Vanke property Jiangning branch

On the evening of July 20, a paper announcement of listed company Juniper Co., Ltd. finally confirmed the long-standing rumor of "land withdrawal" in the market.

According to the announcement, the plot number. 202 18 Hangzhou retired from Song Dynasty, which was the first batch of Canal New Town plots in Hangzhou on May 7-8. Each other won with a total price of 65.438+78.3 million yuan, with a self-sustaining cap of 265.438+0%.

This is the second case of land withdrawal in Hangzhou since the implementation of the "double limit" in the second half of 2065438+2009 (the first case has special reasons), which is different from the "pre-loss" in the era of unlimited price. The reason for withdrawing the land at the price limit is that it is bound to lose money, so that juniper can cut the meat as soon as possible.

The retreat of Song capital is a wake-up call for the market.

The 50 million deposit will be confiscated and the land will be returned.

The original plot of Juniper Co., Ltd. is the plot GS 100 1- 17 of Hangzhou Canal New Town. In May this year, Hangzhou won the bid at a price of 178 billion yuan, with a self-sustaining ratio of 2 1%, a premium rate of 29.86% and a floor price of 209,625,438+08.

Judging from the land information, this plot is in the core position, and the Canal New Town plate where the plot is located is one of the plates with rapidly rising heat in Hangzhou in recent years. After 20 rounds of bidding, it was won by the bidder Juniper, with a land transfer area of 34,025 square meters, a plot ratio of 2.5 and a buildable area of 85,000 square meters.

Judging from the nature and requirements of this plot, the average selling price of the commercial housing blanks built in this plot is not higher than 26,500 yuan/square meter, and the highest selling price of the blanks is not higher than 29 150 yuan/square meter. Where decoration sales are implemented, the decoration price is not higher than 30,000 yuan/square meter.

Compared with the other four projects of Canal New Town, Juniper ranked last in the price limit of hardcover and first in the self-sustaining ratio, while the strength of other four project developers Vanke, Poly, Rongxin and Hong Kong far exceeded Juniper.

It is reported that Juniper had intended to cooperate with Baolong Real Estate before winning the plot. Later, due to the change of partner's intention, Juniper chose to give up the land. Baolong replied, "This matter has nothing to do with Baolong Real Estate, and Baolong has never had any relationship with this plot, and there is no intention of cooperation."

Judging from the market situation, although it was hard to find a room when the Canal New Town Project entered the market, according to the bidding details of Juniper Land, the floor price was 20,962 yuan/square meter, accounting for 2 1% thereafter. The sales price limit of fine decoration is 30,000 yuan/flat, so it is difficult for enterprises to make profits and there is a risk of loss.

Song Duning would rather lose 50 million yuan than make no profit or give up product quality. In the announcement, Juniper bluntly said that the decision to give up the land use right was made by the company's management after careful consideration of market risk factors and based on the company's steady development.

A large number of real estate projects are "dead" blindly taking land.

1, Huaguang Real Estate went bankrupt.

On August 20 15, huaguang real estate, one of the top 100 real estate enterprises, was declared bankrupt and liquidated by the people's court of Tianning district, Changzhou city, Jiangsu province.

The reason for the bankruptcy of Huaguang Real Estate is that since around 2007, the company has taken land blindly for many times in the Yangtze River Delta region, resulting in the break of the capital chain. The most representative is that in 2008, Huaguang Real Estate invested 323 million yuan to win the plot G 1 14 of Nanjing Jiangning University Town, with the intention of building Jiangning Happy City Project. However, in the following seven years, the plot never started.

In the end, this old house enterprise, founded in 1986, died blindly on the ground.

Taihe Group owes huge debts.

Taihe Group has been frantically taking land before 20 18, but after 20 18, the government began to introduce a large number of real estate control policies, and Taihe Group's radical road was forced to press the pause button and began to actively reduce land acquisition and financing. Although the self-help of Taihe Group has achieved certain results, the net debt ratio has directly dropped to 385%, compared with 20 17.

In the first half of 2020, the short-term debt of Taihe Group was 57.4 billion yuan. Because it could not be repaid, it was also inquired by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. At the media communication meeting in June, Huang Qisen, chairman of Taihe Group, said that Taihe Group had slowed down and taken strong measures. We have taken the initiative to stop taking land, repay some projects, increase sales returns, and do our best to carry out project cooperation with outstanding enterprises.

However, it is obvious that these measures can't get Taihe out of the crisis. Because the short-term debt is as high as 57.4 billion yuan, neither private financial institutions nor banking institutions will lend money to Taihe Group. The fate of Taihe Group has also reached a "critical juncture". How to get rid of the crisis has become a reality that Huang Qisen must face. In fact, there are still many enterprises like Taihe, and many real estate enterprises in the country are facing huge debts.

Real estate financing policy tightened, and another door closed.

On April 16, the CSRC announced the revision of the Guidelines for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Attributes (Trial), which clearly stated:

Restrict financial technology and model innovation enterprises from listing in science and technology innovation board. Real estate and enterprises mainly engaged in financial and investment business are prohibited from listing on the science and technology innovation board.

This means that another door for housing enterprises to enter A shares has been closed.

On the surface, the scale of housing enterprises is huge, but in fact, if you can't borrow money, or your ability to borrow money is too weak, you will only die. In 2020, the average asset-liability ratio of the top 500 housing enterprises was 78.77%, and even the head housing enterprises were short of funds. Last year, real estate enterprises such as Evergrande made hot news because of financial problems. Not to mention small and medium-sized housing enterprises, more than 470 housing enterprises will go bankrupt in 2020.

Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that the competitiveness of a developer depends largely on its financing ability.

There are several main sources of funds for housing enterprises:

1. Purchase money: the money obtained from the buyer when selling the new house.

2. Bank loan: It cannot be used to purchase land.

3. Issuance of bonds: Generally, it can only be issued by large-scale housing enterprises.

4. Non-standard financing: Trust financing is more common.

5. Overseas financing: issuing bonds abroad.

6. Equity financing: At present, in the A-share financing or IPO of Hong Kong stocks, several financing methods are tightening in unison.

Under the "three red lines", according to the statistics of RealData, the scale of overseas bond issuance decreased by 43.5%. In addition, the usufruct trust network also gives the latest data, and the circulation of real estate trusts dropped by 26% in the first quarter.

"Three Red Lines" refers to real estate enterprises excluding three indicators: asset-liability ratio, net debt ratio and short-term cash debt ratio of accounts received in advance.

The specific rules are:

(1) The asset-liability ratio excluding advance receipts shall not be greater than 70%;

(2) The net debt ratio shall not be greater than100%;

(3) The cash short-term debt ratio shall not be less than 1 times.

This is the aspect of borrowing, and of course there is money. Housing enterprises can also go public and let investors be shareholders, so the money they get does not need to be repaid and does not constitute debt, so developers like this financing method best.

However, the listing of real estate enterprises has long been tightened, especially A shares. As early as 20 10, when the regulation of the property market was tightened, the CSRC required the real estate enterprises to issue the opinions of the Ministry of Land and Resources. It is equivalent to suspending the IPO of real estate enterprises. Since 20 16, only one real estate company, Du Nan Real Estate, has been listed on the A-share market. In other words, according to the previous regulations, there is basically no hope for real estate enterprises to list in A shares.

To put it bluntly, developers should control and reduce liabilities.

In this case, it is even worse for developers who used to borrow new and return old. At present, the debts of large housing enterprises are overdue. On the one hand, housing enterprises need funds, on the other hand, they need to control and reduce liabilities. What should we do?

It can only be to sell more houses and improve the transaction rate. You see that a real estate enterprise appears from time to time to engage in sales promotion. The so-called "30% discount" is to withdraw funds and ease liquidity tension. However, new houses generally have a price limit, not only the highest price, but also the lowest price, and the profit margin is limited.

The financing of housing enterprises is constantly tightening, and even the door is closed. What's the impact?

1. In the long run, it can avoid excessive debt ratio of housing enterprises, avoid disorderly development and blind development, and reduce risks in the real estate sector. However, buyers need to pay attention to the risks of unfinished business that may occur in the short term due to financial constraints. When buying a house, choose a developer with complete documents, high credibility, low debt ratio and abundant liquidity. In short, to be an enterprise, you must have capital and pay back the borrowed money. If you want to be big, you have to increase capital, instead of borrowing other people's money to expand the scale and pass the risk on to property buyers or the financial system.

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Many housing enterprises said that they were under great pressure to enter 202 1. Many housing enterprises are already heavily in debt, but they will still raise funds, and they have to take land and operate. In other words, they shouldn't die so fast. If they persist for a few years, they may still have a chance.

Developers can reduce blind land acquisition and blind development, reduce the emergence of land kings, and have a certain effect on stabilizing land prices. Because leading housing enterprises have some advantages in financing, but small and medium-sized housing enterprises do not, this will increase the "Matthew effect" between housing enterprises. After a round of killing, more small and medium-sized housing enterprises will be merged and reorganized, and even go bankrupt.