Who is opposing the "Sanming medical reform model"

What is the medical reform model in Sanming? In short, Sanming medical reform has set the goal of "three regression": public hospitals return to public welfare nature, doctors return to the role of seeing a doctor, and drugs return to the function of treating diseases. To this end, 22 public hospitals in Sanming implement the target annual salary system for all staff, and the annual salary is linked to the post workload, medical ethics and social evaluation. Integrate 26 agencies, including urban workers' medical insurance, urban residents' medical insurance and new rural cooperative medical system, to realize the "three guarantees in one".

Sanming medical reform can be started because Sanming, a prefecture-level city with a flat economy, was in a state of serious loss of medical insurance funds before the reform. According to CCTV reports, if the reform is not carried out, the loss of Sanming medical insurance fund may reach 500 million yuan this year, and the gap is widening year by year. Such a huge financial impact may cause a series of serious problems.

At present, it is difficult to assert that Sanming mode is the ultimate way out of medical reform, but there is no doubt that Sanming mode has brought obvious positive effects. This reform plan centered on the "three-medical linkage" has shaken the established pattern of hospitals, medical care and medical insurance. At present, three aspects have become beneficiaries: the legal income of doctors has increased; Medical treatment got rid of medical interests and began to return to the medical law; The medical insurance fund quickly jumped out of the state of serious losses, but made a surplus of more than 200 million yuan. The medical burden of patients is also reduced.

Some people get it, some people lose it. Who is the loser? Simply combing the interest chain is enough to find that pharmaceutical companies are the biggest losers. After the reform in Sanming, only this medium-sized prefecture-level city has paid more than 654.38+700 million less for medical expenses-while there are more than 300 prefecture-level cities in China. Naturally, some medical administrative officials and doctors in the drug circulation chain have also been squeezed out of the space of gray interests.

Selling medicine is not the purpose, but health is the purpose. The drug price in some countries is not low, but it is not the power rent-seeking that supports the high drug price, but the high investment in new drug research and development. High drug prices can encourage drug dealers to actively develop new drugs, which is not contrary to the ultimate goal of improving human health. But in China, where the proportion of self-developed drugs is extremely low, this logic does not apply.

Sanming medical reform has actually changed the competition mechanism of rent-seeking by power, changed the strange phenomenon that drugs are more expensive and easier to sell, and let doctors prescribe drugs according to medical effects, not according to the amount of drug rebates. Such reform will gradually return the core competitiveness of drugs from "relationship" to "efficacy", and urge drug dealers to work hard on efficacy rather than public relations. Therefore, the "side effect" of the reform is not to let drug dealers close down, but to force drug dealers to transform. Naturally, the benefits of this reform will be damaged, but it will make our hospitals more like hospitals, doctors more like doctors, and patients more like patients.