Longguang suspended the payment of interest due on five US dollar bonds.

The reason is the debt crisis. On August 7, Longguang announced that it would suspend the payment of interest due on five overseas dollar senior notes, which was a substantial debt default. Second, the stock price crisis. On August 24, Longguang resumed trading after more than three months of suspension, and the market reaction was a sharp drop. After plunging again 16% on September 5th, the market value of Longguang was only HK$ 3.8 billion. It's almost gone The third is the business crisis. The 2022 interim report disclosed at the end of August shows that Longguang's performance in the first half of the year can be said to be terrible. Behind the triple crisis lies the fourth crisis, which is easily overlooked, but it may be the most serious: the crisis of trust. Since the beginning of this year, from the disclosure of off-balance sheet debts to the replacement of audit institutions, the outside world has been questioning Longguang. 0 1. Off-balance-sheet liabilities changed hands and became the real Longguang. I'm afraid no one can tell you how big the debt is. In addition to the figures disclosed by the company, Longguang was also questioned about the existence of a large number of undisclosed debts. As early as June 5438+ 10 this year, there was news in the market that there were about 2-3 billion dollars of undisclosed US dollar private debt in Longguang Group. Longguang Group naturally denied it at first. On June 4th, 65438+ 10/kloc-0, Longguang also announced that it would buy back 20 million US dollars of senior notes from the open market, trying to prove that it was "not bad money". But soon Longguang admitted in the investor conference call that the private debt it guaranteed did not exceed $654.38 billion. If we question Longguang's off-balance-sheet liabilities, it is only a market rumor with uncertain sources. However, in the first half of the year, many well-known institutions personally stepped down to question. Since then, Longguang's off-balance sheet liabilities are no longer as simple as rumors. To give just a few examples: 1. Standard & Poor's: 65438+1At the end of October, Standard & Poor's announced that Longguang's "BB" long-term main credit rating and the "BB-" long-term debt rating of the senior unsecured bonds that have not yet matured were included in the negative credit watch list. The reason is that Standard & Poor's believes that Longguang may have a previously undisclosed debt guarantee, so more information is needed to analyze the existence of the debt. Followed by UBS: In March, UBS released a report that Longguang's off-balance sheet debt may reach 58 billion yuan to 79 billion yuan. It is 1.23 times to 1.67 times of the net debt of 202 1 interim report. Longguang's rating was downgraded from neutral to for sale, and its target price was also significantly lowered to 65438+ Ernst & Young, the latest auditor of Longguang, resigned in May. The resignation report mentioned that he received an anonymous email. The email mainly questioned three points: ① whether Longguang has the ability of sustainable operation; (2) Whether Longguang properly disclosed the $2 billion to $3 billion guarantee for joint ventures and associated enterprises; (3) Whether Longguang disclosed that it provided a guarantee of $65.438+35 billion for the loan of the joint venture. Until August, Long answered the question in the annual report of 20021:In 20021,the amount of guarantees provided by Long for joint ventures, joint ventures, partners and entities controlled by them was 2.71.60 billion yuan. According to this year's disclosure standards, the amount of guarantees provided by Longguang for joint ventures, joint ventures, partners and entities controlled by them is 30.37 billion yuan. The initial guarantee amount disclosed by Longguang in the 2020 annual report was only 6.56 billion yuan, a difference of 23.8 billion yuan. It is similar to the amount of market rumors at the beginning. Of course, Longguang will not easily admit that he deliberately concealed this more than 20 billion. The company's reason is that the real estate market changed greatly in 20021year, and the company adopted stricter standards for the maximum risk exposure of financial guarantees in 20021year, and adjusted the data in 2020 on the basis of this standard. 02. Can you believe it in the future? As a former "land harvester", Longguang has no comment on its performance in the past six months. Objectively speaking, in the last year or two, Longguang's situation is not good, whether it is business situation or debt situation; But this is the general trend of the industry, and it is not the problem of the Longguang family. However, in dealing with whether there are off-balance-sheet liabilities and how many, Longguang's integrity is questionable. In February, the market rumored that Longguang changed the audit institution. Longguang not only quickly dismissed rumors, but also said that the two sides communicated well. In May, An Yong really resigned, but Long Guang made no mention of his resignation letter in the announcement, saying only that the epidemic isolation affected the audit progress. The question is, the impact of the epidemic is there. Why can the audits of other housing enterprises be completed, but Longguang can't? Why did Ernst & Young audit other companies normally, but did not audit Longguang on schedule? In August, Longguang announced that it would suspend the payment of interest due on five valid foreign currency US dollar bills, which was a formal breach of contract.