Rongxin service, the IPO of the entity enterprise is the most talked about.

"citic guoan has made financial fraud for seven consecutive years, and the same accountant has signed it for 10 years."

This should be the hottest news in the accounting field at present. Not to mention citic guoan's subjective and intentional financial fraud, even accountants who have signed "unqualified opinions" for 10 years in a row can leave a mark on history, which is of course disgraceful.

It is the duty of auditors to truthfully reflect the true situation of enterprises. But the reality is that under the unspoken rules of the industry, Zhitong Accounting Firm, which serves citic guoan, chooses endorsement as a cover, just as the lyrics say:

Society is simple, but people are complicated.

In the property management circle, since the financial data of the prospectus was delivered in June last year, Rongxin service, which has been questioned and talked about the most, has been caught in the whirlpool of media public opinion. I don't know how the accounting firm that serves it feels.

Let's not talk about the basic situation of the credit service:

Management area170,000 and contracted area of 34.3 million;

From 20 17 to 20 19, the operating income of rongxin service was 260 million yuan, 4 10/00000 yuan and 5 10/00000 yuan respectively.

In 20 17-20 19, the net profit of rongxin service was 6.52 million yuan, 33.8 million yuan and 7 1.5 million yuan respectively.

Conclusion: According to the data of the fourth echelon, the amount of financial services is small, but the growth rate is not small.

Perhaps because the data growth is too beautiful, it was questioned by the media: feeding back the parent company in the name of listing, the financial data is suspected of fighting.

Let's talk about the first point: feeding back the parent company in the name of listing.

Property spin-off and listing are all born out of housing enterprises, and the parent company of Rongxin Service is Rongxin China. Under the control of policies such as staying in the house, not speculating and three red lines, Rongxin China has not been happy in the past two years.

As the first echelon of Fujian housing enterprises, Rongxin China is treading on thin ice at present. Although it only stepped on a yellow line, the evil consequences of high-priced land acquisition in previous years gradually appeared, performance declined, debts expired, and it fell into the strange circle of "borrowing new and returning old".

Last year, the total liabilities reached 654.38+079.449 billion yuan. The listing of property is one of its self-help measures. On the one hand, it can give blood transfusion to the parent company, on the other hand, it can follow the example of Blu-ray Garbo service and Yida service to sell at a good price. Of course, it is more valuable after listing.

However, it has been more than four months since the form was handed in, and the news that the meeting was postponed came. Debt-laden Rongxin China can no longer bear it. I sold the Shanghai headquarters office building in June 5438+February last year, and now I may be waiting for the "property meal".

On the eve of IPO delivery, the dividend of Rongxin Service was 654.38+billion yuan, and the beneficiary was Ou Zonghong's family who held 654.38+0.000% of Rongxin Service, with a book value of only 32.9 million, which almost wiped out the undistributed profit.

You know, it's only two years since the profit turned from loss to profit. Is it difficult to know your own situation? This precedent can be compared with marine services.

In addition, the listing of other entities, although also whitewashed, at least looks like it can stand scrutiny. However, the data in the prospectus of rongxin service makes people feel that their IQ has been lowered, which is too careless.

For example, inconsistent property fees, such as receivables from related parties that far exceed operating income, make investors have to wonder whether the income from property fees is written casually, and whether Rongxin China is using related party transactions to control income and profits.

Let me talk about the second point first: contradictory financial data, two aspects.

0 1. Abnormal income and profit data

Operating income is much lower than the accounts receivable of related parties, which is the main way for enterprises to manipulate income and profits financially. Therefore, when the receivables of the parent company of Rongxin Service, that is, the related party, far exceed the operating income, people have to be suspicious. The data are as follows:

Income:

In 20 17, the contribution of rongxin China only accounted for 20.5% of the total revenue of rongxin service, which rose to 32.6% in 20 18, 30.2% in 20 19 and 33.5% in the first six months of 2020.

Related party receivables:

During the three and a half years from 20 17 to June 2020, the amount of accounts receivable of related parties of the company represented by Rongxin China surged from182.95 million yuan to1650,000 yuan, with an increase rate of 799.96%. Other receivables surged from 22.56 million yuan to 43.57 million yuan.

The payment period has also been extended from 86 days on 20 17 to 209 days in June 2020.

Obviously, the receivables of related parties far exceed the operating income, because in the silent period of IPO, there is no argument for Rongxin's service.

The consequence of this practice is that once Rongxin Service is successfully listed, the company's funds may be occupied by Rongxin China.

02. Property fee data of fighting.

Property companies collect property fees mainly from the parent company's transportation area and its own expansion area.

In rongxin service, according to the latest financial report in 2020, the projects provided by the parent company are in 2.6 yuan, and the third-party projects are per square meter 1.4 yuan.

The management fee income of residential projects developed by third parties has accounted for 29.4% of the total management fee income.

Theoretically, the average property management fee of residential areas managed by Rongxin China will inevitably be lowered due to the third-party property management projects.

Just do the math. Divide the data of 355,265,438+08,000 property fees of Rongxin China, * * Tong Development and the third party by the total management area of 654,387,000, and the average property fee level is 2. 1 yuan/,which is not up to the average level of 2.5 yuan listed in the prospectus.

In addition, the income from residential property fees is also worthy of scrutiny. Attention refers to property management service income, excluding owner or non-owner value-added services. The income listed in the table below is.

Still refer to the data of the mid-year report in 2020:

The residential property fee is 2.5 yuan per square meter, with a construction area of 9.834 million square meters. The income from the multiplication of the two should be 24.58 million yuan, but its prospectus is 87.8 million yuan, which is obviously high.

By analogy, the data of other years have similar problems.

In addition to residential property income, non-residential business is also the same problem. In the middle of 2020, the non-residential building area will be 7173,000 square meters, and the property management fee will be 6.6 yuan per square meter. The multiplication of the two is 47.34 million, while the prospectus is 77.57 million, and the difference is not a little.

According to the data in the prospectus, the residential property fee is as high as 8.9 yuan per square meter, not 2.5 yuan: 87807 divided by 9834 = 8.928;

Non-residential property fee per square meter 10.8 1 yuan, non-6.6 yuan: 77573 divided by 7 173 = 10.438+045.

Which data is true? If you don't go to the Tathagata, you may have to ask for more happiness.

Interested friends can draw inferences and verify it.