It only took 7 years for Dongfeng Renault to break up from marriage, but it was reluctant to increase its investment in light commercial vehicles and new energy.

In just seven years, Dongfeng Renault lost out of the Chinese fuel passenger car market.

In December 2003, Dongfeng and Renault formally signed a business contract for Dongfeng Renault Automobile Co., Ltd. Renault officially announced domestic production, and Dongfeng and Renault became one family.

On April 14, 2020, due to the impact of the epidemic, it only resumed work for 20 days. Renault Group released a new strategy in China, clearly stating that Renault Group would transfer its shares in Dongfeng Renault Automobile Co., Ltd. to Dongfeng Automobile Group Co., Ltd. and Dongfeng Renault Automobile Co., Ltd. will cease business activities related to the Renault brand.

Rather than saying this is a new strategy for Renault Group in China, it is better to say it is a "divorce" announcement. Dongfeng and Renault officially announced their separation.

Some people say that after the breakup, Dongfeng Renault's "passionate life is everywhere" will also become "passionate life no longer exists." In the author's opinion, Dongfeng Renault's passionate life has long since disappeared.

Although Dongfeng Renault has been established in 2003, the first model with the "Dongfeng Renault" logo was launched on the Korega in March 2016. By all accounts, it took exactly four years for Dongfeng Renault to start selling.

In the past four years, Dongfeng Renault’s peak moment was in 2017, with sales of 72,200 vehicles. In 2018, the Chinese automobile market began to decline, and Dongfeng Renault’s annual sales fell to 50,100 vehicles. In 2019, it continued to decline to 18,200 vehicles. Due to the impact of the epidemic, only about 600 vehicles were sold in the first two months of this year.

Dongfeng Renault has only sold 171,000 vehicles in four years. It only took a little over 2 years from being the fastest growing joint venture car company in 2017 to cessation of related business.

Car circles often discuss whether Dongfeng Peugeot will withdraw from the Chinese market. Unexpectedly, Dongfeng Renault will "preemptively" withdraw from the Chinese fuel passenger car market.

Do the French understand the Chinese? Why is Dongfeng Renault so vulnerable? With these questions in mind, the author also found some reasons on forums and other websites that are worth talking about.

Since the establishment of the joint venture, Dongfeng Renault has only launched four models on the market, three of which are fuel-powered and one is pure electric. Not to mention that they cannot keep up with the launch speed of new cars of joint venture brands, and even the launch speed of independent brands. They can't keep up, and the comprehensive product strength of new cars is basically uncompetitive. Why don't consumers with such money choose Nissan, which is more widely recognized?

Let’s talk about pricing first. Dongfeng Renault is extremely arrogant. Take the Korejia as an example, priced at 139,800-194,800 yuan, and the Nissan Qashqai on the same platform is priced at 154,900-185,900 yuan. For top-end models with similar configurations, the Korejia is more than 10,000 yuan higher than the Qashqai. According to anonymous stakeholders, the Chinese side has been fighting for more than three months on pricing with no results. The French side has always believed in the charm of Renault that has been around for a century and is extremely confident.

There is a reason why the price is set high: even if the domestically produced Korega and Nissan Qashqai are on the same platform, they can enjoy large-volume purchase prices from suppliers, but the French insist on ensuring that Due to its own profit margin, many parts and components that could have been domestically produced were imported. Even if China-Europe freight trains were later adopted, the cost of purchasing parts could not be reduced much.

Later, I received feedback from the market that the quality of imported parts was not as good as that of domestic products due to rust, rust, breakage, etc. They insisted on using imported parts, mainly because of the imported parts. They are all Renault's own joint ventures or wholly-owned companies.

You can say it is smart, it is indeed smart, and it knows how to think about its own company; you can say it is not smart, it is not smart, and it is not clear whether it will make more or less.

Let’s talk about personnel. Dongfeng Renault’s top management changes frequently. In May 2016, the director of the marketing department was changed, and the vice president resigned in November of the same year; in 2017, the director of the marketing department resigned; in October 2018, the vice president and director of the marketing and sales department were changed; in April 2019, the president and Renault Group China strategic coordination The vice president changed. In July of the same year, the chairman and executive vice president changed. This year, the vice president and director of the marketing and sales department who just took office in October 2018 has also submitted his resignation application.

Dongfeng Renault obviously did not put the reason for poor sales on the product, but frequently changed its senior management such as the marketing department and marketing department. Different leaders have different ideas, and frequent changes will inevitably affect the development of the entire enterprise and be counterproductive.

Also, China has too little say. This is not only the case in a joint venture of Dongfeng Renault, but also in many joint ventures. The models are foreign, the design is foreign, the technology is foreign, and the Chinese side plays a role to a large extent. The role of production and sales has too little say in decision-making. In recent years, independent brands have developed strongly, and this situation has changed.

This is not the case for Dongfeng Renault. It has almost no right to speak. In addition to the pricing mentioned above, it also has the right to change small details after domestic production. According to anonymous stakeholders, after Koleos was launched, TCS (Quality Assurance Department) received feedback from customers. The Chinese side tried to solve the problem by proposing methods, and the French side directly pointed out that the Chinese side had no right to change their drawings, and their drawings were not available in France. Problem, there is no need to modify it in China.

In addition, Dongfeng Renault’s R&D department has extremely low authority. Slight changes in general dimensions require the approval of the French side, and key regulatory items are basically not discussed. As a result, the R&D department has no control when introducing products. Without any right to speak, the problems encountered in the localization process can only be resigned to fate.

Taken together, Dongfeng Renault has gone from the beginning to the end in just 7 years. Although China and France are both responsible, no snowflake is innocent in the avalanche. There is no point in over-interpreting who is wrong and who is right. significance. Of course, this is not worthy of sympathy.

But the author believes that more people want to know what the owners and dealers of Dongfeng Renault should do next. They are the biggest victims.

The new strategy released by the Renault Group also clearly states that Renault will continue to provide high-quality customer services to 300,000 Renault car owners in China through Renault dealers and at the same time using the alliance's synergy mechanism.

In other words, the subsequent maintenance and repairs of Dongfeng Renault car owners will be taken over by Renault, and Dongfeng will no longer be responsible for specific matters. However, after the factory stops production, it will definitely be difficult if parts need to be replaced. Although there are no original factory configurations, Korejia and Koleos can solve some problems by relying on Nissan spare parts on the same platform, but Korejia has nothing to do with Nissan, so after-sales service will be more difficult.

Then, as dealers gradually switch out of the network, there may have been several 4S stores in a city, but now there is only one 4S store in a city. When there are no 4S stores, maintenance will inevitably be affected. Service quality will also decrease.

As for the maintenance service attitude and the original parts replaced during repairs, they are not as guaranteed as before. At this time, you know, there will definitely be discounts. The longer the time, the higher the discounts will be. Is it worth buying?

Nowadays, Dongfeng Renault sells one car for less, and the price/performance ratio is definitely higher after discounts. Should you buy it?

After the factory ceased production and the inventory was gone, the 4S store was withdrawn from the network. It is difficult to repair, replace or maintain parts. Why don’t you buy it?

Everyone has their own considerations, so I won’t make too many comments here.

The factory has stopped production, leaving 4S stores with few options. Dongfeng said that in the event of terminating the distribution agreement, dealers can enter the Dongfeng sales network system.

As for the more than 1,600 employees under the Dongfeng Renault system, Dongfeng also stated that they will be properly accommodated. It is mainly divided into three aspects: retaining personnel to deal with the remaining problems; retaining personnel to develop new business; and negotiating to terminate the labor contract of personnel in accordance with the law.

Dongfeng Renault came to an end on April 14th.

But this does not mean that Renault will withdraw from the Chinese market. The new strategy clearly states that Renault Group will focus on light commercial vehicles and electric vehicles in China. In other words, Renault will no longer participate in Dongfeng Renault, but it will not withdraw from the Chinese market.

This move by French Renault is actually not difficult to understand. Let’s first talk about the reason for focusing on light commercial vehicles: China has a huge demand for light commercial vehicles. In 2019, China’s light commercial vehicle sales reached 3.3 million. vehicles, the market maintains an upward trend.

As we all know, Renault and Brilliance established Brilliance Renault Jinbei Automobile Co., Ltd. in December 2017. Brilliance China Automobile Company holds 51% of the shares and Renault Group holds 49%. It is committed to the development of light commercial vehicles. Production and sales include commercial vehicles, new energy commercial vehicles, and personalized modified commercial vehicles.

Jinbei has a good reputation and recognition in the Chinese market. It is basically a household name and has 1.5 million basic users in China. In 2019, the sales volume of Jinbei brand cars was approximately 162,000 units. The better market environment is an important reason for Renault to focus here.

Let’s talk about Renault’s other focus, the field of electric vehicles: China is currently the world’s largest new energy vehicle market, and Renault will naturally not give up this “fat” easily. Renault's electric vehicles currently occupy a leading position in Europe, and the potential sales of electric vehicles in China have always been considered four times that of Europe. Grasping the Chinese market is an important condition for Renault to continue to maintain its leading position.

In July 2019, Renault and Jiangling Group formally established a joint venture. By increasing capital by 1 billion yuan, they became shareholders of Jiangling Group New Energy Vehicle Company, owning 50% of the equity. Afterwards, Jiangling Group New Energy will introduce Renault's advanced quality management system and technology and launch 4 core models before 2022, covering the main models in China's electric vehicle market segment.

In addition, in August 2018, the Renault-Nissan Alliance and Dongfeng Motor established Yijiet New Energy Vehicle Co., Ltd., in which Renault and Nissan hold 25% and 25% of the shares of Yijit respectively. , while Dongfeng will hold the remaining 50% shares. The first pure electric SUV produced by Renault Eno has been officially launched.

Renault has a high opinion of eNuo, and directly pointed out in the new share: The successful launch of Renault eNuo electric vehicle has demonstrated its strong competitive advantage in the Chinese market. In the A-segment market, Renault eNo is the only joint venture brand electric vehicle.

In fact, it is just an exaggeration. The new car is priced at RMB 61,800-71,800, with a maximum power of 33kW, a maximum torque of 125N·m, and a comprehensive range of 271km. It is difficult to check the sales volume online. What can be found on the car owner's website is that the sales volume in September 2019 was 60 units, 323 units in October, 323 units in November, 1,382 units in November, 1,249 units in December, and 90 units in January this year. vehicles, falling to 0 in February.

Judging from this data, Renault eNuo is just a flash in the pan. What kind of new energy products will Renault launch in the future? Can it successfully attract consumers? Can you take advantage of your opponent's job? Obviously, this is a huge question mark.

At the end, the author can't help but want to ask another question: How big a future does Renault have in China?

This article comes from the author of Autohome Chejiahao and does not represent the views and positions of Autohome.