Will the equity pledge of the major shareholder of Sunshine City exceed 80% and become the next Taihe?

On August 3rd, Sunshine City announced that at the end of the 4th year of the corporate bond duration of "16Yangcheng 0 1", the corporate bond duration in coupon rate was reduced to 6.50% in the 5th year. Under the background of loose liquidity, many housing enterprises have basically chosen to lower interest rates to reduce costs when they have the opportunity to adjust the bond coupon rate. Sunshine City is not the first to do this, but the interest rate of 6.5% is still not low.

In fact, the leverage ratio of Sunshine City has been maintained at a high level for a long time in recent years, and the accumulated large amount of inventory is in urgent need of turnover settlement, further aggravating the financial shortage of Sunshine City. The company also eased the financial pressure by issuing bonds, dollar bills, asset-backed bills and office property REITs special plans, and even reported that its property companies would go public for financing.

Will Sunshine City, which constantly sells land under high leverage and blindly pursues scale, become the next Taihe?

Financing costs are rising rapidly.

According to the prospectus of sunshine city group co., ltd's public offering of corporate bonds to qualified investors in 20 16 (the first phase), the bondholders of "16 yangcheng01"have the right to sell all or part of their bonds back to sunshine city on the interest payment date of the third interest-bearing year and the interest payment date of the fourth interest-bearing year during the bond's existence.

For the case that the bond contains the rights of both borrowers and borrowers, it still reflects the right to speak in the follow-up financing market and gives both parties the opportunity to re-choose.

In fact, the annual coupon rate of "16 Yangcheng 0 1" was only 4.8% in the first three years, but in August of 20 19, Sunshine City greatly increased coupon rate to 7.28% in the fourth year of its establishment, and the financing cost increased by 2.48 percentage points in just one year. During this year's adjustment window, thanks to the abundant liquidity environment, Sunshine City chose to reduce the coupon rate in the fifth year to 6.50%, but it was still significantly higher than the previous 4.8%.

"16 Yangcheng 0 1" is just the tip of the iceberg. In the past June/July, Sunshine City issued two consecutive medium-term notes, totaling13.5 billion yuan. In just one month, the cost rose from 6.6% to 6.8%. In addition, judging from the financing cost of Sunshine City office REITs asset support special plan, the financing cost of priority C assets has reached 7.5%.

On July 8th, Sunshine City completed the issuance of US$ 300 million bonds, accounting for 7.5% of coupon rate. Even the financing cost of short-term financing bonds with a duration of only 1 year has reached 6.2%.

Capitalization of interest hides the financing cost.

In 20 19, the overall average financing cost of Sunshine City was 7.7 1%, which was in the forefront of the top 50 real estate enterprises, 6.34% higher than that of Country Garden, and 4.92% and 4.99% of Golden Land with similar scale.

According to the research data of soochow securities at the end of May, the average financing cost of TOP30 housing enterprises is 5.80%, and there are four * * * enterprises whose financing cost exceeds 7%, including China Evergrande, Sunac China, Sunshine City and Zhongnan Land. The average financing cost of Sunshine City is 7. 18%.

The reason for the high financing cost of Sunshine City is the high interest rate of issuing bonds. Wind data shows that the coupon rate of many US dollar bonds issued by Sunshine City in 20 19 is above 10%, with the highest value reaching 12.5%. Recently, benefiting from the market environment, the interest rate of issuing bonds has been reduced. In July, the US dollar debt issued by coupon rate was 7.5%, which was still higher than that of many large real estate enterprises.

Obviously higher than the financing cost of peers, on the one hand, it reflects the market's concern about the risks contained in Sunshine City's "high capital turnover" model; On the other hand, the high financing cost also makes Sunshine City a "wage earner" of financial institutions.

By the end of the first quarter of this year, the company's total interest-bearing liabilities exceeded 1000 billion yuan, reaching 65.438+065.438+0088 billion yuan. Among them, the short-term debt is 30 billion yuan, the book monetary fund is 4 138 1, and there is about 5 billion yuan in restricted cash. Considering the poor sales return in the first half of this year, the pressure of carry-over delivery is great, and the debt repayment pressure of Sunshine City is not small.

In recent years, the asset-liability ratio of Sunshine City has remained at a high level of over 80%, far higher than the industry average of 64.3%. The net debt ratio exceeds 200%. After several years of decline, the net debt ratio at the end of 20 19 is still as high as 135%(Wind data).

Through the replacement of 20 19 years, Sunshine City reduced the interest-bearing liabilities due within one year from 47.92 billion (monetary funds of 37.848 billion) in the previous year to 3 192 billion (monetary funds of 4 19.78), which made the monetary funds exceed the interest-bearing liabilities due within one year and eased the debt repayment pressure.

However, its long-term loans increased by 15 1.0 1 billion, and its total interest-bearing liabilities were1/0692 billion yuan, which was the same as that in 20 18 years. Judging from the maturity, the amount due in 1-2 years is 45.448 billion yuan, which will be converted into short-term liabilities due in one year in 20021year, which will still test the company's solvency.

In recent years, the net asset-liability ratio of Sunshine City has gradually decreased, but it cannot hide the fact that the company's leverage ratio is still high. With the tightening of financing and the increasing uncertainty of sales in recent years, Sunshine City's highly leveraged capital turnover model is facing a certain test.

In addition, the guarantee amount of Sunshine City is also extremely high. Under the background that the import and export statements of joint ventures and affiliated subsidiaries are becoming more and more "random", the guarantee of real estate enterprises reflects their leverage ratio on the other hand. Wind data shows that by the end of this year 1 quarter, the guarantee amount of Sunshine City reached 187.97% of the net assets, and the guarantee for related parties reached a high level of 164.89% of the net assets.

In addition, the capital cost behind Sunshine City's debt of over 100 billion yuan is partly covered by interest capitalization. In recent years, the capitalization rate of the company has been at a high level of around 90%. The high capitalization rate of interest cost is also one of the important reasons that affect the company's profit rate.

The profit index of Sunshine City has been very low, and the net profit rate has been declining from 17.34% in 20 10 to 7.08% in 20 19.

Soochow securities made statistics on the net interest rates of 25 major real estate enterprises in 20 19 years. The average net interest rate was 13.8%, and there were 3 real estate enterprises with net interest rates over 20%, with the highest net interest rate of 26.02%. There are 14 real estate enterprises with net interest rates between 10% and 20%, and there are 8 real estate enterprises with net interest rates below10%. In contrast, Sunshine City's net interest rate of a little over 7% in 20 19 is relatively low.

In the first quarter of this year, its net interest rate even dropped to 6.65%, and its return on net assets was only 65,438+05.03%, which was lower than that of China Merchants Shekou, Xuhui Group and Jindi.

Is it necessary for major shareholders to repeat the mistake of Taihe's near pledge of equity?

As a highly leveraged Fujian real estate enterprise, although it does not face huge short-term debt repayment pressure like Taihe Group, the high leverage shadow of Sunshine City is a greater pressure on completion and carry-over funds. In 20 19, Sunshine City achieved settlement income of 6104.9 billion yuan, up 8. 1 1% year-on-year, which was significantly lower than the settlement income growth rate and sales growth rate of 70%-80% in the previous two years. The accumulated settlement amount in four years is 654.38+70 million yuan. Compared with the sales of more than 500 billion yuan in the same period, the settlement progress is relatively slow, which has accumulated great carry-over pressure.

The difference between Taihe and Sunshine City is that one spends all the money, which leads to the break of the capital chain; The other is that there is less soil reserve, less carry-over, and just the right amount of funds to cope with short-term liquidity. Under the huge financial pressure required for completion and carry-over, the profitability of Sunshine City is the key to determine whether it can land safely.

Regrettably, in recent years, Sunshine City's high capital turnover model has accumulated a large number of contractual liabilities, but it has also pushed up the overall leverage ratio of the company, resulting in Sunshine City being unable to accumulate enough land reserve projects. Therefore, in order to pursue the sales scale, Sunshine City has a relatively low degree of freedom in land acquisition, and sometimes it has to acquire land, even at a high premium.

In 20 15 years, the newly-increased land purchasing and storage amount was 135 billion yuan, accounting for 45% of the contracted sales amount in that year, while the land acquisition amount in the previous year was only about 3.7 billion yuan. By 20 17, the amount of newly-increased soil reserves will be 98.6 billion yuan, exceeding the contracted sales amount of that year.

On 20 18, Sunshine City began to slow down land acquisition. Nevertheless, the consideration of land acquisition right in that year still reached 30.6 billion yuan, and the total land reserve was13.33 million square meters. In 2065438+2009, the pace of land acquisition was accelerated again, and the land reserve was supplemented by 93.7110,000 square meters, and the equity consideration was 49177 million yuan. The degree of land acquisition increased from 0.26 to 0.36 (the amount of land acquisition for equity/the amount of equity sale).

In the first half of this year, there were 48 new projects in Sunshine City, with a total land price of 464.05438+0 billion yuan. The floor price of the new project reached 5607. 10 yuan/m2, and the average floor price/sales price was 45.28%, which continued to rise compared with 20 19.

The profit of Sunshine City will be greatly challenged, whether it is the decline of gross profit margin caused by the rising cost of land acquisition or the high financing cost devouring profits. The decline in profitability is even worse for Sunshine City, which has been selling land for many years and blindly pursuing scale.

It is worth noting that Wu Jie, the actual controller, has been cutting the shopkeeper for many years, and his equity has almost been pledged. On July 1 1, Sunshine City announced that the controlling shareholder Fujian Sunshine Group and its wholly-owned subsidiary Dongfang Xinlong Assets and concerted action Fujian Kangtian Industrial Group held more than 80% of the shares in Sunshine City. Shanghai Wen Jia, the second largest shareholder of China Minsheng Investment, also pledged all its shares in Sunshine City.

The net debt ratio is high, the financing cost rises, the sales growth rate declines, and the profitability is not strong, which greatly exceeds the external guarantee of net assets, and most shareholders are pledged. The current Sunshine City is quite similar to the Taihe Group of 20 18. The fate of Taihe Group has also become a "negative example" of radical Fujian housing enterprises to a certain extent. Will Sunshine City repeat the mistakes of Taihe?