Who has the comparative data between Chinese and English on Sino-US trade issues and China's macroeconomic issues?

The 7th annual meeting of China and the world economy between China Economic Research Center (CCER) of Peking University and National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) was held in China Economic Research Center of Peking University from June 30th to July 2nd, 2005. Many economists from the United States and China have conducted extensive and in-depth discussions on China-US macroeconomic issues, banking and monetary policies, capital market and tax policies, supervision and economic order, immigration and health economics, public finance and retirement social security, international trade and foreign direct investment. The first issue of the briefing reports the opening remarks and speeches on the macroeconomic situation between China and the United States.

The meeting was first opened by Professor Lin Yifu, Director of China Center for Economic Research. He pointed out that this is the seventh annual meeting between the China Center for Economic Research of Peking University and the National Bureau of Economic Research of the United States in eight years (the meeting in 2003 could not be held as scheduled due to SARS). Great changes have taken place in China's economy in the past eight years. Compared with 1997, the gross national product of China increased by 89.5% in 2004, while the total foreign trade increased by 255%. The strong growth of China's economy shows that China's economy is undergoing tremendous changes, and it also shows that as early as 1997, NBER's American friends proposed to hold an annual meeting at the China Center for Economic Research of Peking University to discuss the economic problems of China and the impact of China's economy on the world economy on a regular basis. This is a far-sighted proposal.

The significance of the annual meeting between China and the world economy lies not only in the great changes that have taken place in China's economy and its impact on the development of the world economy, but more importantly, there have been many interesting economic phenomena in the process of China's economic development, many of which are difficult to explain by the existing economic theories. This phenomenon provides us with rare opportunities and challenges to put forward new economic theories and economic explanations. I hope this annual meeting and subsequent annual meetings can contribute to the development of new economic theory. Welcome to China Economic Research Center of Peking University to attend this annual meeting!

Professor martin feldstein, Chairman of NBER, also made an opening speech. He said that he was honored to be invited to the China Center for Economic Research again to attend this annual meeting. I am glad to see that China Economic Research Center and China have achieved the same rapid economic development. Compared with eight years ago, the number of students and teachers in China Economic Research Center has further expanded; It is also amazing that this center has such splendid buildings. We are very honored to take China Economic Research Center as the organizer of the annual meeting. I especially want to thank Dr. Wei for his important role in cooperation with China Economic Research Center and other exchanges with China. Because of the successful cooperation with China Center for Economic Research on the annual meeting project, NBER launched another project in the United States to promote exchanges between economists who study China's economy in China and experts who study China's economy in the United States.

The original intention of holding the CCER-NBER annual meeting is not to provide another channel for American economists who study China's economy to understand the current situation of China's economy, but to let those experts who have an important influence on the operation of the American economy but lack an understanding of China's economy know more about China. China's economy is of great significance to the world economy and the American economy. I think American economists (including myself) should have a broader and deeper understanding of the current situation and development of China's economy. There will be many speeches and discussions by China economists at the annual meeting, which provides us with an opportunity to directly understand all aspects of China's economic operation; At the same time, from a personal point of view, you can also find points of interest or the direction of further research from the meeting.

This year, we have a particularly grand lineup of American participants, because before the start of this annual meeting, we jointly held the "International Symposium on Social Security System" with the China Development Research Foundation and the World Bank to discuss the reform of China's social security system. Six people present today participated in the seminar on social security system in the past two days. They are experts in social insurance, public health and taxation. Also present were experts and scholars in monetary economics, international finance, immigration and health economics. I think the discussion in the next two and a half days will bring a lot of useful inspiration. The close economic and social relations between China and the United States, especially the direct investment, bilateral trade and other international affairs between China and the United States, will be involved and discussed in depth at this meeting. I look forward to learning more from it. Thanks again to the China Center for Economic Research for its hard work in hosting this conference!

On the morning of June 30th, the first topic discussed was "China-US macroeconomic issues". The following are the main contents of speeches and discussions by relevant departments.

Lin Yifu: "China's Macroeconomy: From Deflation to Inflation"

From 65438 to 0998 to 2002, China experienced deflation. The retail price index RPI decreased by 2.28% in 1998, by 3% in 1999, by 1.5% in 2000, by 0.8% in 2006 and finally by1.8 in 2002. I think this is a typical deflation phenomenon. By 2003, China seemed to be out of deflation, because RPI decreased by 0. 1% in 2003, that is, there was basically no deflation or inflation. At the same time, in 2003, the consumer price index CPI rose by 1.2%, and CPI showed positive changes. In the same year, the GDP growth rate reached 9.5%.

According to the macro situation shown by the above data, we have some arguments about China's macro economy and operation cycle. One view is that China is already in an ideal state that can be achieved by macro-control, because China has a low inflation rate and a high economic growth rate. In this case, the government should not interfere with the economic operation and let the market operate independently, so as to maintain this ideal state for as long as possible. However, another view is that although the macro indicators have performed well, if we look closely, we can find that there are several points worthy of attention. If these potential factors are not controlled, deflation will soon come back. One of the important reasons is that the high growth rate in 2003 was mainly caused by the rapid growth of investment. In this year, the growth rate of fixed investment was 27.7%, mainly concentrated in three aspects: first, real estate, with an investment growth rate of 29.9%, and second, automobile manufacturing, with an investment growth rate of 69%. The rapid growth of investment in the above two industries has driven the investment in the building materials industry. Investment in steel increased by 97%, and investment in cement manufacturing increased by 12 1%. When these investments are not completed, they are a kind of demand, and when they are completed, they become supply capacity. It is impossible for China to absorb so much production capacity in a short time. The low inflation rate in 2003 is mainly due to the decline in prices of most products except a few. In the basket of commodities that constitute the retail price index, * * * has 16 commodities. Of the 16 categories of commodities, only four categories of commodities have increased in price, while the prices of other 12 categories of commodities have continued to decline. Among these four types of goods, one is food, such as agricultural products; This is due to the bad weather this year and the continuous decline in output in previous years. Another commodity with rising prices is gold and jewelry, because the interest rate is too low, only 1.8%, which leads to speculative demand for gold and other commodities, leading to rising prices. The third category of goods is printed matter such as books, but the prices of such goods have only increased slightly. The last category of commodities is energy products, and the price increase of such products is driven by the rapid growth of three industry. The tertiary industry is a high energy-consuming industry, and at the same time, the international energy price is also rising, which leads to the increase of domestic energy price in China. However, the prices of other 12 commodities, most of which are manufactured goods, have fallen by 18 months. So in this case, if we don't intervene in the macro-economy, we can foresee that deflation will return soon.

However, in 2003, due to the strong economic performance, we have been unable to reach an agreement on the macro situation. Theoretical circles did not reach an agreement on macro-control until April 2004, which was due to the publication of macro-statistical data in the first quarter. The rapid growth of investment in 2003 mainly occurred in coastal areas. By the first quarter of 2004, the growth rate of fixed assets investment in coastal areas was 43%, that in the central region was 53%, and that in the western region was 52%. At this time, macro-control intervention in economic operation has become a * * * knowledge. However, there is a new policy debate here. One view is that China is now a market economy. To control investment, it is necessary to raise the price of investment, that is, to reduce investment by raising interest rates. Therefore, the central bank should use monetary policy for macro-control. However, another point of view is that China's economy is still in the transition period, and the effect of interest rate policy regulation is not good, so more other regulation policies should be implemented. The most important thing is to emphasize the capital adequacy ratio and increase the proportion of self-owned capital in the total investment capital. Secondly, it is necessary to restrict the access to loans, because many investments are promoted by local governments, and in most cases, local governments provide loans for investment projects almost at no cost, which is an important factor leading to over-investment in this region. I personally agree with the second view. Careful observation of investment projects in 2003 and the first quarter of 2004, taking real estate projects as an example, investors hope to complete construction and sell as much as possible before the real estate bubble bursts. For these investors, it is difficult to reduce their loan demand by raising interest rates. On the other hand, more than 90% of the investment projects started in 2003 and 2004 came from bank loans. If the investment can get a good return, then the lender will repay the loan; And if the return on investment is poor, then they will get back 10% of the investment and leave the loss to the bank. In this case, even if the interest rate is raised, the lender will continue to borrow for the purpose of completing the project, and due to the increase of interest rate, the lender is more likely to be unable to repay the loan and leave with its own capital. On the other hand, as mentioned above, in 2003 and mid-2004, most industrial sectors were still experiencing deflation and needed to stimulate consumer demand. Negative interest rate is a favorable measure to stimulate consumer demand. Once the interest rate is positive, consumer demand will be hit, which is very unfavorable to macroeconomic development. The debate lasted for about a month, and finally the government listened to the second view, raised the minimum proportion of its own capital in the total capital, and asked banks not to approve projects with its own capital below 30% when examining loans. At the same time, the central government requires local governments to provide loans for investment projects by public auction, and the central government also controls the total amount of loans each year. In this way, the macroeconomic operation has been basically controlled.

In 2004, the retail price index increased by 2.8%, the consumer price index increased by 3.9% and the gross national product increased by 9.5%. In the first quarter of 2005, the consumer price index increased by 2.8%, the retail price index increased by 1.6% and the gross national product increased by 9.5%. Judging from these data, the macroeconomic situation is good, but there are already many phenomena suggesting that deflation will occur again. First of all, food prices will fall, and food prices are the main factor for the rise of consumer price index in 2003 and 2004. Secondly, the price of building materials will also drop sharply, and the price of steel will drop. I believe that the price drop will also appear on other building materials products. There are two reasons for this price drop: the investment growth rate has dropped from 27% to 20% to 15%, that is, the demand has dropped; The investment projects started in 2003 and 2004 are nearing completion, and these projects have shifted from demand to supply. The situation that supply exceeds demand is further aggravated, which leads to the decline of prices. Finally, as investment growth slows down, energy prices will also fall. The prices of other 12 commodities have been declining since 1997, and this price decline will continue. In this case, there is reason to believe that deflation is coming. By the end of 2005 at the latest, deflation will appear. But I believe that China's economy will continue to maintain a relatively high growth rate, reaching more than 8%. When deflation occurs in other countries, economic development tends to stagnate, that is, the growth rate is zero or negative, but this will not happen in China. Because, in other market economy countries, deflation is the result of the bursting of the price bubble and the decline in demand, while in China, it is the result of a sudden increase in supply. Therefore, the growth of consumer demand will remain at 7% to 8%, while the growth of investment demand will be reduced to 20% to 15%, thus maintaining the growth rate of 8% and above.

Martin feldstein: "The macroeconomic situation in the United States and its enlightenment to other countries"

The economic situation in the United States is very good in the short term. In 2004, the real GDP growth rate exceeded 4%, and in the first quarter of 2005, the growth rate was 3.8%, which was twice that of the European Union. At the same time, the unemployment rate has also dropped to a fairly low level, slightly higher than 5%. The price level is also very good, with the consumer price index increasing by 3% and the core price index excluding food and energy increasing by 2.2%. However, the economic growth rate in the coming year is likely to be lower than expected, that is, lower than the expected GDP growth rate of 3.8% to 3.5%. The rise in energy prices is a factor leading to the slowdown of economic growth. The price of oil rose from $30 a barrel to more than $60. Such a high energy price is equivalent to levying an excessive consumption tax, which will lead to a decline in demand and a slowdown in economic growth. But I personally have an optimistic estimate in this regard. Compared with last year, the increase of oil price this year is relatively low, and the oil price factor only significantly affected the economy in one quarter last year, so the situation this year will be more optimistic; At the same time, considering the increase in income, I think the US economy will maintain a growth rate of around 3.5%.

Inflation is my more worrying problem. Not only because of the rise in energy prices, but more importantly, the changes in labor prices. A very important part of business cost and final product price is labor price. Due to the substantial increase in labor productivity, the labor price actually decreased in 2002-2003. This has led to low inflation and deflation in manufacturing in the past two years. But in 2004, the labor price was flat, and in the first quarter of 2005, the labor price rose sharply, with an annual growth rate of more than 3%. If this situation continues, it will lead to an increase in the prices of products and services, thus increasing the pressure of inflation. The Fed responded by gradually raising interest rates. Faced with the fragile economy and the pressure of deflation, the Federal Reserve lowered the overnight lending rate by 1%, then increased it very slowly, once by 0.25%, and will increase it from 3% to 3.25% recently. Even so, short-term interest rates are still low. The Federal Reserve not only controls short-term interest rates, but also controls mortgage interest rates. /kloc-The mortgage interest rate in 0/0 is less than 4%. If the inflation rate is 2%, the real short-term interest rate is about 1%, while the real long-term interest rate is about 2%. Therefore, in the future, we will see a further rise in interest rates.

Long-term difficulties come from the financing of social security and medical system. With the aging of the population, pension insurance and medical expenses will increase substantially, which will lead to a significant increase in tax pressure, if some basic factors have not changed. The main influencing factors are unlikely to change in 10 years, but if the reform starts now, the future situation will be more optimistic.

Another issue I am concerned about is the huge deficit in the balance of international trade in the United States. The current account deficit of the United States is about $600 billion, accounting for more than 6% of the gross national product of the United States, and it is still growing rapidly. A few years ago, this indicator was only 50% of the current level, and only 20% of the current level ten years ago, so the nominal current account deficit continued to grow rapidly. It is worth noting that the financing method of the current account deficit has changed greatly. In 2000, the current account deficit was mainly made up by foreign equity investment in the United States. Foreign investors buy shares in American companies, and foreign enterprises invest in the United States to establish new enterprises or buy American enterprises. At that time, people thought that the return of the American market was higher than that of other markets in terms of risk. But at present, the United States is not the most attractive equity market in terms of net worth, and the United States has more equity investments in other countries. Debt financing has become a more important way, and foreign investors have bought US Treasury bonds, corporate bonds and other fixed-income securities. The reason for this change is not that the attractiveness of the US economy to foreign investors has changed, but that the decisions of foreign governments have changed, including China, South Korea and other foreign governments that have invested in US dollar assets. If all these foreign funds are withdrawn, there will be high interest rates in the United States, which will lead to a significant slowdown in economic growth.

A direct explanation for the huge current account deficit is that the savings rate is too low. In the past few decades, the savings rate of American households has dropped from 10% of after-tax income and 7% of GNP to near zero. In the past ten years, the market value of the stock market has tripled and the value of real estate has increased by more than double digits, so people think they are much richer than before. The emphasis on savings has declined, and the savings rate in the United States has dropped significantly. In other words, the United States is financing its current account deficit through the high savings rate of other countries. If the savings rate of other countries falls, the United States will not be able to finance its own deficit. In the past decade, although it is not a common phenomenon, the savings rate in many countries has been declining, such as Japan and the European Union. However, China, Singapore, South Korea and Russia have huge current account surpluses due to rising oil and gas prices and enhanced manufacturing competitiveness. China has a surplus of $70 billion, Russia has a surplus of $50 billion, and Singapore and South Korea have a combined surplus of $50 billion. This is why the United States can finance its huge current account deficit.

But why does the United States have such a large current account deficit? The high savings rate of other countries in the world does not mean that the United States should have such a large deficit. The savings rate in the United States has fallen. Fortunately, the savings rate of American investors has not declined. An optimistic situation in the future is that the savings rate in the United States will rise, and the demand for imported products will partially shift to the demand for domestic products. I think there is reason to believe that the savings rate in the United States will return to a higher level than usual, which will reduce the dependence of the United States on foreign investment and maintain a healthy international account balance while maintaining high economic growth. But this will bring problems to the rest of the world. If the current account deficit of the United States is reduced from 7% to 3% of the gross national product, that is to say, the total world demand will be reduced by $500 billion, which will have an impact on the trading partners of China and China, as well as other countries that export these commodities.

Second, the statistics of Sino-US trade balance.

In recent years, the balance of bilateral trade, especially the huge trade deficit with China mentioned by the United States, has attracted people's attention. Statistical analysis shows that the trade deficit of the United States with China in recent years is a fact, but the United States has obviously seriously exaggerated the extent of the deficit.

Statistics from the United States show that in Sino-US trade, the United States has a surplus from 1979 to 1982, and a deficit from 1983, with a trade deficit of 1996 reaching $39.5 billion. China's statistics show that during the period from 1979 to 1992, China has been in deficit, from 1993 to a surplus, with a surplus of 1996 USD. Obviously, there are obvious differences in the statistics of bilateral trade balance between China and the United States (see table 1).

Table 1: Sino-US bilateral trade statistics unit: US$ 1 billion.

Statistics from China, statistics from the United States.

China exports China imports China balance US exports US imports US balance.

1993 169.7 106.9 62.8 87.7 3 15.4 -227.7

1994 2 14.6 139.7 74.9 92.9 387.8 -294.9

1995 247. 1 16 1.2 85.9 1 17.5 455.6 -338. 1

1996 266.9 16 1.6 105.3 1 19.7 5 14.9 -395.2

Source: China Customs, US Department of Commerce.

In order to find out the reasons for the great difference in trade statistics between China and the United States and the great trade deficit with China reflected by American trade statistics, 1994, the United States agreed to China's initiative to set up a bilateral trade statistics group under the China-US Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade to conduct a special study. The American members are experts from the Census Bureau of the US Department of Commerce, and the Chinese members are experts from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and the General Administration of Customs. After more than a year's efforts, experts from both sides compared the 1992 and 1993 trade statistics data of China, the United States and Hong Kong, processed hundreds of thousands of records, sorted out hundreds of sets of analysis tables, and formed the Work Report of the Trade Statistics Group of the Trade and Investment Working Group of the China-US Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade on the basis of detailed data. The report believes that the US trade deficit with China is overestimated in at least the following aspects:

First of all, the import statistics of the United States overestimate the import from China, because it ignores the re-export and the added value of re-export. A large part of the trade between China and the United States is re-exported through third parties. According to China's statistics, 60% of China's exports to the United States are re-exported through a third party mainly in Hongkong. According to the analysis of American data, only 20% of China's goods are directly shipped to the United States, and the remaining 80% are re-exported to the United States through third parties. Obviously, the increased value of goods in a third party after leaving China should not be counted as China's export. According to the analysis of the Trade Statistics Group of the China-US Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, the average value-added rate of China's exports re-exported to the United States in the past two years is as high as 40.7%, which is much higher than the average value-added rate of general re-exports. The value-added rate of some major re-export commodities such as toys and knitted garments even exceeds 100%. 1992 and 1993, the added value of China's products re-exported to the United States was $5.23 billion and $6.3 billion respectively. The United States counted the added value of Hong Kong's re-exports as imports from China, greatly overestimating the value of imports from China.

Second, the export statistics of the United States underestimate the export to China, because it ignores the re-export. According to the analysis of experts from the China-US Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade, in the statistics of American exports to China, re-exports to China through Hong Kong only account for about a quarter of Hong Kong's statistics. About 1992 and 1993 respectively, about1800 million dollars and 2.3 billion dollars of US exports to China are not included in the total US exports to China.

Third, the method of determining the origin of goods in the United States leads to statistical differences between the two sides. The determination of the origin of general imported goods is usually based on the importer's declaration. Goods judged as originating in China are recorded as goods imported from China, regardless of whether these goods are actually exported by an intermediary or not, and regardless of whether these goods have added value in an intermediary. Some imports from China recorded by the United States should probably be recorded as imports from other middlemen. Experts from both sides recognize that further research is needed to determine the origin.

Without considering the error caused by the statistics based on the principle of origin, the trade deficit with China calculated by the United States in 1992 and 1993 was overestimated by about 7 billion dollars and 8.6 billion dollars respectively, that is, the deficit with China announced by the United States in that year was exaggerated by more than 60% on average (see table 2).

Table 2: The added value of re-exports and Hong Kong re-exports led to the overestimation of the trade deficit with China by the United States. Unit: one billion dollars.

1992 1993

The United States announced the import of 257.3 3 15.4 from China.

Hong Kong's re-export added value -52.3 -63

Adjusted US imports 205 252.4

The United States announced its exports to China 74.2 87.7

The statistical difference between the United States and Hong Kong passing through Hong Kong is 18 23.

After adjustment, US exports were 92.2 1 10.7.

The United States announced its deficit with China 183. 1.227.7.

The adjusted US deficit is112.8141.7.

Source: Report of the Working Group on Trade Statistics of the Working Group on Trade and Investment of the China-US Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade.

In addition, due to incomplete export statistics, the United States underestimated the value of its exports to China. 1996 12.5 An official of the Census Bureau of the U.S. Department of Commerce pointed out in the American Business Daily that because exports can't bring direct income to the government through taxes like imports, more than 10% of the records in the U.S. export statistics may be omitted. Based on this calculation, the statistics of US exports to China of 1992 and 1993 may have omitted 10 billion dollars respectively.

Based on the above factors, the US trade deficit with China in 1992 and 1993 was overestimated by about 8 billion dollars and 9.6 billion dollars respectively, that is, it was overestimated by about 70% on average. The trade statistics group is only responsible for investigating and analyzing the differences between the trade statistics published by China and the United States. The trade statistics methods of the two sides have not been adjusted accordingly, and the pattern of overvaluation of the US trade deficit with China has not changed substantially so far. If calculated according to the above ratio, the trade deficit with China announced by the United States in 1996 was overestimated by about160 billion dollars.

In recent years, the so-called huge trade deficit with China has many reasons. There are both the defects of statistical techniques and methods and the factors of American policy toward China. Therefore, it is far from enough to evaluate the trade balance between the two countries according to American trade statistics. Fundamentally speaking, the long-term deficit of American foreign trade is determined by its own deep-seated economic factors and should not be blamed on other countries.