9? 27 Shanghai subway accident details

On September 27th 14: 37, a rear-end collision occurred between two trains on the subway 10 line in the downstream section from Yuyuan Station to Laoximen Station 100m 176, causing 295 people to go to the hospital for examination. At present, 70 people are still hospitalized for observation, and no one has died.

The accident investigation team found out that the power supply company of Shentong Group Maintenance Center issued an uninterrupted work ticket without taking risk identification and targeted preventive measures, which was approved by Shanghai Metro First Operation Co., Ltd. On September 27th 13: 58, when the electrician of Shanghai Automation Instrument Co., Ltd. blocked the cable hole of Xintiandi Station of Metro 10 line, the power supply was missing. As a result, the signal of Xintiandi centralized control station on 10 line is dead, and the automatic monitoring screen of centralized control train is black. Metro operation is changed from automatic system to manual control system.

At this time, 10 16 train showed no speed code after descending from Yuyuan Station, and the driver immediately reported to the dispatching control center of 10 line, and the traffic dispatcher ordered10/6 train to run to Laoximen Station (RMF) by manual speed limit. 14, 10 16 stopped at the red light between Yuyuan Station and Laoximen Station, and the traffic controller ordered it to stop and stood by. 0 14: 08+0, the traffic controller starts to locate the train. 14: 08 The traffic controller issued a dispatch order, and the telephone blocking method was implemented on the uplink and downlink sections from Jiaotong University Station to Nanjing East Road Station.

14: 35, 1005 train leaves from yuyuan station with bus tickets. 14: 37, 1005, when traveling at a speed of 54 km/h to the corner between Yuyuan Station and Laoximen Station, found a train (10 16) passing ahead, and immediately took braking measures. However, due to inertia, the speed is still 35 km/h, 106544.

According to the accident investigation team, the direct cause of the accident is that the subway traffic dispatcher illegally issued a telephone blocking order without accurately locating all the trains in the fault section; Without strictly confirming whether the line in the section is free, station attendant illegally agreed to the telephone blocking requirements of the departure station, resulting in the rear-end collision between the subway 1005 train and the 10 16 train.