After the "three red lines", the risk of "off-balance-sheet liabilities" that housing enterprises generally downgrade still exists.

The power of the "three red lines" new regulations is emerging in housing enterprises, at least from the financial statements of housing enterprises in 2020.

According to Kerry's statistics, judging from the financial situation of 67 key listed real estate enterprises that have disclosed performance reports, the short-term interest-bearing liabilities decreased for the first time in five years, and the net debt ratio of more than 60% of real estate enterprises decreased. Through adjustment and optimization, at the end of 2020, 15 housing enterprises successfully lowered the green file.

This collective shift has not reduced investors' concerns. The market generally believes that housing enterprises have a large operating space for financial reports. Through off-balance sheet financing and non-consolidated projects, the real liabilities of housing enterprises can be hidden to some extent, which is the risk point.

A long-term investor in Hong Kong stocks told 2 1 Century Business Herald: "As a real estate company, many things can't be adjusted by drawing a red line. They are water under the bridge, and now the tight capital chain is also an inevitable phenomenon. Reality determines the status quo. "

Actively downshift for stability

From the overall situation of the industry, the average debt level of housing enterprises has improved.

According to the statistical data of Cree, from the annual report of 2020, real estate enterprises can increase the cash inflow by increasing the sales return and promoting the listing of the main body, thus optimizing the industry average short-term cash debt ratio 10 basis point to 1.47, enhancing the short-term liquidity and optimizing the debt structure. The net debt ratio of real estate enterprises decreased by 12.5 percentage points year-on-year to 66.04%.

The "three red lines" are still quite binding on housing enterprises. Judging from the attitude of housing enterprises, the determination of housing enterprises to downshift is indeed great. Take Vanke, a leading real estate enterprise, as an example. Zhu Xu, the secretary-general of Vanke, said at the 2020 annual performance promotion meeting that Vanke is confident to return to the green file during the year and remain in the green file.

Vanke finally succeeded in shifting gears. Vanke's quarterly report 200211 shows that Vanke's net debt ratio is 15.5%, its asset-liability ratio without advance payment is 69.5%, and its monetary fund is196.6 billion yuan, which is much higher than the sum of short-term loans and interest-bearing liabilities due within one year of 72.37 billion yuan.

Vanke just stepped on a red line before, and its financial management has been very stable. Therefore, the successful transition to the green file is also an event that investors expect.

But in fact, shifting gears is never easy.

Li Ting, a member of the Finance Department of the headquarters of a leading real estate enterprise, said when analyzing the situation of its real estate enterprises that at present, the trick of "reducing debts" of real estate enterprises is nothing more than increasing revenue and reducing expenditure. "We are getting funds from the spin-off and listing, and we are also selling high-quality assets. At the same time, I also hope that small profits will be quick turnover; Bonuses and small-scale layoffs are still limited. There is very little land now, and I want to make some old changes, but I will push it slowly. "

But even so, the final result is not significant. These tricks mentioned by Li Ting are used by many real estate enterprises that step on the "red line", but it is not common to turn red into yellow in the end.

For example, since last year, R&F Real Estate has been actively practicing selling assets, suspending land acquisition and reducing staff to "survive", but today, R&F Real Estate is still a real estate enterprise with three red lines.

So is China Evergrande. Since last year, China Evergrande has reduced its debt by splitting Evergrande Real Estate and listing Evergrande Automobile, and the management has repeatedly thrown out debt reduction targets, but by the end of 2020, the debt scale of Evergrande is still huge.

According to public data, by the end of 2020, Evergrande's net debt ratio was 1.53%, the asset-liability ratio after excluding advance payment was 83.4%, and the short-term cash debt ratio was 0.54, which was still in the "red file".

Beware of off-balance-sheet liabilities

How big is the debt scale of housing enterprises?

Many insiders interviewed by 265438+20 th Century Business Herald believe that financial statements can't fully reflect the whole picture, and real estate enterprises can easily adjust their financial statements through non-controlling interests, so even if real estate enterprises are determined, investors are still not optimistic.

"This has always been a risk point, but it is hidden." The above-mentioned Hong Kong stock investors said.

Huatai Gushou also pointed out in a research report that in recent years, off-balance-sheet financing of real estate enterprises has become one of the important financing methods for enterprises, mainly due to factors such as cost reduction and scale expansion, and the phenomenon of cooperative development through project companies is increasing, which provides convenient conditions for off-balance-sheet financing; In addition, housing enterprises are forced to choose off-balance-sheet financing because of poor on-balance-sheet financing channels.

Huatai also stressed that off-balance sheet financing helps real estate enterprises beautify their performance and hide their liabilities.

"If an enterprise realizes off-balance-sheet financing through a non-consolidated company, it means that only the subjects of long-term equity investment remain in the financial statements, and the leverage ratio of off-balance-sheet companies will not be reflected in the consolidated financial statements. If the leverage ratio of the branch is higher than the overall leverage ratio of the company, the effect of reducing the company's book debt ratio will be achieved through the report, so that the apparent leverage ratio of the company cannot truly reflect the actual debt burden of the company. " Huatai sealing scale.

An example that investors take as a warning is Yuzhou Real Estate. In the first half of 2020, the company has achieved revenue of 65.438+04.007 billion yuan, but the annual revenue has shrunk to 65.438+004./kloc-0.2 billion yuan. There was no revenue in the second half of the year, but it was nearly 4 billion less. The net profit attributable to101900 million yuan in the first half of 2020 decreased to11700 million yuan.

Cosmos Group's public explanation is that some joint ventures with good profits failed to consolidate and confirm their income, which led to a decline in profits, which partly confirmed investors' doubts.

It is precisely because of the existence of this operating space that housing enterprises should be more mobile and drive themselves to truly achieve healthy financial operation, rather than shifting gears through financial adjustment skills.

Dennis Huang, founder of Xiezong Strategy Management Group, told 2 1 Century Business Herald that it is more appropriate for real estate developers to reduce the leverage ratio, slow down the development speed and reduce risks. "In fact, this is not so easy to do. There is market pressure, stock price pressure and a lot of stocks to deal with. Many investors are trying to avoid this high-risk industry. "