time, it was ordered that all troops should be under unified command forever. After two months of fierce fighting, in June, Fu's troops were wiped out by Xiangyang White Scarf Army in Xiaogan. At this point, the Qing army "recruited thousands of soldiers and all of them were wiped out." The Qing court transferred 20 thousand Hunan Miao soldiers to help, and the situation began to reverse. In August, most of the White Scarf Army strongholds in Zhushan, Dangyang and Zhijiang were breached. Zhang Zhengmo, the earliest uprising, was also wiped out in Guannaowan. Only Chi-wah Lam Department is still active in Qiu Zi and Changyang, and Xiangyang White Scarf Army is active in Xiangyang North, Suizhou and Zhongxiang. The Qing army was fully armed in southern Hubei, so Yao Zhifu and others expanded northward and entered Tangxian County (now Tanghe) in Henan Province. The Qing court added 6,000 soldiers from Jianrui and Firearms Battalion in Shantung, Zhili and Shi Jing to help. Although the White Scarf Army still won many battles, it suffered great losses. Since the summer of five years, the Qing court's measures such as "building village regiments" and "strengthening the wall and clearing the wild" have gradually taken effect, making the White Scarf Army strategically passive. Not only is the source of grain, grass and soldiers reduced, but also the movement is often blocked, making it difficult to carry out large-scale mobile operations, mainly attacking and flowing in the border areas of Sichuan, Shaanxi and Chu. From January to July, six years, under the continuous attack of the Qing army, there were only a few hundred or dozens of people left in each department, which was basically confined to the old forest in Nanshan. Strong, there are a few people such as Gou,, and Fan. By July of seven years, these three departments had been wiped out by the Qing army. In December, Erdenbao reported to Jiaqing Emperor that "the results have been remarkable, and the famous first rebellion in Sichuan, Shaanxi and Chu has been completely eliminated". In fact, there are still many small white turban troops engaged in guerrilla warfare in Nanshan Laolin. In February 2008, soldiers of the Qing army and Yin Bu of Fengtian Prefecture went deep into the old forest, pursued and killed several soldiers in ambush. In August, some Xiang Yong, who was dissolved by the Qing court, joined the White Scarf Army and attacked Lao Lin from time to time. In September, he defeated the blocked Qing army near Xixiang and killed the lieutenant Zhu Huai. The White Scarf Army persisted in fighting under extremely difficult circumstances 1 years. It was not until September of nine years that Gou Wenrun, the last leader of the White Scarf Army, was killed by traitors, and the nine-year uprising of the White Scarf Army (An Baili faction) came to an end.

The main reason why the Qing army was defeated by the White Scarf Army at the beginning of the uprising was to build castles and villages, stick to one place and fight recklessly. Striding forward, losing ground, and carrying out mobile operations, although the Qing army gained the initiative in the war in a certain period of time and shattered its strategic attempt to gather fighters, the Qing army completely lost its initiative in the practice of building villages and clearing fields because of the lack of base areas, which was also the main reason for the final failure of the White Scarf Army in the later period. The organizational form of the integration of politics and religion and the feudal patriarchal management system led to the proliferation of internal factions, and the lack of unified leadership, planning and close cooperation between ministries in the war, which was also one of the important reasons for the failure of the White Scarf Army.