Don't let professional managers become puppets

Lead: Management is mainly about dealing with people. People are ideological, but also the most difficult to manage and the most headache. It is particularly important to understand and reason, respect, care, understand and trust people, see the value of talents, attach importance to their role and tap their potential.

5438+1In mid-October, Li Rongrong, sasac director, the State Council, led a team to inspect the state-owned enterprises in Northeast China, and still stressed the need to select and hire senior managers of state-owned enterprises through market mechanism.

"Selecting managers through market mechanism, ensuring talents to run state-owned enterprises" and "breaking the employment mechanism and promoting the reform of state-owned enterprises" are the keynote set by SASAC.

Li Rongrong particularly affirmed SASAC's practice of selecting and appointing state-owned enterprise executives around the world some time ago. "Seven people (external executives) did not pay more for their posts."

The motivation for introducing managers is not pure.

On September 29th, the board of directors of Shuanghe Pharmaceutical Company "forcibly removed" Yang Weiping, the external general manager, which marked that its action of introducing professional managers to promote reform ended in failure.

Yang Weiping was born in Henkel, Fei Sen Yus and other foreign companies, and has 15 years experience as general manager of foreign companies. However, when state-owned enterprises still lack the operating platform of professional managers, "airborne troops" eventually became the victims of corporate politics.

In hindsight, the original intention of Qiao Junfeng, the former chairman of Shuanghe, to introduce Yang Weiping was intriguing.

According to the reporter's understanding, Joe strongly introduced that Yang has three purposes: First, he needs a professional manager who knows how to manage two cranes like Yang; Second, under the advocacy of introducing talents, Yang's professional background is a symbol worthy of showing off. Thirdly, under the background of complicated personnel struggle in Shuanghe, Yang Can was used as Joe's "shield" to resist other attackers. After all, they worked in a joint venture company in Germany.

The conceptual differences caused by different backgrounds make the differences between Joe and Yang inevitable in the future.

According to insiders of Shuanghe, Yang Weiping values the future of the enterprise and hopes to carry out enterprise reform. Qiao Junfeng is 60 years old this year, and he thinks more about how to determine the responsibility after the reform. Yang hopes to make his main business stronger as a medicine, while Joe hopes to raise funds through the stock market; Yang is very concerned about the profit and cash flow of the enterprise, while Joe insists on expanding the asset scale through continuous acquisition; Yang intends to be in charge of the market, while Joe wants to be in charge of the market and the mayor.

"Many state-owned enterprise executives are special civil servants, not real entrepreneurs. The goals of officials and entrepreneurs are not consistent." Huang Sujian, deputy director of the Institute of Industrial Economics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, believes that according to the intention of Chairman Qiao Junfeng, Shuanghe can only complete the asset growth through mergers and acquisitions. Therefore, in the absence of a perfect organization and operation system, Shuanghe did not hesitate to buy and merge at a "high premium" in order to achieve rapid growth and "cooperation" of the stock price.

Strong board of directors and weak managers

"The Tao is different, there is nothing to do." Because of the difference of ideas, the position of general manager has never been entitled, and the corporate governance structure of Shuanghe, which is "strong board of directors and weak manager", is doomed to make it difficult for Yang to play his role.

"Godfather" Qiao Junfeng divided the company into four business divisions, and each business division set up an executive committee, with Joe as the director of the committee. In this way, the company is concentrated in Joe's hands, not the manager's.

Therefore, when Yang Weiping proposed to separate the board of directors from the manager, it was bound to touch Joe's power structure and was opposed by Joe.

After Yang Weiping, the external manager, became the general manager of Shuanghe, he strengthened the management of people, affairs and finances. For example, some headquarters executives have been adjusted and the general managers of more than a dozen holding companies have been replaced; At the same time, it signed a 20 1 1 target responsibility letter with the general manager of 18 subsidiary; Strengthen financial control, eliminate the huge risk of capital chain break and avoid new investment losses.

In the second half of 2003, the "Hengkang Shuanghe" incident and the "Kunshan Shuanghe" incident became sufficient reasons for Joe to step down. Hengkang Shuanghe formed a 50 million equity investment difference; Kunshan Shuanghe's illegal behavior has caused Shuanghe to suffer millions of penalties. The rights issue plan also aborted. Joe finally took responsibility and resigned. Take over as chairman with defender Hua Cheng.

Previously, Wei Huacheng was the chairman of Beijing Pharmaceutical Group and the vice chairman of Shuanghe Pharmaceutical. At the age of 45, he may not have no ambition to control the two cranes. The reform that I wanted to carry out before was opposed by Joe, but supported by Wei. However, when Wei Huacheng became the chairman, the contradiction between the chairman and the general manager did not disappear, but became more intense. Eventually, Yang was out.

In fact, Wei Huacheng and Qiao Junfeng have basically the same ideas, including their understanding of the chairman's authority and the party's management of cadres. Therefore, it is inevitable that the contradiction between Joe and Yang will continue to the contradiction between Wei and Yang. Among the reasons for Yang's dismissal, he refused to implement the resolution of the shareholders' meeting; Disobedience to the party's leadership became an excuse.

The introduction of professional managers needs institutional basis.

Recently, the board of directors of Shuanghe disclosed that in the audit of the departure of former chairman Qiao Junfeng, more than 300 million yuan of entrusted wealth management business suspected of violating laws and regulations was discovered. At present, the Audit Office's audit of Qiao Junfeng's departure and the audit of some directors have not yet ended. Whether the illegal behavior exposed by it is "corporate financial management behavior" or personal corruption crime has not yet been determined.

State-owned enterprises have become "fish" that are slaughtered by others. Some analysts believe that due to the absence of the subject of property rights, the subject of responsibility cannot be implemented. Some recruiters are even less responsible for assets than "recruiters".

An expert told reporters that many state-owned enterprises have the impulse to standardize corporate governance by introducing professional managers and aim at "maximizing shareholders' interests". However, under the transparent corporate governance structure, this means that there is nowhere to hide corruption. "Maximizing the interests of shareholders" and "maximizing the interests of insiders" are contradictory.

Huang Sujian believes that Chinese and foreign property rights systems have different foundations, and the introduction of professional managers will not fundamentally change the entire institutional foundation of state-owned enterprises.

Therefore, while implementing the Draft, SASAC actively carried out the pilot of the board system of state-owned enterprises and improved the corporate governance structure; On the other hand, actively promote property rights reform. Because as long as there is no substantial change in property rights reform, the positive significance of establishing the board system and introducing professional managers to manage state-owned enterprises does not seem obvious.

People in the State Council Development Research Center believe that state-owned institutions should speed up the establishment of capital and equity management norms that are compatible with the market economy system and improve corporate governance? Let professional managers get "legal status" as soon as possible.