What kind of grim situation does China, the ninth-grade PEP version, face?

First of all, the real estate bubble crisis is emerging.

Today, Xinhuanet published an article entitled "20 14 China Economic Macro Data Reveals Two Risks of Real Estate and Local Debt", which discussed the severe challenges brought by the real estate bubble and high local debt to China's future economy from many angles. Coincidentally, People's Daily published an article entitled "Three Facts of China's Real Estate Bubble Inventory by Forbes" today: According to a report on Forbes website 65438+1October 20th, the GDP growth rate of China in the past ten years is amazing, but the share of real estate is too high, about% 15. Therefore, real estate has become an important bubble factor for the rapid growth of GDP in China.

The article "Three Facts of China Real Estate Bubble Inventory by Forbes" demonstrates that "the real estate bubble began to show signs of bursting" from the following three facts:

(1), the real estate market accounts for nearly 15% of China's GDP. Taking 20 13 as an example, China's GDP increased by 7.7% year-on-year, of which the real estate market contributed 15%. Real estate not only accounts for more than one-sixth of the total GDP, but also has close ties with banks, construction and many other industries. The real problem that hinders the banking industry is that real estate is the main collateral for bank loans in China, and the collapse of the real estate market means that loans will default, which will have a chain reaction.

(2) In 2013 years, the real estate industry grew at a double-digit percentage. However, the house price, which was rising like a rainbow at that time, showed signs of falling at 20 14. In just 20 13 a year, 2.5 billion square meters of new houses entered the market, equivalent to 25 million houses. By contrast, at its peak, the US housing market had only 2 million new homes. However, according to the data of the National Bureau of Statistics, the highest drop in house prices this year was 1.9%, of which Beijing house prices fell by 0.7% and Shanghai by 0.9%. Existing housing prices in all 70 cities have also dropped by 0.5% to 2.0%.

(3) The first default of China bond market is just around the corner: Caesar Group Holdings Limited, which is listed on the stock exchange, is expected to face an international bond default in early 10. Although it is still within the grace period of 30 days, if the interest is not paid in time, then the company will automatically become a technical breach.

There is a fact that makes China's real estate industry not optimistic: since the 1960s, all countries whose real estate investment accounts for more than 6% of GDP have experienced the bursting of the bubble. When Japan's real estate bubble burst, the proportion of real estate investment in GDP was only 9%, and the local peak was only 6.2% during the US subprime mortgage crisis in 2008. In China, it is generally believed that the ratio is 15%. In August this year, some media made a statistics on real estate investment in 25 cities across the country, showing that the proportion of real estate in GDP was listed as 18. 17%. Such a high proportion is extremely abnormal. If the government adopts macro-control to reduce it, how much impact will it have on GDP?

Second, local debt has been rising all the way, from 4 trillion in 2007 to 23 trillion in 20 14.

China Economic Times reported on May 3rd, 2065438+00: According to the calculation by the Finance Department of the Ministry of Finance, the local government debt at the end of 2007 was about 4 trillion yuan. According to the latest data of CBRC in May 2009, the debt of local financing platforms was 7.38 trillion yuan; By the end of 2009, local government debt will be close to 1 1 trillion yuan, equivalent to three times the local fiscal revenue in 2009.

Reuters and Hongkong 2011118: Many local governments in China are heavily in debt and can be called "Little Greece" of China. Taking Hainan Province as an example, the ratio of accumulated debt to GDP approaches the high level of 100%. In addition, one fifth of China's cities are facing the dilemma of high debt level, totaling $65,438 +0.7 trillion. In 20 1 1 year, a quarter of local bonds will mature. According to the data released by the National Audit Office, the debt of 78 cities in China accounts for more than 100% of GDP. Among all provinces, Hainan has the highest debt level, and the ratio of total debt to GDP is 93%. Driven by the central government's 4 trillion RMB economic stimulus plan, local government debt soared by 65,438+09% in 2065,438+00.

2011April 19, Zhu Haibin, the chief economist of China in JPMorgan Chase, revealed at the press conference that according to the internal research in JPMorgan Chase, by the end of 20 12, the total local government debt in China was "slightly higher than 14 trillion".

2013 June 14 China youth daily published an article entitled "local governments are heavily in debt, and it is difficult to add new debts to old debts". According to the article, the National Audit Office recently announced the results of spot checks on government debts of 36 local governments since 20 1 1 year. The results show that the debt balance of 36 local governments is 384,7581100 million yuan, an increase of 65.438+02.94% in recent two years. Some local governments borrow new debts to repay old debts, and new debts become old debts.

According to the latest data from Xinhuanet, the balance of local government debt in China at the end of 20 14 was 23 trillion yuan, an increase of 30% compared with the end of 20 13.

Regarding the long-term high debts of local governments in China, many economists said: After the global financial crisis broke out in 2008, local governments increasingly relied on loans for investment and construction, which often led to unfinished projects and difficulties in paying debts. Nearly half of local government debt will expire before the end of 20 14. Stephen Green, an economist at Standard Chartered Bank, said that the probability of default of local government bonds in 20 14 years exceeded 50%. This will be the first time this has happened in China. Once there are signs that the government is tightening liquidity, it is hard to predict whether it will cause market anxiety. Once panic occurs, policy makers may find it difficult to deal with it.

Third, large monopoly state-owned enterprises are either in a "high output value and low profit" for a long time, or become the hardest hit areas.

On September 3rd, Xinhua News Agency reported that China Entrepreneurs Association released the list of 20 14 top 500 Chinese enterprises in Chongqing on the 2nd. According to the data, among the top 500 enterprises in China, 43 suffered serious losses (9 enterprises suffered losses exceeding1900 million yuan). Among them, 42 are state-owned enterprises and only one is a private enterprise. State-owned enterprises have become the hardest hit areas.

There is also an equally grim reality: some super-large state-owned monopoly enterprises have long had the phenomenon of "high output value and low profit" and even enjoyed government subsidies for a long time. Among the 9 1 Chinese mainland enterprises that have ranked among the Fortune Global 500 this year, the vast majority rely on monopoly resources, energy and prices, and their main markets and profits are at home, and they have little international competitiveness (including 47 state-owned enterprises and 37 local state-owned enterprises supervised by SASAC). Worse still, among the 9 1 enterprises in China, 16 are losing money. Among them, the strangest thing is that PetroChina and Sinopec, which are generally regarded as profiteering industries by Chinese people, are actually two enterprises that have long been attached to the government. In the first half of this year, PetroChina ranked in the top ten with a subsidy of 565,438+74 million yuan, and Sinopec received a subsidy of 790 million yuan, ranking fourth. In the past ten years, the "two barrels of oil" received government financial subsidies of 1 2,588.3 billion yuan (for details, please refer to the article "Listed companies get government subsidies in the first half of 2030, and PetroChina wins the subsidy king again" on People's Daily in September1).

Fourth, the manufacturing industry has overcapacity, the gold content of science and technology is too low, and the level of international competitiveness is too low.

Since the early 1980s, China's economy has been growing at a high speed. Because the real market economy system is far from being formed, the main characteristics of China's economy are "three more and one less": First, there are too many large state-owned enterprises that monopolize national resources and energy and rely on government policy protection and financial subsidies; Second, there are too many technology "clone" enterprises, low-level repeated construction, weak competitiveness in the international market and low added value of products; Third, there are too many joint ventures, relying entirely on foreign core technologies and basically staying at the level of processing materials. "One less" means that there are too few large companies with high-tech content, living in the upstream of the global industrial chain, strong competitiveness and strong anti-risk ability. This "three more and one less" has led to extensive development and extensive growth of the national economy.

Manufacturing industry has always been the pillar industry of big country economy. However, due to the long-term low-level redundant construction, the added value of products in China today is very low, so we can only rely on "cloning" other people's products, and too many enterprises survive by cheap sales and vicious competition; There are too many joint ventures that completely rely on foreign core technologies and basically stay at the level of processing materials. Because of this, China's manufacturing industry has been in a state of low profit or even loss for a long time. For example, in 20 14, there were 260 manufacturing enterprises in the top 500 Chinese enterprises, with a total operating income of 23 trillion yuan, but the total net profit was only 462.3 billion yuan-only13 of the annual profits of the national 17 national banks; In the same year, the total operating income of 17 state-owned banks nationwide was 552 billion yuan, but the net profit was equally high.

The serious backwardness of manufacturing industry has led to high-tech digital electronic products and internationally renowned brands. China is not only far behind the United States, Japan and many western countries, but also far behind South Korea.

Under the background of economic globalization and increasingly fierce international competition, the serious backwardness of a country's manufacturing industry will inevitably bring overcapacity to the country's manufacturing industry. Therefore, the two are mutually causal.

Summary:

The severe challenges facing China's future economic development are far more than the above four points. Limited to space, other aspects will not be listed one by one.

A very important factor of China's long-term high-speed GDP growth is the advantage of developing countries. Although there are undeniable places in this model, there are also many problems and defects, hiding too many crises and challenges. As for how to resolve the crisis and challenge, it is not the significance of this article.