What impact will the lifting of Iranian sanctions have on the situation in the Middle East?

Since 12, Iran has been subjected to more severe sanctions and its oil exports have fallen sharply. Therefore, Iran experienced negative economic growth in two years, namely 12 years and 13 years. This may be the main reason why Iran has to negotiate with the West. If the sanctions are completely lifted, the World Bank predicts that Iran will achieve an economic growth rate of 5. 1% and 5.5% in 16 and 17 respectively. Affected by the increase of Iranian oil exports, if OPEC members do not cut production, the international oil price is expected to fall by 14%. This will have a negative impact on the economies of other oil exporting countries, such as Saudi Arabia's GDP may be reduced by 5%. If the sanctions are completely lifted, the World Bank predicts that Iran will achieve an economic growth rate of 5. 1% and 5.5% in 16 and 17 respectively. Affected by the increase of Iranian oil exports, if OPEC members do not cut production, the international oil price is expected to fall by 14%. This will have a negative impact on the economies of other oil exporting countries, such as Saudi Arabia's GDP may be reduced by 5%.

Jing Jing Jing Jing Jing believes that after the sanctions are lifted, Iran will concentrate on developing its economy and reducing foreign intervention activities. However, we should also consider that there are many people in the United States and Iran who oppose the nuclear agreement, so both governments have recently taken some symbolic countermeasures to appease hardliners, such as Iran's seizure of American ships and the new sanctions imposed by the United States on Iran's ballistic missile program. Therefore, it is still possible for the Iranian government to strengthen its foreign activities in order to calm the dissatisfaction of the hardliners, or simply let the hardliners go their own way to make up for the image loss caused by the compromise with the United States.

As for Saudi Arabia, although it will be threatened by Iran's national strength, it is unlikely to launch a pre-emptive attack like Saddam launched the Iran-Iraq war. First, Iran's threat to Iraq at that time was far greater than that to Saudi Arabia now. Saddam Hussein faced a revolutionary fanatical Iran. After Khomeini's death, Iran's foreign policy has normalized and it is no longer keen on exporting Islamic revolution. Unlike Iraq, where the Shiite population is the majority, the Shiites in Saudi Arabia only account for 10% of the total population. Even in the areas where they are concentrated, Oriental Province only accounts for one third of the local population, and its influence is limited. Iran's model of ruling the country by jurists is almost unattractive to Saudi jurists who are basically integrated with the royal family. Compared with Iran, it is a popular political organization like the Muslim Brotherhood that poses a greater threat to the Saudi regime.

Second, the strength contrast between Saudi Arabia and Iraq is also different from that of Iran and Iraq. Saddam launched the war and seized the opportunity of unstable situation, fluctuating army morale and declining combat effectiveness after the Iranian revolution. He did make some progress in the early stage, but in the end he was deadlocked because he failed to beat Iran quickly. At present, Iran's military strength is the top level in the Middle East, and it is even more impossible to win a surprise attack. On the other hand, although Saudi Arabia's weapons and equipment are advanced, its morale is lax, and its combat effectiveness may even be inferior to that of the Iraqi army during the Iran-Iraq war. Saudi Arabia's western allies are now more concerned about eliminating IS than containing Iran. If it is forced to go to war with Iran, it will be difficult for Saudi Arabia to get support. Therefore, considering comprehensively, it is unlikely that Shai will directly participate in the war.

Of course, Saudi Arabia can also provoke conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites in other countries, forcing Iran to intervene militarily, thus consuming Iran's national strength, just as the civil war in northern Yemen dragged down Nasser. But now it seems that Saudi Arabia first fell into a quagmire in Yemen. It should also be noted that the Shiites in the Middle East were originally complex in composition, numerous in sects and not unified. Saudi Arabia's practice of intensifying sectarian contradictions has aroused the oppression of all Shiites, strengthened their identity and reduced the difficulty of internal integration of Shiites.

Another ideal situation is that Israel repeats Babylonian actions and attacks Iran's important military facilities, so that the current peace achievements will be destroyed, and Saudi Arabia can just take advantage of the chaos to profit. But this must have the cooperation of Netanyahu.