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What role does the government play in the urbanization process? (The more detailed, the better)
Rapid urbanization is a common phenomenon in developed coastal areas.
Rapid urbanization is a phased phenomenon that the government actively guides the development of market economy from top to bottom, adopts a series of industrial policies, and vigorously promotes the construction of urban infrastructure, leading to rapid urbanization. Rapid urbanization has the following characteristics:
(-) The demand for intensive land use is very urgent. Economic development has entered the late stage of industrialization (in 2000, the per capita GDP of the Pearl River Delta region except Huizhou, Jiangmen and Zhaoqing exceeded US$ 3,000, which has entered the late stage of industrialization according to the international standard model), and the requirements and trends of industrial structure upgrading are very obvious. The development of the tertiary industry has accelerated, and the planting area of ordinary crops has decreased rapidly, but the pace of agricultural industrialization has accelerated.
(B) The role of the government in promoting urbanization is very obvious. In terms of policies, the Guangdong provincial government introduced a policy to promote urbanization in 2000. In terms of investment in fixed assets, local governments set up state-owned or state-controlled subway companies, expressway companies and urban construction companies, and invested heavily in building urban infrastructure and service facilities, which directly promoted urban construction and industrial development. For example, Guangzhou implemented the strategy of "expanding to the south", and planned and built large-scale infrastructure and service facilities such as University Town, Nansha, Metro Lines 3 and 4, Beijing-Zhuhai Expressway, Southern Expressway and Guangzhou New Railway Station in the south. The total investment of these projects exceeds 654.38 billion yuan. While investing in public facilities, the government also invests in the construction of industrial clusters with a scale of 10,000 mu, such as Songshan Lake Industrial Park built by Dongguan Municipal Government, Guangzhou Development Zone built by Guangzhou Municipal Government, Wusha Industrial Cluster built by Shunde District Government, Xinhua Industrial Cluster built by Huadu District and Nanxiangshan Industrial Cluster built by Zengcheng City.
(3) A large number of rural collective land has been expropriated, and the scale of cities has expanded rapidly, leading to the direct urbanization of rural areas and towns. For example, Guangdong Province is building a university town in Xiaoguwei Island, Panyu District, Guangzhou. The first phase of land acquisition 18 square kilometers, relocated nearly 10,000 villagers. This year, the first batch enrolled more than 30,000 students, and the population of service personnel on the island exceeded 60,000. In less than 1 year, the originally backward agricultural island village was turned into a new science and education satellite city.
(D) Closely integrated with undertaking a new round of international capital transfer. For example, Guangzhou invested heavily in the construction of Nansha Port in recent two years, and the first batch of four 50,000-ton multi-purpose berths were built this year, which quickly attracted 500,000 Toyota engines, 400,000 tons of JFE40 hot-dip galvanizing and other large-scale projects to settle down. With the help of international industrial transfer, the prototype of a new coastal industrial city was built in less than two years.
The reform of rural collective property rights system in rapidly urbanized areas lags behind.
In the rapidly urbanized areas, a series of rural problems, such as the difficulty of rural land requisition, the difficulty of continuously improving the efficiency of rural collective assets operation, the intensive disorder of rural construction, the difficulty of farmers' employment transfer, and the difficulty of participating in social insurance, have generally emerged, forming a "rural disease" in the process of rapid development, which has become one of the most prominent problems in the rapidly urbanized areas at present, and is also a new "three rural" problem in the developed coastal areas of China. The emergence of rural problems in rapidly urbanized areas is related to the current level of productivity development, government work efficiency and social and cultural values, but the fundamental reason is that the existing rural management system, especially the rural collective property rights system, cannot meet the requirements of rapid urbanization. Generally speaking, the reform of rural collective property rights system in rapidly urbanized areas lags behind, which is embodied in the following aspects:
(1) There is still a big gap between the rural collective economic organizations and the corporate system in the rapidly urbanized areas, which makes it difficult for the rural collective economy to truly integrate with the modern market economy.
First, the vast majority of rural collective economic organizations still take the form of economic cooperatives, economic cooperatives, joint-stock cooperatives and other joint-stock cooperative systems. A considerable number of villages have not solidified their shares, and the number of shareholders has been constantly adjusted, causing disputes such as "marrying women outside". The shareholders of the joint-stock cooperative system are limited to the farmers in the cooperative organization, and the shares are not transferred to the outside world, which restricts the improvement of asset liquidity and hinders the optimal combination of rural capital across regions and industries. Second, the management personnel of economic organizations are basically limited to the cadres of the two committees of the village, and the quality of personnel is low. However, village-level assets in rapidly urbanized areas have generally accumulated to a considerable scale. For example, the net assets of village-level collective economy in Dongguan City are about 55.27 billion yuan, and the assets scale of economic organizations does not match the quality of managers. In addition, village cadres also serve as managers of village-run enterprises, confusing social administrative affairs management with enterprise management, resulting in a serious problem of separating government from enterprises.
(2) The rural collective land expropriation system is incompatible with the level of economic development, which leads to the contradiction between local governments and farmers.
Rural collective land is an important part of rural collective assets. Rapid urbanization needs to requisition a large amount of rural land. How to compensate rural collective assets actually involves value evaluation and transfer income. At present, according to the land management law, the compensation standard for expropriation of rural land is calculated according to the output value of crops in the first three years of the plot. According to this method, the compensation standard of land expropriation in many rural areas in rapidly urbanized areas is far lower than the land value of surrounding towns. In the rapidly urbanized areas, the potential benefits of land are great, and farmers often think that the government should refer to the market value of land in the surrounding areas for land acquisition compensation. Therefore, there is a great conflict of interest between the government and farmers on the issue of land acquisition. In addition, after the implementation of the new "Land Management Law" from 65438 to 0999, the examination and approval of land use has become stricter, and it will take a long time for local governments to requisition land according to law to improve the procedures for land use. During this period, the relationship between the government and farmers has become more tense, especially since the State Council implemented the land market order rectification this year, the contradiction caused by land expropriation has become more obvious. The government indirectly compensated farmers by reserving rural development land, building farmers' houses (transferred to farmers at cost) and helping farmers buy social insurance. However, how to reasonably formulate the compensation standard for rural collective land expropriation remains to be solved, and the compensation problem of farmers petitioning for land expropriation in rapidly urbanized areas is still serious.
(3) It is difficult for the rural collective land circulation system to guide the intensive use of land and regulate the rural asset trading behavior.
In the rapidly urbanized areas, social capital is rich and mobile, and the asset nature of rural collective land is gradually emerging and constantly strengthening. If farmers use rural collective land to build properties for attracting investment and leasing, rural collective land (especially construction land) can become an important support for maintaining and increasing the value of rural collective assets, thus forming a strong demand for rural self-built properties in order to obtain profits. However, due to this development trend, a set of institutional arrangements to guide the orderly construction and transaction of rural collective land has not been established in the rapidly urbanized areas. As a result, a large number of illegal houses and factories in rural areas have been banned, forming a "city is not like a city, and rural areas are not like rural areas" in the vast towns and villages. For example, in the late 1990s, Guangzhou developed and built the Pearl River New Town, and a large number of high-density "villages in the city" rental houses were quickly built in the surrounding rural areas, which became a stubborn disease in the process of building a modern city with "two benefits". In addition, due to the lack of an effective rural collective land management system, it is difficult for the city government to make overall use of the land in towns and villages, and the phenomenon of "lighting in every village and smoking in towns and villages" is still widespread in rapidly urbanized areas. At the same time, the right to use rural collective construction land is transferred spontaneously in the form of transfer, lease and mortgage. Frequent occurrence, and the number and scale continue to expand. According to statistics, the hidden transaction of rural collective construction land in the Pearl River Delta region exceeds 50% of the collective construction land. There are some problems in the spontaneous circulation of rural collective land, such as unauthorized occupation of cultivated land by non-agricultural construction, unauthorized change of land use, and disputes caused by unclear ownership, which is not only conducive to the intensive use of rural land, but also to the healthy development of rural asset trading market.
(D) The reform of rural property rights system restricts the reform of other rural management systems.
Rapid urbanization is a huge process of asset reorganization and benefit distribution, and the corresponding rural management system reform also needs to pay huge costs, which need to be paid by rural collective assets to a large extent, so it is urgent to carry out rural property rights system reform.
First of all, in terms of household registration system, this year, the household registration system was launched on a large scale in rapidly urbanizing areas. Guangdong province will cancel the goal of "rural to non-agricultural" household plan from this year, and propose to strive to reach 50% of the urbanization level of the province according to the registered population by 20 10, including 70% in the Pearl River Delta. Recently, Guangzhou has established a system of transferring farmers into urban hukou. Since July this year 1, Foshan has registered the registered population of the whole city as a resident account, and Shenzhen has similar reform measures. After the reform of household registration system, it is necessary to increase the construction and operation costs of urban public facilities such as education and municipal administration in the original rural areas, which involves the reform of rural property rights system.
Secondly, in terms of social security system. At present, the rural social security system in rapidly urbanized areas is still in a very difficult initial stage, and the fund gap required for old-age insurance is very large (most farmers did not pay in the past). The important way to solve the problem lies in the income of rural collective assets or the input of land compensation. For example, Foshan initially established a basic old-age insurance subsidy system for land-expropriated farmers this year. District and town governments subsidize 20%-30% of farmers' insurance costs, and village collectives contribute 40%-80%, and individuals do not need to pay fees. This level of old-age security is very low. Existing insured retired farmers can only receive 120 yuan insurance money to 300 yuan every month, which is lower than 3 10 yuan of the city's minimum living security line. The social security fund in Foshan has to bear more than 3 billion financial pressures, and the net assets of rural collectives in the city are estimated to reach 200 billion (mainly property). At present, due to farmers' traditional consciousness and short-term interests, rural collectives are generally unwilling to pay social security and municipal fees. It is very necessary for the government to set mandatory provisions in the land expropriation system and the measures for the management of collective assets to further guide the investment of rural collective assets.
policy advice
Rapid urbanization is a development process vigorously promoted by the government, and it is necessary for the government to take active measures to solve rural problems in this process. In fact, since last year, many local governments have realized this problem and started a lot of positive reforms and explorations, involving many aspects of the rural management system. Some measures have touched the rural collective property right system, forming a massive local government system innovation behavior. However, due to the lack of authority of local governments, especially prefecture-level cities (and below), these innovative behaviors may still be difficult to completely solve rural problems, which require the guidance and support of national and provincial people's congresses and governments, and take corresponding measures to solve them.
(1) Accelerate the reform of the rural collective property organization system. By revising the Regulations on the Management of Rural Collective Assets and formulating normative documents for the reform of rural economic organizations in prefecture-level cities, the following reforms will be implemented rapidly in the process of rapid urbanization: First, the village (team) level organizations will be merged to save management costs. For example, 1993, Shunde District reorganized 2,272 production team-level economic cooperatives into 290 joint-stock cooperatives, reducing the management staff by two-thirds. 200 1 year, 19 1 village and 3 1 neighborhood committee were transformed into 109 villages and 88 neighborhood committees. Second, separating government from enterprises, quantifying shares and establishing a corporate system. Accelerate the implementation of the solidification of shares in rural collective joint-stock cooperatives, and set up village-level collective asset management companies as the main body of collective economic management, accounting independently and taking responsibility for their own profits and losses. Members of the village "two committees" will no longer serve as the legal representatives of the company, but form a board of supervisors to supervise the operation of the company. The work functions of village committees and neighborhood committees will shift to social management and community service. Third, while solidifying rural collective shares, we should reserve a higher proportion for collective shares for public affairs such as municipal education and health, social insurance expenses, etc.
(2) Formulate a relatively unified benchmark land price system for rural collective land. The focus of rural problems in rapidly urbanized areas is land. At present, the biggest problem involved in reforming land acquisition and establishing circulation system is how to reasonably determine the value of rural collective land, thus providing theoretical basis for the formulation of compensation standards and circulation prices. The historical formation of rural collective land ownership in China has its particularity, which was divided by the state into peasant collectives in the land reform in the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China. These land uses are mainly used for agricultural production, rural collective construction land can not be used for real estate management, and the collective land of "villages in the city" needs to pay land transfer fees when it is converted into state-owned land. In addition, the improvement of the value of rural collective land in the surrounding areas of cities and towns is largely due to the huge investment of the government in infrastructure construction. If the land expropriation compensation price is allowed to climb to the market price of urban land, it will cause great resistance to the promotion of urbanization, which is unfavorable to regional development and the long-term interests of villagers themselves. Therefore, compared with urban state-owned land, rural collective land has incomplete property rights, and rural collective land and state-owned land should not be "in the same place, at the same price and with the same rights" for the time being. It is imperative to reform the land expropriation system and establish the land circulation system. The breakthrough of the reform is to unify the compensation standard for land expropriation and the collective land transfer price as soon as possible, so as to avoid conflicts and frictions caused by excessive bargaining between the government, farmers and land-use enterprises in the process of land expropriation and land transaction. Operationally, the land departments of prefecture-level cities can make a unified assessment, divide regions according to different levels of regional economic development, and comprehensively consider many factors such as land prices of surrounding towns, crop output value, infrastructure investment, etc., and formulate a benchmark land price system for agricultural land and collective construction land, which will be used as the standard for land acquisition compensation and land transfer price after confirmation by provincial departments, and will be adjusted every once in a while (for example, three years). Public welfare projects and business projects should adopt the same benchmark land price system (the difference between them is actually the result of urban planning), but the compensation for land acquisition can be supplemented by reserving village-level development land, compensation and reserving land for shares, so that the rural collective economy can retain a certain proportion of land or shares in new land-use projects and share the benefits brought by urbanization.
(3) Accelerate the circulation and agglomeration of rural collective construction land. According to the scope of land requisition permitted by the state at present, Shenzhen, Dongguan and other rapidly urbanized areas are likely to have no land in 5-6 years, and the transfer of rural collective construction land is an important way to supplement urban land. It is urgent to establish a unified planning, construction and management mechanism of rural collective construction land by establishing policy norms to prevent the extensive use of rural land and funds and prevent the recurrence of illegal construction in rural areas. At present, Guangdong Province has issued a pilot scheme for the transfer of rural collective construction land, but it is urgent to speed up the formulation of detailed rules for the implementation of prefecture-level cities. On the basis of standardizing the behavior of land circulation, actively guide the agglomeration of rural collective construction land. At present, Guangdong Province has proposed to promote the intensive use of land in towns and villages through land replacement in the central town policy, and should also speed up the formulation of relevant implementation measures. When building industrial and commercial gathering areas, all localities should try to gather the scattered construction land in the surrounding rural areas by replacement, which not only reduces the land acquisition work, but also helps to balance the interests between governments at all levels and villages. Relevant land use approval work should speed up the formulation of special policies (health norms). There is a strong interest motive in using collective land for illegal construction and trading in rural areas. If the government can't give timely guidance, the waste of social resources will be quite serious.
(4) Accelerate the improvement of the "direct election" system of village committees. The rural collective property right system is closely related to the "direct election" system of village committees. Since the afternoon of 200 1, Guangdong province has fully implemented the direct election of village committees, which has greatly stimulated the villagers' consciousness of being masters of their own affairs, strengthened the supervision over the management of rural collective assets, and promoted the democratization process of rural management. However, the existing "direct election" system basically has no restrictions on candidates' academic qualifications and qualifications, and the elected village head is in charge of the human rights of village collective asset management, which gives many evil forces and clan forces the opportunity to enter the village Committee for rent-seeking through "direct election", and the term of "direct election" is only three years, which is easy to lead to short-term behavior of the village Committee. Rapid urbanization will bring great adjustment to the interests and values of the whole region. At the same time, the implementation of the "direct election" system has added more uncertainty to social stability and the long-term income of rural collective assets. It is suggested that the following measures should be taken to improve the "direct election" system: First, the term of each village committee should be extended to five years through the legislation of the national or provincial people's congresses. At present, the term of office of township governments has been extended to five years, and the term of office of village committees should be adjusted accordingly. The second is to speed up the openness of village affairs, further refine the open management of collective assets, and increase villagers' understanding of the work performance of village committees. Third, the election qualifications of village committees should be properly restricted. By taking the above measures, we will create a more stable environment for the reform of rural collective property rights system and promote the rural collective assets to obtain more long-term stable income.
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