Manstein: Not the best general in Germany in five aspects.

General World War II military enthusiasts and German military scholars will think that Rommel, manstein and guderian are the best military generals in Nazi Germany, and manstein, also known as "Earl of Lightning", is a military genius and strategist.

Guderian spoke highly of him, thinking that he was the best person in the army commander-in-chief, and he himself wanted to be the military leader of the Eastern Front of the Third Reich. Based on the historical records such as the war history and the memoirs of the parties, this paper tries to talk about people calmly and objectively and restore the true face of the myth of "Count Lightning"-"First Nazi General".

1. Manstein's once brilliant military achievements.

In the Polish campaign in September 1939, Manstein mainly played the role of a staff officer. He was the chief of staff of the Southern Army Group that invaded Poland. During the election campaign, he made some very reasonable suggestions. For example, Manstein's southern army group surrounded the main force of the Polish army continuously. It is said that the commander at that time adopted Manstein's suggestion. After the German army besieged Warsaw, it was Manstein who suggested that the German army use artillery and air force bombing to attack Warsaw without water and food, so as to force Poland to surrender, thus avoiding the tragic urban street fighting. On September 28th, the desperate Bo army finally surrendered across the board.

After the Battle of Poland, Manstein made the famous "Manstein Plan" to invade France. 1 February 940,1,manstein became the commander of the 38th German Army. According to the "Yellow Plan", the Germans concentrated on using armored forces to cross the Ardennes forest, then quickly occupied the bridgehead of the Maas River, and attacked maginot line eastward, quickly cutting off the French army in the north. "Europe's number one military power" was defeated in just one month. There is no doubt that the rapid victory of the French campaign was partly attributed to the unexpected victory of the Manstein Plan.

1941February, Manstein was appointed as the commander of the newly formed 56th Armored Army, preparing to invade the Soviet Union. 1941From June 22nd to 26th, after the outbreak of the Soviet-German War, manstein's armored forces advanced 320km into the Soviet Union, captured the bridge on the Dona River and almost rushed into Leningrad, winning him the title of "Earl of Lightning".

In September, manstein became the commander of the Southern Line (Crimea) German Army 1 1, belonging to the southern German Army Group under the command of Marshal rundstedt. He commanded 1 1 army to successfully go south, captured Crimea, and captured 430,000 Soviet troops. By 165438+1October16, the whole Crimea was completely occupied except Sevastopol. When winter came, Manstein resisted the Soviet counterattack and continued to push south. In July 1942, 1, manstein's troops occupied the fortress of Sevastopol. In his memoirs, he claimed that he captured100000 Soviet prisoners of war in Sevastopol. According to the data of the post-war Soviet Union, many captured prisoners of war were not real soldiers.

Manstein, with outstanding achievements, was promoted to German Marshal. In late July, 1 1 army turned to the northern line and joined the northern army group. 1in August, 942, manstein was responsible for directing the German attack on Leningrad. During this period, Manstein's military achievements can be described as "brilliant".

In military art, Manstein was the first to put forward the idea of establishing an independent assault artillery. Later, Nazi Germany set up some independent assault artillery units. Of course, this armored mobile artillery group could effectively support the outnumbered German infantry, but due to technical defects, too few people and other factors, the assault artillery group could not play a decisive role in the battle. In all fairness, Manstein's "Manstein Plan" is a model of a military strategist, and it has done well in Leningrad, Crimea and Kharkov! He also wrote a good book about military history-The Lost Victory.

2. The mistakes made in the decisive campaign that decided the national movement:

First, mistakes in the Battle of Stalingrad.

When the Sixth German Army fell into the trap of Soviet encirclement in Stalingrad, Hitler was very ambivalent about whether to retreat or stick to it. Emotionally, he can't accept the fact of retreating. The word "retreat" is not in the dictionary of German soldiers. It is unreasonable for a second-class people like Russia to force the best German soldiers to flee hastily. But Hitler was well aware of the consequences of being surrounded. He first asked Zeitzler to tell paulus to turn around and stand by. At one time, Hitler was ready to sign an order for paulus to break through.

But the opinions of two people at that time influenced Hitler's decision. The first was Air Marshal Goering, who assured Hitler that his air force would fully support the Sixth Army and was fully capable of ensuring the maintenance of the Sixth Army. The second person who influenced Hitler's decision was Marshal Manstein, who was very fond of the Fuehrer at that time. Hitler listened to Marshal Manstein before making a decision and asked him if he was sure to rescue the Sixth Army. Manstein said he could save it. According to the latest news, Manstein also believes that if the Sixth Army breaks through, even if it succeeds, it will be defeated by the pursuing Soviet army, and hundreds of thousands of people in the Sixth Army will become useless skirmishers to stabilize the Eastern Front, so he euphemistically expressed his disapproval of the breakthrough. So Hitler ruled out all interference, resolutely ordered paulus to stick to foreign aid, and lost the best opportunity to break through.

Manstein served as commander of the newly formed German Army Group on the Don River, and had jurisdiction over General Hoss' 4th Panzer Corps, General paulus's 6th Army and Romanian 3rd Army, among which the whole 6th Army and part of the 4th Panzer Corps had been surrounded in Stalingrad. Marshal Manstein was full of ambition at that time. At General Wilkes' headquarters, when Wilkes anxiously told him about the danger of the Sixth Army, he confidently interrupted Wilkes. "Don't worry, I'll try my best." Then he personally sent a telegram to paulus, asking paulus to insist on assistance. This is the famous "Don't give up, I will come to save you, Manstein." Telegraph However, when General Hubie told Manstein that this sentence had become the most popular sentence among the officers and men of the Sixth Army in the encirclement, Manstein, who had been unable to keep his promise, denied it, saying that he had never made such a promise. Someone (alluding to the high command keitel and others) slandered his reputation out of thin air.

Even three weeks after the establishment of the prison camp, Hitler was still hesitating, wondering whether his decision to let Admiral paulus stick to it was wrong. But at this time, the Fuehrer can only hold good wishes and bet on manstein.

Manstein's task is to rescue these trapped troops. 165438+ In fact, on June 28th, the German army group on the Don River had discovered 143 numbered Soviet troops, and the army group on the Don River under the command of manstein launched an attack on February 28th 12. By February 24, 65438, the rescued Germans were only 50 kilometers away from Stalingrad. But then the Soviet army made a careful and vicious battle plan and invested a strong counterattack force. Manstein's army group on the Don River was ruthlessly blocked and forced to retreat 200 kilometers.

The sixth army ran out of ammunition and food, and the wounded were full of soldiers. The end is coming, and manstein can't keep his promise. When the enemy was desperate, Manstein asked paulus to break through with him, knowing that it was impossible. So a major named Eichmann (intelligence director) was sent to contact paulus without sincerity, instead of the chief of staff of the Tang Army Group or one of his generals. The decision-making responsibility concerning the fate of hundreds of thousands of troops is not something that a small major can bear. Obviously, manstein didn't really want the Sixth Army to break through with him. He's just going through the last procedure before he retreats. Then in his memoirs, on the grounds that paulus refused to break through, he pushed the responsibility of Stalingrad's failure to clear up completely.

On the issue of Stalingrad, Manstein is very different from Hitler. Once Hitler established his faith, he would not change it. Manstein will constantly revise his position according to the actual situation, which is why we see Manstein's performance on the Stalingrad issue and some of his contradictions. However, there is no doubt that manstein influenced the Germans' decision to stay or not.

To sum up, Marshal Manstein and Goering have an unshirkable responsibility for the tragedy of Stalingrad. However, it is unfair for people to blame all the failures of Stalingrad on Hitler's tyranny, dictatorship and interference after the war.

Second, the important mistakes in the battle of the court.

The battle of Courths is an attack that should not be launched. Manstein, who was overjoyed, wanted to repeat the glory of the battle of Kiev in 4 1 year. He was the only general in the German army who repeatedly urged Hitler to launch this campaign.

1in March, 943, after making great sacrifices, the Germans defeated the Soviet army and occupied the important town of Belgorod. Manstein took it for granted that Germany had the military power of the Soviet Union to eliminate the prominent part of Courths. He suggested that the Southern Army Group and the Central Army Group destroy the Soviet Army Group in Cordes to shorten the long front, that is, the "fortress battle plan".

Manstein's plan was opposed by most German generals, including the famous guderian, Mo Deer and others. Marshal Krueger, commander of the Central Army Group, also said that the Central Army Group had no choice but to Manstein's plan.

Even in the spring of 1943, it is not realistic. There are only 495 tanks left in the East German Army 18 armored division, and the troops have been fighting continuously 10 has not rested in rotation for more than a month, so they are very tired.

The continuous spring rain made the road muddy, waiting for the new equipment to let the fighters pass by completely. Manstein defended himself in his memoirs, claiming that he also suggested canceling the Battle of Cortes. Unfortunately, his statement of attitude change has been confirmed by the memoirs of the parties concerned. In fact, the reason he claimed for proposing to cancel the Battle of Kurtz was not to suggest canceling the battle, but to get reinforcements from two divisions and urge the battle to start as soon as possible. Manstein's request was coldly rejected by Hitler. Manstein has always been an active advocate and instigator of the palace war.

In the Battle of Kurtz, the attacking Germans suffered heavy losses in front of the embattled and disparate Soviet troops. The attack direction of the Central Army Group on the North Road was judged as the main attack direction by the Soviet Union. After heavy casualties, the armored forces turned to attack at Mo Deer's insistence. On the other hand, the South Road where manstein is located has a strong German force and a relatively weak Soviet defense, so the German propulsion strategy in the South Road is superior to that in the North Line. Should have stopped when things were going well, but manstein didn't have a strategic overall view. He focused on the gains and losses of one city and one place and thought that victory was within reach.

Sun Tzu's art of war is called a general, and it is the same at home and abroad to know how to "fight cautiously". Marshal Mo Deer repeatedly urged Hitler to stop the Battle of Kurtz, but Manstein did the opposite, insisted on continuing the attack, and put about 150 tanks into the 24th Panzer Corps (23rd Panzer Division and Viking Grenadier Division) of the last reserve. Hitler was swayed by considerations of gain and loss, and he believed in manstein. Hitler's decision was based entirely on his infinite trust in manstein and his infinite desire for victory. Manstein's continued attack could not defeat the Soviet reserve armored forces, and the situation forced Hitler to finally make a decision to transfer several armored divisions in manstein, thus ending the Battle of Kurtz in an anticlimactic manner.

Facts and data have proved that it is impossible for Germany to win the battle of Kurtz. From July 5 to 23, Manstein's southern battlefield wiped out 14395 Soviet troops, but lost 54,000 troops and 900 tanks and self-propelled artillery, only temporarily occupied some irrelevant land, which had no operational or strategic value. Manstein's continued attack can only be to throw all the last German armor into the hands of Russians who occupy favorable terrain and are good at defending. German armored forces (2,400 tanks or self-propelled artillery) were stretched before the recent counter-offensive of the Red Army (7,900) and remained passive for the rest of the war years.

After the Battle of Kurtz, the Soviets began a big counterattack. Mo Deer has prepared for a rainy day and led the Germans on the northern line to fight and retreat; The Germans on the southern line of manstein are in an offensive position that is not conducive to defense. They suffered avoidable losses and withdrew from the occupied positions at a high price. Manstein's poor defense led to the defeat of Nazi Germany.

Three. The contribution analogy highlights Manstein's lack of military capability.

Manstein played his talents in the defending wars of Kharkov and Dnieper River, and made up for the stability and fragility of the Eastern Front many times. However, it is obviously inaccurate to evaluate his talent only by his autobiography "The Lost Victory". Konev mentioned Manstein's exaggeration of Soviet military strength in his memoirs. The obvious fallacy is that in the Battle of Kharkov, he said that the ratio of the number of German and Soviet divisions was 1:8, and he counted all Soviet tanks (only serial numbers, but the actual strength was less than one division) as Germans. As a field commander, his information can't be so inaccurate. There is only one explanation that exaggerates the difficulty of Kharkov 1943 counterattack.

Manstein was good at organizing well-planned offensive warfare, but he wasted too many troops and made great mistakes in defensive warfare. Hitler once accused manstein of being responsible for the bad situation of the southern army group and wasting a lot of troops. Judging from Hitler's thinking, manstein often asked for reinforcements, and the result was a mess. No matter how many troops are assigned to him, it is not enough for him to fill the black hole. In addition to the objective reasons such as the tragic situation on the Eastern Front and the strong attack of the Red Army, manstein's command was indeed insufficient.

Winning with obvious advantages is far more valuable to a general than commanding the army to defeat the strong when the weak are at a disadvantage. It is not that some people narrowly think that "the army and navy are not comparable" and their contribution to the national movement of the Third Reich is comparable. For example, Deng Nici was called "the originator of submarine tactics" in World War II, and his military role was "a person who could have changed the course of World War II". Although the number of German submarines is small, Deng Nici has set a dazzling record. He creatively put forward that "our submarines must be in groups, in order to break the British escort system!" Brand new submarine tactics.

From1June 1940 to165438+1October, only six German submarines were lost. * * * sank 272 allied ships, accounting for 1.395 million tons. The "wolves" released by Deng Nici ravaged the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, which almost ruined the fate of the British Empire. British Prime Minister Churchill still wrote in his post-war memoirs: "In the war, the only thing that really scared me was the threat of German submarines!" After 1943, the powerful economic and military potential of the allies began to play a decisive role. Nearly 100 special protection aircraft carriers were modified by merchant ships, and three-dimensional anti-submarine replaced plane anti-submarine. Deng Nici lacks submarines and air support, but it still restricts its allies' naval and air forces with absolute disadvantage, delaying the opening of the second battlefield.

Manstein's efforts to stabilize its southern front are often at the expense of its brothers, such as the Central Army Group or the Northern Army Group. In the German army, there is no outstanding general who pays equal attention to both offense and defense, and Rommel is one of the most outstanding representatives. First of all, Rommel's Infantry under Attack is a more academic book than The Lost Victory. In World War I, Rommel performed better than Manstein. Rommel was wounded twice and won the military medal four times. In Africa, Rommel led his troops into more than 350 kilometers in less than six weeks of fighting, occupied the bloody sands and conquered cyrenaica. At the expense of more than 2,000 casualties, about 97,000 enemy troops, 485 chariots, 4,000 trucks and hundreds of artillery were captured. The allies called it "the fox in the desert" and even dubbed it "Hannibal in the 20th century". Although manstein also won some victories on the Eastern Front, he never won the respect of the Soviet Union.

In terms of defense, Rommel successfully moved Africa to the port of Brega in the face of the British "Crusader" attack, and Rommel also successfully organized a thousand miles retreat. Unfortunately, the code was deciphered by the Allies, Rommel's last counterattack failed, and a generation of owls sadly ended their "African myth". The African legion led by the mediocre General Anam finally walked into the grave of destruction. After 1944 was put into use again, Rommel effectively organized and built the "Atlantic barrier". Unfortunately, when Normandy landed, the project was not completed.

Mo Deer is another German "defense expert". In fact, Modell is equally good at attacking. More importantly, Mo Deer was a general who was good at leading the German army to success at a disadvantage. Offensively, Mo Deer took part in many battles against Poland and the Soviet Union, as well as the Battle of Kursk and the Battle of Ardennes. In terms of defense, Mo Deer succeeded in the battles of Gerzhev, Mars, Kutuzov, Leningrad, Bagration and Market Garden. Mo Deer's concept of "battle group" and "shield and sword" strategy are more practical military theories than Manstein's assault gun theory.

Hitler's evaluation of Manstein, "Manstein may be an outstanding talent trained by the General Staff, but he can only command a complete cutting-edge division, not a beaten army like me now. I can't form a brand-new fighting capacity for him, and it makes no sense to appoint him. "

4. Interpersonal relationship has become the reef of Man Shuai's career.

Manstein was born in Prussia, a military family, and is said to be related to Hindenburg. He is very clever. He has developed a competitive personality since he was a child and likes to show his courage. This also made his relationship with high command Hald, keitel, Jodl and others very bad; He also had a bad relationship with General Hubie, one of the survivors of the Battle of Stalingrad.

People's positive comments on Marshal Manstein are said to be mostly based on some German generals or marshals who worked with Marshal Manstein before the visit, such as guderian and Meilinzin. However, the fact that the generals and marshals of the German high command (including Hitler himself) are not very optimistic about manstein is seldom taken seriously. After all, it was the personnel of the high command who came into contact with Marshal Manstein's strategic thinking, not manstein's subordinates or guderian and others, and they had little contact with him. Unfortunately, those who held a negative attitude towards manstein, such as Hitler, keitel, Hubie and others, died in the war or were executed as war criminals after the war, leaving no memoirs. We can only glimpse the leopard from the side from the memories of the staff around us.

In Crimea, Manstein once shot a general named Hipponik. Whether it is necessary is debatable. Manstein seldom looked at the war situation from the interests of the whole Third Reich, but always emphasized the interests of the group. In his memoirs, he blamed Hitler's intervention and command for his lost victory, which was neither elegant nor convincing. You know, when he was popular, "whenever Hitler finished speaking, Marshal Manstein would be the first to jump up and shout,' If the Fuehrer gives the order, we will obey!'" "(see Hitler's file)

Moreover, manstein often put forward some unrealistic suggestions and demands, some of which deeply angered Hitler and cast a shadow over his career. For example, he once raised the issue of the highest military leadership with Hitler, and suggested the establishment of the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front, which Hitler refused. "

Verb (abbreviation for verb) The ending of Marshal Manstein

As the head of the German front line, manstein's mistake occurred in a major battle that decided the life and death of the Third Reich. Hitler didn't make much mistake in firing him and snubbing him. The collapse of the German Southern Army Group in the Ukrainian battlefield and the siege of the 1 Armored Army Group were the direct reasons for manstein's dismissal. At that time, manstein ignored his lack of tools to cross the river and considered the stability of the whole line of defense, and ordered Hubie to break through to the west. Hu Bie advocated a breakthrough to the south for the safety of his own army, and there was a fierce quarrel between the two sides. After several vacillations, Hitler finally supported manstein's opinion. As a result, Hubie was really surrounded by Russian troops. Although it succeeded in breaking through later, it lost most of its equipment and heavy weapons. As an Panzer Corps, 1 Panzer Corps has existed in name only.

The reason why manstein was abandoned is explained by Hitler's words because the era of large-scale armored attack on the Eastern Front has passed, and the German army will change from strategic attack to strategic defense. This shows from one side that Manstein is a general who is not good at defense. From then on, manstein was dismissed by Hitler and never used again.

Manstein bought a manor in East Prussia with the bonus from Hitler and the salary of 4,000 marks per month to spend his old age. When the Red Army approached East Prussia, he fled to the western front. 1945, Manstein was captured and imprisoned by the British in Linz. 1949 was tried by a British military court in Hamburg, sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment, and transferred to Vere prison for execution. 1953 in may, manstein was pardoned. 1954, most Nazi generals became the backbone of the West German army, and manstein served as a consultant. He put more energy into memory and summary, and wrote the book "Lost Victory". 1June 1973 1 1 manstein died in Bavaria (Munich) at the age of 86.