War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, Han Deqin

1937 After the outbreak of the Anti-Japanese War, Han Deqin was appointed as the Chief of Staff of the Deputy Command Department of the Third Theater in August. In June 165438+ 10, Gu succeeded Chen as the chairman of the Jiangsu provincial government. In the same month, Han was appointed as a member of the Jiangsu provincial government and director of the Civil Affairs Department. As an officer in the third war zone, Gu has no time to take care of provincial affairs. 1938 in may, Han Deqin, acting chairman of the province. Due to the tight war in Zhenning, the provincial government and the general security headquarters moved from Zhenjiang to Yangzhou and then to Huaiyin. There are 10 security groups in northern Jiangsu, among which 4 security groups were added to the 87th Division of the Central Army after the Nanjing Defence War. The other six peacekeeping corps,1February 1938, were ordered to be upgraded and reorganized into the 89th Army, commander Han Deqin, with two divisions: the 33rd Division, commander Han Deqin (concurrently); 1 17 branch, Mr. Li Shouwei. Later, the army added an independent sixth brigade at 1939.

At the beginning of 1938, the 24th Army of the Army was established, with the commander of the third theater Gu as the commander-in-chief of the Army and Han Deqin as the deputy commander-in-chief (actually under the command of Korea). This group army has two armies: the 89th Army and the 57th Army (commander Miao). Formerly Northeast Army, 57th Army was under the jurisdiction of11Division (Chang Enduo) and1/Division 2 (Huo Shouyi). The group army also commanded the 8th Army Guerrilla Corps, the 5th Theater Guerrilla Corps and the Hongze Lake Water Guerrilla Corps. As the acting chairman of Jiangsu Province, Han also commanded the county security team in northern Jiangsu Province. Han Deqin's total strength is nearly 654.38+10,000. However, its troops are mostly adapted from local armed forces, and their combat effectiveness is not strong. In the battle of Xuzhou, Han Deqin's 24th Army was in charge of the downtown operation, fighting the Japanese army in Yancheng and Funing in northern Jiangsu, struggling to kill the enemy and resisting the enemy from Dongtai to the north, otherwise Xuzhou would be attacked by the Japanese army from north to south.

1in the spring of 938, in order to expand the occupied area, the Japanese Central China Dispatching Army (changed from the original Shanghai Dispatching Army) advanced from south to north with several divisions. 10 1 One of the divisions started from Shanghai, went north along the east side of northern Jiangsu, and successively captured Chongming, Nantong, Rugao and Hai 'an. On March 25th, the Japanese army attacked Dongtai, and the 33rd Division of the 89th Army of Han Deqin Department, which was defending the area, took the initiative to evacuate. 1in April, 938, Central China sent troops to cooperate with North China in the Xuzhou Battle. On April 24th, the Japanese army/KOOC-0/0/KOOC-0/division's Sato detachment (including five infantry brigades and/KOOC-0/artillery brigade) went north from Dongtai. On the 26th, it opened the city gate with heavy shelling and captured Yancheng. Then the Japanese army continued northward, defeated the "tenacious enemy" on the 28th, and captured Xinxing. On May 7th, with the air support of a squadron, the Japanese army captured Funing after fierce fighting with Han Deqin 24th Army 1 1 117. After the Japanese army captured Funing, due to the small number of troops left behind along the way, the Han Deqin Security Brigade and other troops of the National Army counterattacked the Japanese troops left behind in Tianshenggang, Nantong, Rugao and Dongtai, destroying roads and bridges, resulting in the 200-kilometer transportation line leading to the rear of the Japanese army being cut off, and the Japanese army was forced to organize armed fleets to change to waterway transportation. Due to the destruction of the rear traffic lines and repeated attacks on various strongholds, the Japanese Central China Dispatching Army ordered the Japanese army in Funing to stop advancing and advance to Haizhou (Lianyungang) as a unit, but later gave up because the Japanese Marine Corps captured Lianyungang alone. Japanese divisions1010/brigade "swept through the nearby enemies" during their garrison in Funing, which was strongly countered by Han Deqin 24th Army117 divisions, with huge losses. 1In the summer of 938, the Japanese army withdrew its 10 1 division and garrison troops stationed in Funing, Yancheng and Dongtai to the Yangtze River to prepare for the battle of Jiujiang and Wuhan.

10 1 After the Japanese divisions invaded the north, Han Deqin's troops resisted again and again but lost ground. 1On May 9, 938, Chiang Kai-shek called Han Deqin and asked, "Cha Funing's enemies are less than 3,000, and driving thousands of miles away is like nobody's business. Now there is a tendency to spy on the East China Sea blocking Longhai Road. The deputy commander-in-chief's troops were five times stronger than the enemy's, but he lost his division and ground, which affected the security of the main force's side and rear. How will he solve it? Although Korea and China did not perform well in the frontal defense war in northern Jiangsu, they contained some Japanese troops in central China and launched guerrilla warfare to harass the enemy's rear. Therefore, Bai Chongxi once said in his memoirs: "When the Fifth Theater was fighting in Xuzhou, Han Deqin was the chairman of Jiangsu Province and commander-in-chief of the 24th Army, guarding the northern end of northern Jiangsu, eastern Anhui and even the canal and sea highway (Nantong-Haizhou), and repeatedly guerrilla warfare reached the southern end of Jinpu Road, which reduced the special threat of my fifth theater and was the victory of Taierzhuang. After the battle of Xuzhou, Chiang Kai-shek asked Han Deqin to "still command the Miao army and defend his homeland", and Han Deqin was ordered to stay behind the enemy lines in northern Jiangsu. During the Battle of Wuhan, in order to give full play to the role of the national army behind enemy lines, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Han Deqin: "It is important for our army to continue to destroy the railway in the southern section of Jinpu, hinder the enemy's transportation and attack the enemy at any time." Therefore, Han Deqin obeyed orders, led troops and local armed forces to take the initiative to attack, and actively destroyed the southern section of the Jin-Pu Railway.

After the Japanese invaded Xuzhou, they fought a protracted tug-of-war with Han Deqin in northern Jiangsu. In July of 38, Han Deqin attacked the Japanese army and occupied Dongtai, Yancheng and Funing. After Han Deqin recovered Funing and Yancheng, Chiang Kai-shek was deeply praised. He called Han Deqin: "This army is brave and good at fighting, destroying the enemy, and has repeatedly made meritorious deeds. I am deeply gratified and still hope to make persistent efforts to disturb the enemy's rear and benefit the overall situation. "

1On August 29th, 938, under the command of Chiang Kai-shek, Han Deqin commanded two regiments, the 57th Army1Division and the 89th Army, to counterattack Xuzhou. The specific arrangements are:11division 66 1 regiment and the 89th Army. During the battle, the national army once invaded Xuzhou Xiguan and occupied some urban areas. Although Xuzhou was not captured in the end, it also contained the Japanese army to some extent. In order to reward Han Deqin's achievements in destroying the Jin-Pu Railway and counterattacking Xuzhou, Chiang Kai-shek telegraphed Han Deqin: "Our army's bravery in the war of resistance is extremely commendable. We still hope to continue our efforts, bravely kill thieves and contain the enemy's rear, so as to facilitate the Wuhan battle and make great achievements."

After the fall of Xuzhou, in order to consolidate the Huaihe River and ensure the safety of the seat of the Jiangsu provincial government, Han Deqin ordered Gu Xijiu, brigade commander of the 357th division of the 89th Army, to lead the 70 1 702nd regiment of the brigade to Suining County, and Liu, head of the 33rd division198th regiment, to Suqian. In addition, District 9 Administrative Inspector Li Mingyang and the guerrilla headquarters of the Jiangsu-Anhui Border Region in the Fifth Theater are also stationed in Suining. In order to ensure the safety of Longhai Road, the Japanese army in Xuzhou carried out "clearing" on both sides. 1938 During May and July, Japanese troops invaded Suining several times, but they were all repelled by Han Deqin. In June 5438 +065438+10, the Japanese army assembled all its troops in the southern section of Jinpu, captured Sixian County, and then attacked Suining. After a day and a night of fierce resistance, South Korea retreated and Suining fell on June 1 15. Subsequently, the Japanese army invaded Suqian with Beichuan United, six planes and tanks. During the defending battle of Suqian, Hu, the commander-in-chief of the 3rd Guerrilla Corps of the 8th Army of the National Army, Liu, the head of the 198 regiment, and Wu Shaowen, the deputy head of the regiment, died heroically, and most of the troops guarding the city died. After the fall of Suqian, Han Deqin sent 1 12 divisions to counterattack Suqian several times, but all failed. Han Deqin had to command headquarters to defend. During this period, the Northern Jiangsu National Army led by Han Deqin actively resisted Japan, consolidated and expanded the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines with Huaiyin as the center, destroyed the traffic lines of Longhai and Jinpu to a certain extent, restrained the actions of the Japanese army, cooperated with the military activities on the frontal battlefield, and caused considerable losses to the Japanese army. For example, in July, August and September of 1938, the Japanese army suffered about 3 160 casualties. Among them, the Japanese Central Support Department suffered about 630 casualties. In the battle between Xuzhou and the southern section of Jinpu Road, the Matsumura Brigade of the Fifth Division of the Japanese Army suffered about 500 casualties; In the battle of Yangshao, the Japanese Sato United suffered about 330 casualties; In the battle of Sunjiashan, the Japanese Marine Corps suffered about 300 casualties. Shen Bao once reported: "According to a recent survey, Xuzhou counties were the best in the Anti-Japanese War. According to the statistics of 62 traffic points, in recent March, guerrillas in various counties contacted the Japanese army more than 50 times, fought positional warfare 10 more than 0 times, and attacked the Japanese army 5 or 6 times. A total of 1000 Japanese people were killed or injured. Guerrillas destroyed roads in Tianjin and Gansu more than 20 times and attacked Japanese trains five times. "

1939 65438+ 10, the military commission of the government established two guerrilla zones behind enemy lines, namely, Jicha Theater and Su Ru Theater. Among them, the jurisdiction of Su Ru Theater is "north of Yangtze River, east of Jin-Pu Railway and south of Old Yellow River". The commander-in-chief of the theater is Yu Xuezhong, and the deputy commanders are Han Deqin and Shen Honglie. Due to the inconvenience of unified command in southern Shandong and northern Jiangsu,1In April, 939, the Military Commission set up a theater deputy headquarters in northern Jiangsu (in Xinghua), and Han was in charge of northern Jiangsu affairs in the theater. 1939 10, Gu resigned as the part-time chairman of Jiangsu Province, and Han Deqin officially became the chairman of Jiangsu Province and concurrently served as the provincial security commander. After the establishment of the deputy commander-in-chief of Su Ru Theater, the number of the 24th Army was revoked, and the subordinate units were directly under the jurisdiction of the deputy commander-in-chief. As Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Su Ru Theater and Chairman of Jiangsu Province, Han Deqin has jurisdiction over 33 counties and cities. The main force is the 89th Army/KOLOC-0//KOLOC-0/2 Division and the 57th Army (at that time/KOLOC-0//KOLOC-0/Division was under the command of Yu Xuezhong), and he also commanded/KOLOC-0/0 Security Brigade in northern Jiangsu and six district security headquarters in Jiangsu Province.

At that time, the anti-Japanese armed forces in northern Jiangsu were mainly composed of regular troops, quasi-regular troops, local teams and civilian armed forces. The regular army in northern Jiangsu, mainly the 89th Army (under the jurisdiction of the 33rd Division and the 1 17 Division, followed by the Independent 6 Brigade), is Han Deqin's own army; The 57th Army of the Northeast Army, later mainly under the command of Yu Xuezhong, was active on the border of Su Ru. The paramilitary forces in northern Jiangsu mainly include the guerrillas of the Eighth Army (Tax Police Force) and the guerrillas (Erli Force) under the command of Li Mingyang. The guerrillas of the Eighth Army were adapted from the tax police force of the former Ministry of Finance. They used to belong to the eighth army, but in fact they have no connection with it. At the beginning, the guerrilla commander of the Eighth Army was Zeng Xixuan. Later, because of the conflict with Han Deqin, he was almost infighting and was dismissed. Instead, Chen Taiyun, a first-year student from Huangpu. Li Mingyang, a veteran of the Kuomintang, participated in the Revolution of 1911, the War of Protecting the Law, the Second Revolution and the Northern Expedition. Before the Anti-Japanese War, he served as a member of Jiangsu provincial government and director of provincial security. After the outbreak of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, Li Mingyang successively served as Xuzhou Administrative Inspector, Commander-in-Chief of Guerrilla in the Fifth Theater, Commander-in-Chief of Guerrilla in Jiangsu and Anhui, and Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Guerrilla Area in Northern Jiangsu. After the war in Xuzhou, Li Mingyang moved to Taixian County for development and formed its own system. Li Mingyang took Li Changjiang as his confidant and deputy, so he called them "Li Er" at that time. After the establishment of Su Ru Theater, Li Mingyang Command was reorganized into the General Command of the Second Guerrilla Area of Su Ru Theater, with 7 detachments, 1 peacekeeping corps in northern Jiangsu, and then expanded into 8 columns, 2 independent detachments, 1 independent regiment. Erli jurisdiction is divided into two centers, Taixian and Peixian, with Taixian as the main one.

The local team in northern Jiangsu mainly refers to the security teams and teams at the provincial and county levels. After the end of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the provincial peace preservation corps in Jiangsu Province was expanded to 10 regiment, the latter part joined the Central Army such as the 88th Division, and the remaining six regiments were reorganized into the 89th Army. In order to make up for the vacancy after being reorganized into a regular army, the security forces in Jiangsu Province were reorganized again. First, several standing regiments were established, and then several standing brigades were expanded. By August of 1939, the provincial security forces under the direct command of Jiangsu provincial government in Han Deqin had 6 security brigades and 4 standing brigades. After the Anti-Japanese War, the county-level security team was reorganized into a county-level national soldier standing brigade, with the county magistrate as the captain and two or three additional brigades in important counties.

The main source of guerrilla mass armed forces in northern Jiangsu is the training of able-bodied men before the war. Before the Anti-Japanese War, the National Government strengthened national military education by training able-bodied men. By June 37, 65438+10, Jiangsu Province had trained 600,000 able-bodied men. After War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, the names of able-bodied training institutions have been changed several times. 1938 In August, the National Military Training Office of Jiangsu Province was established. Its main tasks are as follows: 1, set up training courses for social military training cadres, and train military training instructors, squadron leaders and other grassroots military cadres; 2. Combine the training of ordinary people with the training of armed men. On the one hand, strengthen the training of armed able-bodied men and enrich the standing armies in various places as much as possible. On the other hand, organize ordinary people into task forces such as fortifications, transportation, special agents, communications, and plainclothes guerrillas according to their abilities. (1) Strengthen political training. 1938 February, Han Deqin put forward in his speech that "discipline is the life of the army ... but maintaining military discipline is not mandatory, but political training". At the beginning of 1938, the military commission set up the political department and ordered the military divisions to change the political training department into the political department. So Han Deqin ordered the establishment of political institutions at all levels in the 89th Army and other troops to recruit students and young people for training and appointment. The development of its political work is mainly divided into two aspects: military political training and mass organization training. On the military side, it mainly includes training and strengthening military-civilian relations, as well as strengthening military patriotism education and anti-Japanese education. In organizing public training, mainly through organizing anti-Japanese entertainment conferences, printing newspapers and periodicals such as Battle Report, Founding of the People's Republic of China and Fiberhome, etc., publicizing the atrocities of the Japanese aggressors, inspiring people's patriotic passion and promoting patriotic movements such as military-civilian cooperation. In addition, the political work organization of the Northern Jiangsu National Army also undertakes some intelligence work tasks behind enemy lines.

(2) Military training courses for military education. /kloc-in the autumn of 0/938, the training course for Soviet cadres of the Central Army Military Academy was established in Huaiyin (moved to Jingkou 40 years later). The class department has set up education, general affairs, military supplies, military doctors, politics and other subjects. 1938 In July, the 89th Army also opened a training course for officers. In addition to the regular army, other paramilitary forces and guerrillas also carry out military education through training courses and teaching teams. The establishment of these military training courses has, to a certain extent, alleviated the shortage of soldiers and low military quality of the national army behind enemy lines in northern Jiangsu.

(3) Control each unit by means of funds and personnel, assembly, reorganization and even elimination and differentiation. For the small armed forces, Han Deqin incorporated them into his own system by means of incorporation. But for some larger forces, it is difficult to incorporate and digest. For example, when Han Deqin was incorporated into the Eighth Army guerrillas, there was a serious contradiction between him and the guerrilla commander Zeng Xixuan. Although Zeng Xixuan was later replaced (replaced by Chen Taiyun) and Han Deqin also planted some of his own personnel in the Eighth Army guerrillas, he failed to completely control the Ministry in terms of personnel, which led to a delicate relationship between the 89th Army and the Eighth Army guerrillas. Han Deqin's control and influence on Li Er's army is also very weak.

Generally speaking, through various measures, Han Deqin has established an armed system with wide external coverage and clear internal division of labor in northern Jiangsu. At the same time, through political training and military courses, the combat effectiveness of the troops has been improved to some extent. However, due to Han Deqin's failure to properly handle the relationship with Chen Taiyun and Li Mingyang, the integration and unified command of the armed forces in northern Jiangsu could not really be realized. As a result, Han Deqin didn't really cooperate in the battle with the Japanese army, and had friction with the New Fourth Army, and was finally defeated in northern Jiangsu. (1) The establishment of unified leadership of the party, government and army in wartime. During the war, in order to cope with the sudden changes in the war situation and effectively mobilize manpower, material resources and financial resources to cooperate with the war, we need to concentrate our efforts. 1939 65438+in February, the Military Command of the Military Commission promulgated the compilation table of the general command of guerrilla zones, which once again clearly stipulated that "in order to give full play to the unified and comprehensive strength of the party, government and army in guerrilla zones, the general command of guerrilla zones and the divisional meetings of the battlefield party and government committees were specially established to be responsible for the military party and government respectively, and the general command of guerrilla zones was unified." The duty of the commander-in-chief in guerrilla areas is to "accept the orders of the commander-in-chief in the war zone, accept the guidance of the party and government branches and local provincial governments, and direct the military, political, economic and cultural operations and political, economic and cultural construction of the party, government, army and people in this area." Since then, northern Jiangsu has been divided into two guerrilla zones: the first guerrilla zone, centered on the headquarters and Xinghua, where the Jiangsu provincial government is located, including Gaoyou, Baoying, Huaiyin and Huai 'an, with Han Deqin as the commander-in-chief of the first guerrilla zone; The second guerrilla zone, mainly in Taixian, Taixing and Jiangsu-Anhui border areas, was led by Li Mingyang, commander-in-chief of guerrilla forces in northern Jiangsu and Shandong-Jiangsu-Anhui border areas. 1938 in may, Han Deqin acted as the chairman of Jiangsu province (he became a full member in 39 10), and served as the deputy commander-in-chief of Suru war zone for 39 years, realizing the command of the party, government and army affairs behind the enemy lines in northern Jiangsu.

(2) Actively restore and rebuild grass-roots political power in enemy-occupied areas. Han Deqin believes that "rectifying Ji Gang and Jue is the primary task of War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the founding of the People's Republic of China". Therefore, after he took office, he first rectified the discipline of the county-level government, "telegraphed the Commissioner, county magistrate and district head of the land and water police, and affirmed the responsibility and methods of defending the land against the enemy. Violation of wartime military discipline "severely punish officials who leave their posts without permission and flee without permission. In addition, Han Deqin also attaches great importance to the selection of administrative personnel at all levels. Han Deqin demanded that "anyone who seeks party member or has a fighting spirit and is familiar with local conditions should be appointed as the county magistrate", and "the Commissioner should select those who have military knowledge or administrative experience and are enthusiastic about resisting the enemy, and report them to the Central Committee for approval and appointment respectively". Under the influence of this measure, the county governments in northern Jiangsu first screened and hired the leaders. For example, Taixian "re-elected the mayor of Jiabao by provincial decree, and ordered all districts to complete the election before 1 1 20th. The selection criteria are as follows: 1, which must be welcomed and loved by all towns and villages; 2, must be enthusiastic about public welfare undertakings, people who have the ability to train people in various towns and villages; 3, people who must work hard and have the determination to resist the war. " After the initial stabilization and establishment of grass-roots political power, Han Deqin also conducted ideological and professional training for grass-roots administrative staff in the form of a training group for local administrative cadres in northern Jiangsu, with 240 people trained in the first phase. In order to strengthen the Kuomintang's party work, Han Deqin divided Jiangsu into nine director areas. "The district directors are all guided by the Executive Committee, which is convenient and easy to make achievements. However, the work at the lower level is quite unorganized because of the county's fall. Now I want to strengthen the organization and attach importance to the military and political institutions. " In addition, Han Deqin has also adjusted the organizational structure at the grass-roots level, removed the complexity and reset the budget.

These measures have restored and rebuilt the grass-roots political power in northern Jiangsu to a certain extent. By the end of 1938, Jiangsu grass-roots political power under the National Government had been restored and rebuilt in Rugao, Haimen, Fengxian, Peixian, Dangshan and Pixian. After the restoration and reconstruction of grass-roots political power, Han Deqin also specially convened more than 50 commissioners and county magistrates to hold a meeting on September 1938 to clarify the responsibilities of grass-roots political power, involving mass organizations, official management, armor protection, disaster relief, health, drug control and many other aspects during the Anti-Japanese War. According to the regulations of this meeting, the Jiangsu provincial government has strengthened the inspection of grass-roots administrative personnel. Under these measures, the basic political power of the National Government in Jiangsu has been initially stabilized and developed, and the official documents issued by the provincial government can reach 6 1 county, half of which are occupied by Japanese puppet troops and are in a guerrilla state. However, the provincial government obeyed the order, and the funds were allocated by the provincial government. The counties that did not fall under the occupation paid taxes normally.

(3) Take various measures to resume the development of production. 1, encourage the production of agricultural products, especially the cultivation of food crops. Jiangsu Provincial Government issued a document, War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression period, the main task is to grow food, 80% of the cultivated land should be used to grow food. Han Deqin also ordered the restoration of "agricultural improvement fields" that existed before the war and were once abandoned after the outbreak of the war to improve rice and grain seeds. These measures have restored Jiangsu's grain production to a certain extent-"Last spring (spring of 38 and spring of 39), the planting area of wheat and rice expanded one after another, increasing by more than 20% than usual." 2. Reasonably determine the rations collected by land tax to reduce the burden on poor farmers. For example, Fengxian county put forward the slogan of "reasonable burden", and its method is: the financial department of the county government, according to the annual demand of the grain management office and the pre-war report, removes one mu from each township for its rations, and the rest mu is the grain field to be paid. If the Zhang family owns 15 mu of land, if the population of the Zhang family does not consider calculating by mu, it should pay 150 kg (multiplied by 15 mu multiplied by 65438 kg per mu); If there are 10 people in the Zhang family, first subtract 10 mu as the ration of the Zhang family, then the Zhang family 15 mu of land only needs to pay 5 mu of land tax. 3. Strengthen grain reserves. Before the outbreak of the All-round Anti-Japanese War, all counties in Jiangsu set up grain management committees to manage savings. After the war broke out, Jiangsu Province continued to strengthen the grain reserve work. 1938165438+10, Jiangsu provincial civil affairs department and finance department formulated seven principles for all counties to follow. 1940 1.5 The Jiangsu provincial government has formulated the Interim Measures for County Grain Storage in Jiangsu Province in an Extraordinary Period, which adopts the method of breaking the whole into parts according to the grain storage standard, and takes the bag as the storage unit and keeps it separately.

(4) Improve the mobilization mechanism and strengthen mass training. Han Deqin attached great importance to mass organization and mobilization during the Anti-Japanese War: "Mobilizing the people is to win the final victory of the war and contribute all the strength of the people to the country. ..... This kind of victory depends not solely on fighting, but on whether our whole nation can resist the Japanese war permanently and coordinate all the people with the army. " How to effectively mobilize the people, Han Deqin believes that there are three points: First, clarify the management of officials and improve their own organizations. Second, the government should try its best to help people organize themselves spontaneously, and should not use top-down orders to put people in a passive position. However, the people should not be divorced from the administrative system, which will cause chaos and shake the society. Third, in order to promote people's mobilization, various armed forces should pay attention to discipline and care for the people. Among them, Han Deqin believes that the establishment and improvement of mass organizations is the key. At the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War, a number of mass mobilization organizations were established in Jiangsu Province. After the battle of Xuzhou, according to the past experience and lessons, the "General Command of the People's Self-Defense Forces" was established, and the commissioners were ordered to set up headquarters, and the counties set up corps departments to concentrate on arming able-bodied men and organizing training to defend the place, wipe out traitors and bandits and crack down on the enemy and bandits. This method quickly assembled and trained the people and played a very good role in arming the people and cracking down on the Japanese aggressors.

Construction effect: Han Deqin's political, economic, organizational and mobilization work in northern Jiangsu has played a positive role in stabilizing the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines in northern Jiangsu and War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression, but it is not satisfactory. For example, on rural issues, the Jiangsu provincial government mainly focuses on technological improvement, without touching on land rent, usury and other issues. Corruption of government personnel and lax military discipline have always existed, which has greatly reduced other work and even intensified the opposition between the government and the people, the army and the people. Because of its positive performance in the Wuhan battle, the national army behind the enemy lines in northern Jiangsu attracted the attention of the Japanese army. At the beginning of 1939, the Japanese North China Army launched the "Bugu Campaign" and dispatched 2 1 division, 5 1 14 division. With the cooperation of the Central China Dispatching Army and the Japanese Marine Corps, it is intended to seize the areas centered on Huaiyin, Haizhou and other important towns and compress the national army behind the enemy lines in northern Jiangsu.

In Huaiyin direction, 2 1 Japanese First Division (based on about 5 infantry battalions and 2 artillery battalions) first assembled in Suqian and Chepaoji, and launched military operations on February 24th 1939. On February 27 and 28, it advanced to Siyang, Shuyang and Ahu Town. Han Deqin saw the intention of the Japanese army and called Chiang Kai-shek. Because of the shortage of troops and bullets, Chen requested that the 57th Army in southern Shandong be transferred to the south for assistance. In this regard, Jiang instructed North Korea to use guerrilla warfare against the enemy, saying that the strategic value of Huaiyin Siyang was low and it was difficult for the 57 th Army to go south. Without the assistance of the 57th Army, the 89th Army of the Korean Army lost its firm determination to resist and retreated to the south. The Japanese army occupied Siyang with little resistance, Huaiyin on March 2, Baoying on March 5 and Huai 'an on March 8. At the same time, the East Advance Team of the Fifth Division occupied Lianshui on March 4 and Funing on March 7.

In the direction of Haizhou, the 5th Division 1 regiment set sail from Qingdao on February 25th, 1939, and landed on Andong Street on February 26th. The main force of the 5th Division (based on Infantry Wing 2 1) set sail from Qingdao on February 27th and arrived in Xin 'an Town (55km south of Haizhou) and the vicinity of Xiangshuikou on March 1. In addition, a division of the 5th Division from Linyi broke through the provincial boundary between Shandong and Jiangsu on 26th. On March 1 day, the head of the 5th Division of the Japanese Army commanded most of the 5th Division, a brigade of the 5th Division14 and a multi-brigade of the 2nd Division1to attack Haizhou first. The eighth army guerrillas (tax police corps) responsible for Haizhou defense broke through. On March 2, the Japanese advance team occupied Dayishan Town, and the Japanese main force occupied Guanyun on the 4th and Haizhou on the 6th.

At the same time, in order to cope with the southward movement of Japanese troops in North China, South China sent Yamamoto Brigade stationed in Yangzhou to occupy Xinghua in the north.

The Japanese army occupied Huaiyin, Lianshui, Funing, Haizhou and other towns within 20 days, and launched raids on the Korean army from time to time. After the Japanese attack, the northern Jiangsu National Army lost its territory, and Han Deqin led the Jiangsu provincial government to move to Xinghua (Yamamoto Brigade retreated after a short occupation of Xinghua). Since then, the Northern Jiangsu National Army still controlled the middle section of the canal and launched guerrilla warfare to harass the Japanese army.

Objective reasons: 1, the Japanese army is well-planned and powerful. Although the soldiers are divided into multiple roads, each road is heavily concentrated. 2. Subei, a plain area, has no danger to defend, which is conducive to the galloping of Japanese mechanized troops. After 38 years of fighting, Han Deqin's 89th Army and other departments have not recovered from the destruction.

Subjective reasons: 1, Han Deqin pays too much attention to the gains and losses of one city and one place, and guards separately again, resulting in weak forces in all directions and inability to defend against the enemy. 2, the various ministries of the national army cooperate poorly. At the beginning of the campaign, Chiang Kai-shek rejected Han Deqin's request for the cooperation of the 57th army in southern Shandong. But ten days later, due to the unfavorable war situation, Jiang changed his mind and ordered the 5 1 Army of Yu Xuezhong, commander-in-chief of Su Ru Theater in southern Shandong, to go south to cooperate with the Korean army, but the Ministry failed to give strong assistance. Li Mingyang and Li Changjiang in Taizhou not only failed to help the Korean Ministry, but also took precautions against it.

In order to continue to attack the Northern Jiangsu National Army and open the canal channel, the Japanese army attacked the Northern Jiangsu National Army from the west, south and north on June 1939. On the West Road, the Japanese army marched eastward from Bengbu, Anhui Province, and captured Xuyi County, Jiangsu Province on June 2, 10, and then continued westward. The Japanese army in Nanlu started from Zhenjiang and Jiangdu with 15 division. Go back to the canal with the Japanese Marine Corps to attack Gaoyou. The Japanese army on the North Road, with a division of 2 1, was divided into left and right wings and headed south. The left-wing Japanese army coordinated from Funing, and the right-wing Japanese army set out from Huaiyin along the canal to meet the Japanese army 15 Division. Facing the Japanese attack, Han Deqin ordered the 6th Brigade of the Independent Peace Corps to stop the enemy advancing eastward from Bengbu in Xuyi, the 3rd Brigade of the Guard to stop the enemy advancing northward from Jiangdu in Gaoyou, the 5th and 6th Regiments of the Tax Police to stop the enemy advancing southward from Funing in the north of Yancheng, and the 89th Army 1 17 Division to stop the enemy advancing southward from Huaiyin near TouHan Han and Jinghe Town. The Korean army resisted the Japanese army from/kloc-0 to 4, and the Japanese army met the Jiangba at the border respectively. Subsequently, the national army moved to Caodian and Mayidian, east of Huai 'an, and immediately took advantage of the weakness to attack the enemy's rear. 1 17 division recovered Gaoyou and Baoying in April and May, and Jiangba and Xuyi were recovered by the 6th Brigade on the 7th, 1 16544 division 1 division. The enemy of Baoying 2 1 Division, Pingjin United, continued to advance eastward. 18 echoed Beichuan United, the enemy of Funing's southward advance, and captured Yancheng. The 33rd Division of the 89th Army of South Korea cooperated with guerrillas to attack the Japanese rear. The Japanese army was forced to withdraw from Funing once on 19, and the national army pursued it bravely and gained a lot. The obstruction and harassment of the national army caused certain casualties to the Japanese army and recovered some lost land. The Japanese army opened canals and highways leading to the sea, but the national army still controlled vast areas on both sides of the strait and continued guerrilla warfare.

1939 After the second training and consolidation of the National Army, in 10, Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Military Commission, signed the winter offensive plan of the National Army, and deployed a full-scale counterattack against Japan at the end of 1939, preparing to take the training and consolidation troops directly under the Military Commission and the second, third, fifth and ninth theaters as the main attack, with other theaters as the auxiliary attacks. Su Ru theater also received the auxiliary attack task. So from the end of 1939, 1 1 to the beginning of 1940, the Han Deqin department in northern Jiangsu was ordered to launch active counter-offensive operations in Huaiyin, Baoying, Liuhe and other places, and fought fiercely for more than ten times, killing and injuring thousands of people.

At the beginning of 1940, the spring drought in northern Jiangsu was serious. There is only water in the middle of the big river in Xinghua, and the rivers and ports are completely dried up, and the land of water network has become land, which makes Han Deqin, with Xinghua as the center, lose its natural barrier against Japanese mechanized troops. The Japanese army took the opportunity to attack the national army in northern Jiangsu in two ways: the Japanese army threatened Yancheng and Dongtai from Funing and Huai' an in the north, and then Xinghua and Taizhou from east to west; Japanese troops threatened Xinghua and Taizhou from Yangzhou, Xian Zhen, Shao Bo, Gaoyou, Baoying, Tianchang and Liuhe from west to east. Han Deqin adopted the strategy of avoiding war, leaving only a small number of troops to defend the enemy, and the main force left Xinghua on May 20th. Because the Japanese army fought alone and lacked strength, it burned Xinghua county government and various organs on May 26th and then evacuated. Then the Korean Ministry followed the Japanese army back to Xinghua.