Gome's resignation compensation

"Gome" used to be a home appliance hypermarket. Figure/vision china

Gome crisis further fermented.

165438+ 10 18, the listed company Gome Retail announced that it would terminate the acquisition of all the shares of Pengrun Real Estate, which means that Huang Guangyu's plan to inject the shares of Gome Shangdu and Xiangjiang No.9 into the listed company in August this year ended in abortion. In order to support the stock price, Huang Guangyu's property disposal actions have continued in the past two years. On April 7th, 20021year, he has injected nearly 20-year leases of Pengrun Building, Xiangjiang No.9 and Gome into Gome Retail.

However, witnessing the frequent reduction of Huang Guangyu and Du Fu this year, the market is now more willing to interpret the seemingly "self-help" action as "self-defeat".

According to the equity disclosure records of the major shareholder of Gome Retail in Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the shareholding ratio of Huang Guangyu and his wife reached its peak on April 7th, 200211%. Huang Guangyu and his wife have frequently reduced their holdings since the end of 20021. So far, * * * has reduced its holdings by 13 times, and accumulated cash of about HK$ 65,438 billion.

The last time happened in June 165438+ 10/4, that is, four days before the termination of Pengrong's acquisition announcement, Huang Guangyu and his wife reduced their holdings by 0. 138 1 and cashed in 69.05 million Hong Kong dollars. After the reduction, their shareholding ratio is less than half of last year's high point, which is 37.79%. During the year, Gome Management Co., Ltd. and Yongyang Investment Co., Ltd. actually controlled by Huang Guangyu also reduced their holdings simultaneously with Huang Guangyu.

In February, 20021,Huang Guangyu returned to Gome after being released from prison for eight months, and Gome's retail share price soared to HK$ 2.28, the highest point in 10 years. As of press time, Gome's share price is 0. 1 19 yuan, and its market value is less than HK$ 4.3 billion, down 95% from the February high of 202 1.

Gome has fallen into the abyss of debt. The semi-annual report of 2022 shows that Gome's accumulated liabilities to banks, employees, suppliers and strategic partners are nearly 58.6 billion yuan. At the end of the year, accounts payable and bills exceeded 654.38+04.4 billion yuan, while book cash was only 2.4 billion yuan. In contrast, when the Suning crisis broke out at the beginning of 20021,public channels showed that its debt was 40 billion yuan, and the bonds due at the end of 20021were about1600 million yuan.

"I dedicated my youth to Gome.

Now I'm forced out. "

At the beginning of September, Lin Bo, who had worked in Gome for 20 years, resigned. As the head of an operation department at the headquarters, 40-year-old Lin Bo received a notice from the Human Resources Department a month ago, asking him to transfer his post. When signing the contract, Lin Bo, who accepted the transfer, found that the employer was no longer Gome, and Gome did not issue a tripartite agreement on labor dispatch. He was worried that Gome's length of service would be cleared after the new company, while Lin Bo refused to sign a contract and accepted layoffs.

According to the economic compensation regulation of "N+ 1" in the Labor Contract Law, Gome should compensate Lin Bo for more than 300,000 yuan. "But when we talked about it, the manpower proposed to cap the resignation compensation of 300,000. If you don't accept the cap, the resignation compensation will have to be reported to the chairman. The process is very troublesome and the boss may not necessarily approve it. " Lin Bo told China Newsweek. In order to get compensation as soon as possible, Lin Bo resigned after accepting the "compensation ceiling".

Since then, Lin Bo has never received payment from Gome except for the unpaid salary in August on June 5438+00 and June 5438+05. In addition to compensation and salary in September, bonuses in the first half of 2022 were not paid as scheduled. Lin Bo said that in April this year, Gome paid the last housing provident fund for it, and the provident fund has been in arrears since then.

Considering the debt problem of Gome, Lin Bo and his colleagues who were also fired filed a collective labor arbitration. "Because it is a collective arbitration, the Tongzhou District Arbitration Commission (Beijing) asked us to negotiate with Gome before the trial." Lin Bo said that after the first negotiation, Gome proposed to pay the first compensation before120, and settle the remaining compensation in February. But on the day of the negotiation, Gome overturned this plan. "A few hours later, the Arbitration Commission called us again. At first, it said it would be postponed until April 25 next year. Everyone disagreed and finally compromised on March 3 1. We are not satisfied with this plan, but we must first get legal documents that can take effect. " Lin Bo said.

Employees, whether on-the-job or resigned, are owed wages or compensation. Qin Cong, a former employee of Gome App“Dresser, was laid off in June this year and has not been paid since March. "There are more than 70,000 unpaid wages, and we have not paid wages and compensation according to the promised time and amount. We are going to the labor bureau, but the arbitration result has come out and we still can't get the money. " Qin Cong told China Newsweek.

When interviewed, Lin Bo was preparing for the interview that afternoon. "All home appliance manufacturers and e-commerce companies have submitted resumes, but people who go out from Gome have no e-commerce experience, and it is difficult to find a job over the age of 35. Gome also has many old employees who have worked for about 25 years, but many companies in the market are over 32 years old. "

Gome's 20021annual report shows that by the end of 20021,Gome's employees over the age of 35 accounted for more than 53%. The sudden outbreak of Gome crisis means that most of the old employees have to face greater pressure of re-employment.

Lin Bo is married and has children. As the backbone of the family economy, he has been unemployed for more than two months and is in urgent need of capital turnover. "I gave my youth to Gome, and now I am forced to come out. There is nothing left. If you can't find a job, you can only go to Didi, send a courier or take out. " Lin Bo told China Newsweek.

Workplace social platforms show that current and former employees of Gome are very active recently, including Zhao Liming, former vice president of retail strategic management who worked in Gome for nearly 15, 1 1. Prior to Zhao Liming, from July, Gome executives who left the company included Dresser founder Cui Jian, CEO Gao Fei, True Happiness Director Ding Wei, and Gome Butler CEO Zeng Zhining. The most striking thing is the departure of CEO He of Gome Investment and CEO Wang Wei of Gome in September.

Different from the external perception, many employees said that the Gome crisis broke out as early as the second half of 20021year.

"At the beginning of 2020, due to the epidemic, sales declined. However, the serious problem began in the second half of 202 1 and the sales volume plummeted. " Chu Ying, a former employee in charge of the operation, recalled. In the eyes of employees, due to long-term inventory, the turnover days of Gome's accounts payable and bills have become longer. However, in the case of slow settlement, Huang Guangyu strongly changed the long-term cooperation mode after returning the goods, requiring the supplier to pay the exhibition hall service fee in one lump sum, which intensified the contradiction.

Gome's retail financial report shows that from 20 16, the turnover days of the group's accounts payable and bills increased from 1 19 days to 187 days in 2020. With the official return of Huang Guangyu, Gome has successively reached strategic cooperation with Pinduoduo and JD.COM, and the two major e-commerce giants have purchased convertible bonds of US$ 200 million and US$ 65.438+0 billion respectively. In addition, the financing actions visible in public channels include the strategic cooperation between Gome and Kunming Branch of Guangfa Bank. The cooperation signed in May 2020 enabled Gome to obtain a comprehensive credit line of RMB 3 billion from Kunming Branch of Guangfa Bank.

The improvement of cash flow is directly reflected in the turnover days of accounts payable and bills in the following year. In 20021year, Gome shortened this key financial indicator by 12 days to 175 days. In the retail dilemma caused by the epidemic, Huang Guangyu, who was released from prison soon, did not choose to bail out cautiously, but continued his usual style, shouting "Strive to restore the original market position in 18 months" at the group executive meeting.

Since 20021,Huang Guangyu has expanded in five businesses at the same time: e-commerce "true happiness", home dressing ",intermediate platform of supply chain" * * * enjoy * * construction ",wine supply chain" Gome wine cellar "and logistics distribution platform" An Xun logistics ".

At that time, the concept of "hyperuniverse" was in the ascendant, and Huang Guangyu entered the game to recruit blockchain practitioners. Sun Hao, who joined Gome as CEO of Dresser in April this year, included "Home Metauniverse" when introducing his duties. The positive expansion is reflected in the financial report. In 20021year, Gome's retail management expenses increased by nearly 40% compared with the previous year, of which the salary expenses increased by 208 million yuan, from 877 million yuan in 2020 to10.85 million yuan.

The strategy of holding high and hitting high is not favored by the market. After Huang Guangyu's return, Gome's retail share price fell all the way. Among the five new businesses, "Dresser" is in the cold wave of domestic real estate, and "true happiness" is helpless in the face of white-hot e-commerce. The new business with high input and low output has dragged down the main retail business of 15.

The financial report shows that in the first half of 2022, Gome lost 3.297 billion yuan, an increase of 63.3% over 202 1. In half a year, the book cash dropped sharply from 4.378 billion yuan to 2.409 billion yuan, and the turnover days of accounts payable and notes payable soared from 202 1 57 days in the first half of the year to 30 1 day, with a net increase of 144 days.

Before employees are owed wages, consumers can't pick up the goods after paying in Gome stores. Since the second half of 2022, Gome stores in various provinces and cities have been closed on a large scale, and stores have defaulted on rent and utilities.

On the banking side, Chang 'an Bank, Industrial Bank, Shangrao Bank, China Everbright Bank and Jiangsu Bank filed lawsuits for financial loan contract disputes, and cases of property preservation and enforcement against Gome continued. On the supplier side, after Whirlpool China announced that Gome had long defaulted on payment of 82.36 million yuan in April this year, there were frequent incidents in which suppliers from all over the country recovered the arrears.

"Gome's e-commerce

I've never really done it. "

In Lin Bo's memory, he followed Gome through three crises.

The first two crises were closely related, which began in June 2008 when 5438+0 1 Huang Guangyu was arrested and his power was hollowed out. Then, Chen Xiao, founder of Yongle Electric and chairman of Gome's board of directors, and Huang Guangyu's family had a quarrel for two years, and their profitability dropped sharply. It was not until March, 20 1 1 that Chen Xiao went out and Gome gradually resumed its operation.

(Profile picture) Huang Guangyu. Figure/vision china

Gome, which just finished two years of internal friction, soon fell into the situation of "being attacked on both sides". When Huang Guangyu was arrested in 2008, Gome's asset-liability ratio was as high as 88.84%. During the turmoil, Gome adopted a contraction strategy and drastically cut its capital expenditure. Compared with the main competitor Suning, the number and area of stores have decreased, and the inventory turnover days in the past 60 days are much higher than Suning's 46 days.

Also in the year of 20 1 1, when Gome ended its internal strife, the contradiction between home appliance manufacturers and home appliance chains was escalating due to the increasing concentration of home appliance channels, which led to the rise of e-commerce forces represented by JD.COM.

In 2008, the sales of JD.COM Mall was 65.438+32 billion yuan, accounting for only 654.38+0% of Gome and Suning. At that time, the national household appliance chains represented by Gome and Suning accounted for 18% of household appliance retail, and the market was mainly in first-and second-tier cities. By 20 1 1, online shopping channels that also target first-and second-tier cities have accounted for 6.3% of the home appliance market.

Compared with the offline market at that time, the price of home grid purchase is usually 10% to 15%. The game between home appliance manufacturers and chain stores makes the cooperation between manufacturers and e-commerce closer. 20 10, the inventory days of JD.COM Mall in less than 30 days have been significantly lower than that of Gome and Suning, and the operating advantages are obvious.

Gome and Suning both noticed the enthusiasm of the market for e-commerce and began to seek transformation. 20 1 1 year, Gome took the opportunity to acquire Kuba and jointly developed and launched the online shopping website "Gome Online" with Accenture. "Best Buy's e-commerce accounts for only 5% of its total sales, and the e-commerce market in the United States is more advanced than that in China. Therefore, for Gome's e-commerce platform, according to Gome's current physical store sales scale exceeding 1000 billion yuan, its (online) sales revenue should be between 5 billion yuan and 654.38+0 billion yuan. " He, vice president of Gome, said that year.

At that time, Suning reached the peak of cash reserves with a net book value of 6 billion, while Gome was less than 500 million. Under such a financial background, the e-commerce strategies released by Gome and Suning in that year almost run counter to each other.

Compared with Gome, Suning's judgment and planning at that time was extremely bold: "After 10 years, the annual sales scale of Suning.cn will reach 300 billion yuan, and an online Suning with the same level as Suning's physical store will be recreated." In fact, just a year ago, Suning. com's point of view was similar to Gome's, and it was also an effective supplement to e-commerce as a physical store. However, one year after the trial, Suning.cn achieved a year-on-year growth of 400% at 20 10, and its attitude suddenly changed.

In 20 12, Suning and Gome were involved in the price war initiated by JD.COM and Tmall. "If JD.COM continues to develop like this, the share of our physical stores will also be divided by these e-commerce." Sun Weimin, vice chairman of Suning, said publicly that year. To this end, Suning shouted "truly implement the price war with the whole network price comparison". Han Depeng, general manager of Gome Online, responded: "Gome is not afraid of price comparison."

The rhetoric failed to help Gome break through the fierce e-commerce price war, but instead made Gome's annual net profit negative. By 20 13, Gome's capital expenditure had to shrink again. In retrospect, in the crucial year that decided the direction of Suning, Gome and JD.COM in the next decade, Gome chose to shrink its online business and deepen its offline business. Suning officially launched an online and offline integrated Internet retail model, while JD.COM made great strides with its price advantage, rich non-electric products and good user experience, gradually widening the gap with Suning and Gome.

"Various manufacturers have gradually completed the classification of their products, which means that e-commerce products and offline products are completely separated. The entire e-commerce industry has gradually monopolized low-end products, which means that chain drainage products are basically gone. " Lin Bo told China Newsweek.

In the following three years, Gome, whose online business contracted, did not invest in e-commerce research and development. Compared with tens of millions of users in JD.COM and Suning, the number of active users of Gome Online stayed at100000, and SKU was far behind JD.COM and Suning.

Lin Bo also considered leaving Gome to join the e-commerce platform. "Gome's own e-commerce is not doing well. I was not optimistic about e-commerce at that time, but I didn't expect JD.COM to develop so fast. "

Gome 20 16 revisits online business strategically. However, Gome Online has missed the opportunity to compete with Ali, JD.COM and Suning. "Our online (business) is not to break away from Ali, JD.COM PK, or all offline to online transformation. It should be able to maintain a growth rate of 90% and 100% this year, but it is uncertain whether it will continue to slow down next year. " Lee Hung, director of Gome's retail investment relations, said at an investor exchange meeting.

Behind the fuzzy management, Gome has always been unable to sort out the ideas and goals of online business. At that time, Gome was unable to seize the e-commerce and could only seize the tiny incision of after-sales service "Gome Butler".

From 20 17 to 20 19, Gome, which has never really developed e-commerce business, proposed a strategic transformation from "e-commerce retail" to "home life". In this strategy of exploring "home+home improvement" based on home appliance chain, there is still no operable path for online transformation. From the operational point of view, in 20 18, Gome successively settled in Pinduoduo and JD.COM, and opened two flagship stores of Gome's e-commerce, which seems to have completely abandoned its e-commerce platform. "Gome's e-commerce has never really done it." Lin Bo told China Newsweek.

Until 2020, on the eve of Huang Guangyu's release from prison, Gome suddenly launched an e-commerce platform "really happy". However, both the market and employees are quite confused about the positioning of their "social entertainment" e-commerce. Before there was a traditional e-commerce giant, there was a rising "shake fast" live e-commerce. Where is Gome's living space?

In the specific operation, "True Happiness" tried live broadcast, knife cutting and other gameplay, but failed to cause market repercussions. "Our e-commerce is really bad." Chu Ying told China Newsweek.

"The analysis is dizzy,

But in fact, everyone knows. "

Compared with the vacillation of online business and the uncertainty of new business after Huang Guangyu's return, it is difficult for Gome to survive on 14.

20 1 1, the era of national chain-led home appliance channels is over. However, the rise of e-commerce and the strong online layout of competitor Suning do not mean that the intensity of offline competition is reduced. On the contrary, since e-commerce first cut in from first-and second-tier cities, it has become particularly difficult to maintain market share.

From the perspective of store operation, Gome has been biting Suning in the number of stores for more than ten years, and the gap in single store area has remained stable. From the perspective of offline efficiency, Gome's sales per unit area is always higher than Suning's, even in the most difficult period of Gome from 2065438+00 to 2065438+02.

20 13 decided to shrink online business, deepen offline Gome, shrink capital expenditure, turn to refined operation, and pay more attention to the choice of high-margin differentiated goods. At that time, Gome closed 126 inefficient stores and opened 93 new stores nationwide, paying more attention to third-and fourth-tier cities with poor e-commerce layout. This enabled Gome to immediately shorten the accounting period and improve its inventory, income and net interest rate. Along this line of thinking, in 20 14, Gome achieved revenue of 60 billion, of which 95% came from offline.

Under the market background of low gross profit margin, after two years of exploration, it is found that the secondary market dominated by third-and fourth-tier cities will become an important force to promote growth. In 20 15, Gome put forward a clearer and clearer path to the strategy of deep cultivation.

At that time, the secondary market was dominated by brand franchise stores and regional home appliance chains. Gome's market share is only 3%, the secondary market accounts for 39% of Gome stores, and its revenue contribution accounts for less than 25%. In order to win the secondary market, Gome acquired 590 in-vitro stores with the same store sales and higher gross profit margin than listed companies on the basis of 1224 stores. And the "Yiwei" storage of 65.438+0.09 million square meters has also increased the storage area of Gome by more than 50%.

In the primary market, Gome began to follow the example of IKEA and try to experience stores. In order to improve the gross profit margin, Gome is not satisfied with the screening of finished products, but turns to the first customization, striving for the first launch of Huawei's flagship new products and Apple's new products. In addition, Gome is no longer satisfied with high-end consumers who only eat high-end goods, but instead relies on low-cost underwriting and large-scale promotion to obtain low-end consumers. For example, after the launch of the new iPhone, the previous generation of products will be underwritten at a low price to achieve a higher profit margin. This exploration won Gome the title of "Best Distributor" of Apple in 20 14.

By 20 17, Gome's main stores have surpassed Suning in scale and area, but the killing of the secondary market continues. Under the pressure of e-commerce, the sales and management expenses of Suning and Gome have increased substantially, including personnel salaries, advertising expenses and rent. On the issue of inventory, Suning reduced the inventory turnover days to 37 days with the help of the "online+offline" integration model, while Gome increased it from 48 days in 2007 to 68 days.

"Gome's inventory problem has been very serious." Lin Bo told China Newsweek that in order to differentiate itself from e-commerce, stores choose high-end products with high gross profit and high price, which will inevitably lead to the further reduction of consumers of low-frequency household appliances.

Twenty years ago, Lin Bo started from the grass-roots sales of Dazhong Electric Appliances, and then entered the headquarters to be responsible for purchasing. Lin Bo believes that Gome's feedback from retail terminals to procurement has always been sensitive and smooth, even when e-commerce rises and Gome is gradually forgotten. However, with the continuous accumulation of unsalable inventory problems, after the outbreak in 2020, sales gradually got out of control.

"The most direct impact is that we start to work overtime." In 2020, Lin Bo was promoted to Director of Operation Department, responsible for commodity analysis. "Because the sales are not good, it is necessary to analyze why the goods are not easy to sell, or why the store drainage is unsuccessful. What's our inventory status? 90 days, 180 days, 360 days, what is the slow-moving ratio? I have been analyzing and dizzy, but in fact, everyone knows that the economic environment is not good and e-commerce competition is greater. " Lin Bo told China Newsweek.

"If the inventory is poor and needs to be improved, we will make suggestions on how to sell and how to negotiate with the manufacturers. However, it costs money to solve these problems, such as promotion and discount. The money is in the hands of the sales department and needs to apply for funds from the group. But because there is no money, it can't be solved in the end and it can't be pushed. " Lin Bo recalled.

From 20 16, Gome's retail fell into the abyss of loss. By the end of 20021,the accumulated loss in five years was about 20 billion yuan, which was already difficult to support and eventually collapsed after Huang Guangyu's return.