Is the box horse worthy of such worship?

Text/Changjiang Business Daily Qi Jianbao, this article only represents the author's personal views

Some time ago, Ma Yun and Xiaoyao went to the fresh food store of Box Horse, which indicates that Box Horse has finally won the affirmation of Ali's top management and will definitely access various resources of Ali. Therefore, Mr. Hou Yi said happily that "Boxma Xiansheng has not seen any competitors so far".

The internet is also full of praise, decoding, worship and even reports from some professional investors. Box horse fresh life has become the first sample of new retail, and so has the limelight.

However, applause is not necessarily a seat! After on-the-spot investigation and careful consideration, the author thinks that Boxma Xiansheng lives in many questionable places, which has laid a great hidden danger for its sustainable management. The pit trodden by traditional retail enterprises, the current model of box horse fresh life is inevitable.

Let's take a look at the data recently released by Box Ma Xiansheng:

1, the annual turnover of Jinqiao Store in 20 16 is about 250 million yuan, and the floor efficiency is about 56,000 yuan, which is much higher than the average level of the same industry10.5 million;

2. Online orders account for more than 50%, and mature stores that have been in business for more than half a year can reach 70%;

3. The conversion rate of online goods is as high as 35%, much higher than that of traditional e-commerce.

At first glance, these data are really shiny. But the truth needs the analysis of "experts who know cows"-

First, the excellent performance of Jinqiao Store does not represent the whole story. Many retail enterprises will have star stores, and the single-store operating performance of these star stores is unmatched by Jinqiao stores.

The second point is the proportion of online orders. Box Ma Xiansheng forcibly excluded many offline consumers during the payment process. In addition, the free delivery of online orders by Boxma Xiansheng is actually a high subsidy strategy (which will be introduced in detail later), so the proportion of online orders will naturally be high.

Thirdly, when it comes to the online commodity conversion rate of Boxma Xiansheng is higher than that of traditional e-commerce, the author thinks that Boxma Xiansheng is likely to use B2C models such as Tmall Fresh and JD.COM Fresh. In fact, the traffic between the two is very different: from fresh online to offline, users log in to Box Horse APP with a very strong purchase goal, and the conversion rate is naturally high; However, Tmall Fresh and JD.COM Fresh are often random transformations brought by users wandering on the Internet, and the conversion rate is naturally not high. So this comparison is of little significance. If we have to compare, the commodity conversion rate in the fresh area of the physical supermarket is over 90%. How about a box horse?

Therefore, Box Horse only disclosed some of the process indicators, but kept the business performance indicators such as sales and profit margins confidential. This is the practice of reporting good news instead of worrying, which is really unconvincing. The hidden truth is that the business performance of Box Horse is not optimistic. Of course, as an enterprise that is still in the start-up stage, it is also a routine to carry out public relations in this way.

Below, the author makes a speculative analysis of the operation of box horse through some data and discusses it in the industry:

The first store in Box Horse has a daily sales of 400,000 yuan, a gross profit margin of 20%, a customer unit price of 60 yuan, and a distribution cost of 12 yuan/order. What exactly do these data represent? That is, if the monthly sales of the store is 6.5438+0.2 million yuan, the gross profit is 2.4 million yuan.

Referring to the front-office opening rate of traditional supermarket 15- 18%, the front-office opening fee of Box Horse will reach180-2160,000 yuan, but the difference is that the back-office logistics fee of Box Horse is as high as140,000 yuan (based on the monthly order of 200,000 yuan)

The above data comes from field research, and the data can only be roughly accurate. However, the accuracy of this data does not affect our basic business judgment: box horse fresh students are subsidizing, and box horse fresh students are seriously losing money!

In addition to data analysis, the author will also talk about why Boxma Xiansheng fell into the quagmire of losses from the perspective of business logic.

Anyone who has been to Boxma Xiansheng knows that it has several typical characteristics, which is also the focus of many enterprises' imitation:

A, large fresh seafood area;

B, catering and shopping integration;

C, the integration of stores and warehouses, the ultimate logistics and distribution experience.

But is this a function or a BUG? The root of the loss may be based on these characteristics. It looks beautiful, but it often cannot stand the test of market and time.

1

Commodity strategy: the huge seafood area is a Maori black hole.

Boxma Xiansheng's huge fresh seafood area is really shocking and very eye-catching. Because few people dare to play like this, users often feel very fresh. But why don't established retailers like COSTCO and Sam dare to do so? They are all enterprises with great single store performance.

Anyone who has done fresh food knows that fresh aquatic products are basically profit black holes and it is difficult to make profits. They are basically structural supplementary categories, mainly high-frequency freshwater aquatic products, including fresh master Yonghui. The business direction of this category is based on the high standards of freezing and refrigerating fresh food.

Boxma Xiansheng manages fresh seafood on a large scale in a more extreme way! The typical characteristics of this kind are low frequency, high unit price and high loss. The low frequency is determined by the user's diet structure. Although our living standards have improved a lot, our diet structure has not fundamentally changed.

Box Horse's customer base is young white-collar workers. This group's consumption power does not support high-frequency consumption and high-priced fresh food, and this group's recognition of fresh food is not so high. The high unit price is determined by the high cost and loss of fresh seafood logistics.

TAKE, a seafood supermarket in Shekou, Shenzhen, also deals in a large number of fresh seafood, and it is a senior business banquet for large enterprises around. TAKE's single store is very successful. The problem of box horse is to locate the low-frequency and differentiated commodity consumption group of fresh seafood on a large scale. Serve who? Will these customers continue to pay the bill? This difference will lead to different results.

In addition, except for the huge seafood area, there is little difference between other products and boutique supermarkets. On the contrary, due to the limited consumption scenes, the product portfolio is easily covered by competitors, which is inconvenient from the consumer's point of view. Box horse's interpretation of the scene is only a subjective splicing of "eating" scenes, but actually it is not really from the perspective of consumers to organize goods.

2

Category combination: the catering rental area may collapse.

On the integration of catering and shopping. Many comments think that this is the first model of box horse, but I don't agree. In fact, the supermarket industry has always been engaged in fast food, cooked food, cakes and other categories, and there will be a variety of light catering combinations. What is the essential difference between this and a box horse?

However, under the tide of consumption upgrading, slow supermarket enterprises did not upgrade these categories from the aspects of taste, variety, packaging, environment and service, which led to the lower and lower management level of this category and gradually became the choice for employees' working meals or low-income people's meals. Therefore, it is too exaggerated to call the splicing of box horse catering and shopping the so-called cross-border business model!

The author also found an interesting logic: the purpose of box horse is to solicit customers online, which will inevitably lead to relatively few customers coming to the store; Moreover, the joint catering merchants in its stores are basically catering-oriented, so they can only compete for the remaining 30-40% of the passenger flow. How can they manage like this? If they can't continue to operate, how can they contribute to the rent?

Of course, with the brand influence of Box Horse, the occupancy rate of joint catering merchants may remain at a tolerable level for some time, just as many street shops always close down and people always take over. But in this state, how to explain that the mode of box horse fresh life is competitive?

Some time ago, I went to Box Horse for investigation and saw that many joint venture stores were making adjustments. In the long run, the integration of rental catering and self-operated shopping is difficult to maintain, and it will be normal to change tenants like a cursory tour.

If we want to explore the integrated management of catering and shopping, the author highly praises Yonghui's super-species approach. "They are serious about catering", customer orientation is clear, profiting from efficiency and cost control, self-managing, easy to replicate on a large scale, and his work is very solid and reliable.

three

Logistics: The performance cost is twice that of the industry.

When it comes to the logistics of box horses, it is nothing more than the integration of stores and warehouses and self-operated distribution. There is nothing novel about this model itself. Many fresh e-commerce startups do this. What is different is that Box Horse has truly achieved the ultimate in user experience and raised the barriers to competition.

But in fact, it paid a very high price: 12 yuan/single performance cost. Don't question this data. Look at the salary structure of box horse fresh delivery staff: 20 yuan every hour during the protection period, 2 yuan every time, and 8 yuan every time at the end of the protection period (data comes from the open recruitment website).

In addition, the box horse also needs to pay huge rent, equipment, personnel and packaging costs in the sorting area. Because of this, the data of 12 yuan/Zhang is reliable. And the cost of third-party distribution often only needs 5-6 yuan/order, and users have already begun to pay.

Each branch of Box Horse is equipped with a huge and modern sorting background, which ensures their order processing ability. On the surface, this kind of logistics investment improves the efficiency of sorting. But in fact, fresh orders and take-away orders often have strong concurrency. This configuration is usually designed according to peak orders. Just as the government designs the width of expressway according to the peak traffic flow, in fact, the utilization rate is not high, and the general ledger does not necessarily bring efficiency improvement.

In fact, the above reflects a very serious problem. Box horse improves the experience of consumers, but does not improve the operational efficiency of enterprises. The logistics cost and the regular cost of the store are rigid. At present, the expense rate of box horse shop should be twice that of ordinary supermarket. The author thinks that Box Horse has been subsidizing users. How long can the prosperity brought by this subsidy last? How long can the subsidy last?

four

Operation: There is limited room for improvement in later operation.

Box horse online operation ability is very strong. Can the business statements be gradually improved through later operation? I find it difficult.

A very big change in the current business environment is the fragmentation of the business circle. Ten years ago, we could point out where the business center was without thinking. Now you have a try.

This is due to the change of users' consumption habits, the acceleration of the pace of life, the change of business pattern brought by real estate, the rise of store rents and the intensification of competition in the same industry. In this business model, the practice of box horse is equivalent to raising a big hippo in a small pond, and all the aquatic plants are not enough for it to eat! Even if you have strong operational ability and high penetration rate.

The deep-seated reason leading to the dilemma of Box Horse lies in the mismatch of resources. The failure of many startups lies in making small businesses into big costs. Another common reality is that the growth cycle of stores is shortening now, and it will enter a stable platform period in a short time, and there will be no greater growth rate thereafter. This is more and more like a catering enterprise, seeing life and death within six months. So blindly hoping for the future may be disappointing. The old box horse shop has been open for almost two years. Will there really be high growth?

The author agrees with Mr. Hou Yi's statement and accurate core customer orientation theory, but disagrees with Box Horse's handling of non-core users: it is almost a neat addiction. The consumption group characteristics of fresh users may be special, showing typical "dual" characteristics: uncles and aunts and housewives, and this pattern may exist for a long time. The aunts who sweep the floor with box horses are often the decision makers and implementers of three meals a day. Almost half of the trading opportunities are gone, how to improve the penetration rate by more than 70%?

Therefore, whether the target group positioning should be more reasonable with the family as the unit, not with the individual as the unit. In addition, the consumption of fresh ingredients by single young people is actually very low. They only have a rigid demand for quality fast food, but compared with professional fast food, box horse has no core advantage.

Above, the author analyzes many problems of the box horse model, but the author is not a malicious attacker, just an objective comment. Finally, I would like to make three constructive suggestions for reference only:

First, guide users instead of changing them, precipitate users instead of seducing them. The trend of online users is doomed, but the process is slow, and artificial acceleration may have no effect, so the author thinks it is necessary to conform to the law and prepare with both hands.

Second, compressing water makes big stores smaller and evolves into box horses. Lost a heavy burden of expenses to keep the box horse alive. The property availability of small shops is stronger, which can solve the bottleneck of rapid expansion at present; A large number of stores can give Box Horse more tentacles to stick to offline users and support its online strategy.

Third, access to B2C as soon as possible to realize the value-added traffic and make up for the shortcomings of the current commodity structure. Fresh food can only be used as a flow category, and it is difficult to get gross profit as a category. Fresh e-commerce entrepreneurs who died two years ago may have a deeper understanding of this. This is determined by the current situation of competition in the fresh food industry, and it is difficult to make money simply from the retail sector.

Ali may have high hopes for Box Horse, hoping that Box Horse can export methodology to build a team to integrate its acquired physical retail enterprises, which is the starting point of new retail. However, the current box horse has not proved itself, which may be the reason why Ali did not make further moves after a series of acquisitions.

The turning point of retail industry has arrived, just as the substitution of supermarket format for traditional format in the 1990 s is irreversible. Although there are many problems with Box Horse, we can't ignore the self-adjustment ability of this entrepreneurial enterprise! It remains to be seen whether Box Horse will become the new king or leave sadly.