Focus on China Biden to Promote Global Strategic Adjustment

Authors: Zhao Minghao, visiting researcher at the Center for Strategic and Security Studies in Tsinghua University, and researcher at the Institute of International Studies of Fudan University.

Since Biden came to power, the US diplomatic and national security strategy has more clearly focused on "great power competition", showing three characteristics.

The first is the obvious "internal orientation". The so-called "blue collar wins America", how to effectively respond to the economic and security demands of the American people, especially the working class and the working class, and consolidate the ruling foundation is the core concern of Biden's government.

Biden's government regards "rebuilding the middle class" as the core goal of its administration, trying to fundamentally change the prevailing situation of "neo-liberalism" and "trickle-down economics" in the United States since the 1980s, promote "domestic rejuvenation" and start a new round of national development cycle.

Biden emphasized that "internal affairs are foreign affairs, and diplomacy is also internal affairs" and clearly put forward "a foreign policy serving the American middle class", saying that it is no longer oriented to the interests of large American enterprises and multinational corporations. In order to prevent overseas military operations from further damaging the interests of the domestic middle class, Biden's government completely ended the war in Afghanistan.

The second is the realistic "value diplomacy". Attaching importance to the values and problems of "democracy" and "human rights" is the foreign policy tradition of the US Democratic government. Biden continued this tradition and regarded the global "democratic recession" as a "major threat" to US national security. Blinken, Secretary of State, and other senior officials emphasized that Biden's administration put "values" at the center of its foreign policy. Biden tried to strengthen the "democratic" foundation of the United States in order to let the United States play its "model power" again, provide guidance to other countries, and then "find the West again."

The Biden administration's diplomacy guided by "democratic values" is realistic. Compared with the past "democratic expansion" strategy, it seems that it pays more attention to strengthening the cohesion and defense of "democratic countries" and serves the overall strategy of coping with competition with big countries such as China. The Biden administration has fully injected ideological factors into the decision-making of economy, trade, technology, security and international development, providing an ideological basis for the United States to piece together "small circles", implement "new alliance strategy" and promote "selective multilateralism".

The third is the more complicated "great power competition". Biden administration emphasizes "long-term competition" with rivals such as China, and pays more attention to controlling the cost of competition, trying to solve the damage or self-attack brought by competitive measures to American interests. The White House, the Ministry of Finance, the State Council and other institutions have "optimized" the means and practices of US foreign sanctions.

In addition, Biden stressed the need to comprehensively use the means of American state power instead of relying too much on military means, saying that "diplomacy should become the number one tool of American power." To this end, the Biden administration actively builds a diplomatic mechanism system that can adapt to the "new era of great power competition." In 20021year, Blinken announced the "the State Council Modernization" plan. Reform measures include establishing a new cyberspace and digital policy bureau, appointing special envoys to take charge of key and emerging technology affairs, and strengthening international policy coordination in the fields of artificial intelligence, quantum information and biotechnology.

Blinken emphasized that "protecting our national security means increasing investment in our technological capabilities and enhancing the status of this issue in diplomacy and national defense". The Biden administration has also focused on the needs of future wars, vigorously adjusted the structure of defense expenditure, and spent more resources on "wise investments in science and technology" such as networks, space, unmanned systems and artificial intelligence.

Driven by the Biden administration's "great power competition" layout, the US strategy toward China and the US global strategy are increasingly consistent and interdependent. Judging from the evolution path of American strategic competition with China, the late Obama administration is in the "gestation stage", the Trump administration is in the "experimental stage" and the Biden administration is in the "deepening stage".

Biden's administration regards China as the "most severe competitor", "systematic competitor" and "institutional competitor" that the United States faces, and emphasizes that "competition is the essence of US-China relations" and it is necessary to launch "fierce competition" and "responsible competition" with China. Biden's government also proposed to launch a so-called "head-on competition" with China, that is, to "do your own thing", to build a "compound international camp" based on enhancing the competitiveness of the United States, to focus on increasing deterrence against China in the "Indo-Pacific" region, and to provoke ideological opposition as the starting point, and to lay out potential plans.

In the nearly one year after Biden took office, Biden's administration did not fundamentally modify the Trump-era trade restrictions on China, but maintained punitive tariffs, which substantially promoted the United States to reduce its dependence on China's supply chain. At the same time, Biden's administration has basically repaired the economic and trade relations with American allies damaged by the "tariff war", and has taken coordinated actions in WTO reform and digital trade rule-making, so as to urge allies to cooperate more closely with the United States to meet the "China Challenge".

Biden's government regards science and technology competition as the core of its competition with China, and tries to strengthen the pressure on China's science and technology by increasing domestic R&D investment, perfecting the strategy of "small courtyard and high wall" and forming a "democratic science and technology alliance". Biden's administration further strengthened the Indo-Pacific strategy, upgraded the Quadripartite Mechanism (QUAD) of the United States, Japan, India and Australia, pieced together the tripartite security partnership (AUKUS) of the United States, Britain and Australia, promoted "comprehensive deterrence" against China, showed "diplomatic return" to ASEAN, and tried to build an "Indo-Pacific economic framework".

Biden's government significantly enhanced the importance of democracy and human rights issues in its China policy, organized the Global Democracy Summit, and put forward the "Building a Better World" (B3W) initiative with other western countries in an attempt to prove that "democracy is still effective". Biden's administration attaches great importance to coordination with allies and partner countries, actively remoulds the US-led alliance system, and establishes a multi-level, targeted and flexible new mechanism (such as the US-Europe Trade and Technology Council) in an effort to increase the effectiveness of suppressing China through "camp-driven competition" and "rule checks and balances".

Under the background of Biden's government's comprehensive strengthening of strategic competition with China, the danger of Taiwan Province Province's problems is highlighted again. Senior US military officials advocate the argument that "the mainland will attack Taiwan before 2027", and the US military frequently conducts actual combat training activities in the Taiwan Strait. In August this year and in May 438+10, Biden publicly stated twice that the United States would "defend Taiwan Province Province" if the mainland used force against Taiwan.

Although the White House and the State Council insist that the US "one-China policy" has not changed, it is undeniable that the US government's "strategic ambiguity" on the issue of Taiwan Province Province is approaching the "tipping point" state of "strategic clarity", including greatly strengthening US-Taiwan military ties, "using Taiwan Province to control China" in the supply chain, promoting Taiwan Province authorities to "meaningfully participate in the United Nations system" and provoking European countries to adjust their policies related to Taiwan. Some "hawkish" members of the U.S. Congress promoted the discussion of the Armed Taiwan Province Province Act and the Taiwan Province Province Deterrence Act, clamoring for the establishment of the Taiwan Province Province Security Assistance Initiative. Mai Aiwen, former senior director of Asian affairs of the White House National Security Council, believes that Taiwan-related issues will dominate the US-China security competition in the coming period.

The original title is "Biden Administration Focus on China's Global Strategic Adjustment", and the article comes from the official WeChat account "World Knowledge".