2007 certified safety engineer safety production accident case analysis simulation test questions (2)

1. When the engineering department of Hua Mao Electric Power Construction Bureau installed the inclined beam of trestle bridge in the expansion project of a paper mill, the inclined beam weighing about 3t collapsed when the hook was unhooked, causing four workers to fall from the height of 1m, of which 1 was standing on the inclined beam without wearing a seat belt, and the second person hung the seat belt on the inclined beam, and both of them fell to death. Although the third person wore a seat belt, he did not fasten it, squatting on the edge of the inclined beam and welding; The seat belt of the fourth person is fastened in a firm place. When they fell, the former fell on the soft soil and was seriously injured, while the latter hung him in the air with a seat belt, but he was only slightly injured. Analyze the violations of the above events.

2. Tianjin Venture Chemical Plant is a village-run enterprise that produces hexabromo-2,4-dinitroaniline. The factory has only one large workshop, which is divided into three workshops; The East Workshop produces the intermediate product 2,4-dinitroaniline, and the middle workshop is the material preparation workshop, where bags of strong oxidants such as sodium chlorate, bromide and 2,4-dinitroaniline are piled up. 1996 Half-court 65438+1At 4 o'clock on October 26th, someone found black smoke coming from the middle window of the factory building and shouted to put out the fire. The director of the factory office, the staff in the dormitory and the villagers nearby all rushed to put out the fire. They found that the sodium chlorate in the preparation workshop smoked, so they raised water from the wastewater pool about ten meters away from the factory building to put out the fire. It's useless to spill a few barrels. The director asked someone to transport sand to put out the fire quickly. Before the sand arrived, they only heard two loud noises. A puff of black smoke soared into the sky, and the factory building with an area of about 500 square meters was razed to the ground. Workers and villagers who came to put out the fire died 19, and the direct economic loss 14.

Please analyze the cause of the accident and the preventive measures to be taken.

Three, township coal mine gas explosion

The designed annual output of a township-run coal mine is 30,000 t, and the actual annual output is 60,000 t, which is developed by vertical shaft and ventilated at the central boundary.

Mine managers and special operations personnel work without certificates. The phenomenon of three violations is serious. There is no pre-shift meeting and shift change system, and there is no unified arrangement and record of underground operation tasks and personnel arrangements.

Materials and fire-fighting equipment under the mine are stored in disorder; Always block the blast hole with coal surface and coal block; The phenomenon of cable connector open circuit shooting occurs from time to time.

The coal dust in this mine is explosive. There is no dust-proof sprinkler facilities and dust-proof measures underground, which leads to the accumulation of coal dust underground. On the day of the incident, after the power failure at 8: 30 in the morning, a diesel generator was used to send electricity to the underground. Due to the lack of electricity, the north wing working face and the south wing working face take turns to produce. /kloc-72 people went down at 0/4. After the workers in the south wing face go down the well, they drill holes and fire the first shot before unloading coal. At about 30: 00, the water pump was turned on and the south wing was cut off. At that time, neither the main fan nor the local fan was turned on. 17: 30 the whole mine calls, but the main fan and local fan are still not turned on. The gas inspector missed the inspection during the empty shift. When the second gun was ignited after drilling in the north wing working face, the foot line of the 1 1 electric detonator hung on the back plate at the mouth of the working face 2 m was contacted and detonated by the dragged cable connector, causing gas and coal dust explosion accidents. * * * 26 people were killed, 10 people were injured, and the direct economic loss was 380,000 yuan (time value).

Question:

1. Try to analyze the direct and indirect causes of the accident according to the above data.

2. According to the "Safety Production Law", put forward preliminary treatment suggestions.

3. Put forward measures to prevent similar accidents.

4. The "5.30" catastrophic fire accident of Xingye Garment Factory in Dongguan City, Guangdong Province.

In the early morning of May 30th, 199 1, Xingye Garment Factory (belt processing enterprise) run by Wang Mouyi, a self-employed (nominal collective) couple in Binling Village, Shipai Town, Dongguan City, Guangdong Province caught fire, and the whole factory was set on fire, resulting in 72 deaths and 47 injuries, with direct economic losses reaching 3 million yuan.

During 1989, Mr. and Mrs. Wang built a four-story factory building with their own funds. In June of the same year 165438+ 10, Shipai Xingye Garment Factory was opened in the name of Wang Mouer, and a processing agreement was signed with Sanyu Company to produce plastic raincoats. Since then, Wang Yizhi has been responsible for recruitment, production and management. After production, the production workshop, warehouse and workers' dormitory are in the same building, and raw materials, finished products, waste materials and flammable items are placed at will.

On May 20th, Liang, an overtime worker, threw down his cigarette butt and lit flammable materials after smoking. At about 4: 20 am, a fire broke out on the first floor of the factory. More than 70,000 pieces of PVC plastic sheets and finished raincoats stored on the floor caught fire. The fire spread rapidly, blocking the only exit of this four-story factory building. There is no minimum fire fighting equipment such as fire hydrant and fire extinguisher in the building, and there is no fire escape and emergency exit. Many doors and windows are welded with iron bars, which makes workers unable to put out the fire and have no way out. Smoke and fire rushed into the workers' dormitories on the third and fourth floors along the stairs and elevator shafts. At that time, many workers were sleeping in the building, and they were smoked or burned to death before they woke up or didn't know what was happening here. In the end, 64 people were directly smoked and burned to death, and 55 people jumped out of the window to escape. Among the evacuees, 2 people fell to death on the spot, and 6 people fell and burned too much, and died after being rescued. * * * meter caused 72 deaths.

In view of the above accident cases, analyze the direct cause, indirect cause, responsible person and corrective measures.

Five, Shenzhen "8. 5 "explosion fire accident.

1August 5, 993 13: 26, a serious explosion accident occurred in Qingshuihe chemical dangerous goods warehouse of Shenzhen Anmao Dangerous Goods Storage and Transportation Company (hereinafter referred to as Anmao Company). The explosion caused a fire, and a second strong explosion occurred in the fire area after 1 hour, causing extensive damage and fire. The Shenzhen Municipal Government immediately organized thousands of fire, public security, armed police, PLA commanders and medical personnel to participate in the disaster relief work. Due to the correct decision, decisive command and full support from all sides, the fire was finally put out at 5 am on August 6. The accident caused 15 deaths and more than 200 injuries, including 25 serious injuries, resulting in direct economic losses of 250 million yuan.

According to the investigation, the accident occurred in Anmao Dangerous Goods Storage and Transportation Joint Company and Shenzhen Dangerous Goods Service Center under China Foreign Trade Development Group Company. The explosion site is located in the northeast corner of Shenzhen, and the Liu Qing warehouse in Qingshuihe warehouse area covers an area of about 2,000 square meters. Six warehouses (2#-7#) were completely destroyed, leaving two large pits with a depth of 7 m at the site, and the remaining 1# warehouses and 8# warehouses were seriously damaged. The warehouse with 240 t hydrogen peroxide, the liquefied gas station with 8 large tanks and 4 1 horizontal tanks, the liquefied gas of 28 wagons and the newly arrived 1 gas station did not explode. Otherwise, it will cause greater losses to Shenzhen.

On the afternoon of August 5th 13, and on the afternoon of 10, the storekeeper of No.4 found the ammonium persulfate piled in the warehouse smoking and catching fire. Because there was no water in the fire-fighting facilities, no fire extinguisher was used to put out the fire. Telephone alarm, "1 19" cannot be connected. So, the security guard quickly stopped a car and went to Sungang to call the police. After receiving the alarm, the duty officer of Shenzhen Public Fire Bureau immediately dispatched the fire truck of Sungang Fire Squadron to put out the fire. Shortly after the fire truck was driven out (13: 26), the combustible materials piled up in Warehouse 4 exploded for the first time, completely destroying the conjoined warehouses No.2, No.3 and No.4, and the powerful shock wave destroyed the nearby warehouses, exposing a variety of hazardous chemicals to flames. When the person in charge of the municipal fire department heard the explosion, the first thing he thought of was the nearby liquefied gas tank, so he immediately mobilized the nearby fire squadron to rush to the scene. 15 minutes, 1 1 fire engines of five fire squadrons arrived at the fire point. The leaders of the fire department quickly set up a fire headquarters at the scene, mobilized squadron commanders before the war, and formulated emergency measures at the same time. All the firemen stood in front of the fire and fought bravely. Due to the continuous warming of dangerous goods, after about 1 hour, 14: 27, the conjoined warehouses 5#, 6# and 7# exploded for the second time. The explosion shock wave caused a wider range of damage. After the explosion, flying objects with fire (such as yellow phosphorus, burning plywood and other flammable materials) made the fire spread rapidly, igniting the wooden floor 400-500 m away from the explosion center, six four-story dry warehouses at 3000 m and trees on three hills. At the same time, the nearest fire fighter died heroically and many comrades were injured. However, firefighters and armed police soldiers did their best to put out the fire despite difficulties and dangers. In the evening, more than 100 fire engines from Guangzhou, Zhongshan, Dongguan, Zhuhai, Huizhou, Foshan and Qingyuan came to reinforce. After nearly 10,000 public security fire fighters, border armed police and PLA chemical fighters 16 h, the fire was basically put out at 5 am on August 6.

In view of the above accident cases, analyze the direct cause, indirect cause, responsible person and corrective measures.

Reference answer

Simulated test questions (2)

First, the main points of answering questions

(1) Before lifting the hook, check the weld quality as required, and dismantle the hook only after it meets the safety requirements;

(2)3. Workers working at heights did not use safety belts correctly according to regulations;

(3) Lack of on-site supervision and inspection by safety supervisors;

(4) Strengthen safety compliance and discipline education.

Second, the main points of answering questions

This is a major casualty accident caused by an enterprise failing to store chemical materials according to regulations and improper fire control measures.

Sodium chlorate is a strong oxidant. It should be packed in dry and strong iron drums, with a layer of plastic bags and kraft paper inside to prevent moisture. Strong oxidants will not spontaneously ignite when used alone, but will decompose and release heat if they are put together with organic substances. In this case, the packaging of sodium chlorate in the venture chemical plant is plastic bag inside and woven bag outside. When workers shovel materials with shovels, it is inevitable that sodium chlorate will be scattered outside. A few days before the accident, the temperature in Tianjin continued to be high. On 26th, the outdoor temperature was 33℃, and the roof of the factory building was asbestos tile, so the thermal insulation was poor. The temperature in the workshop reaches 40℃, and plastic bags and woven bags are organic matter, so strong oxidants and organic matter will release heat when they are oxidized at high temperature, which will accelerate the oxidation reaction, leading to the burning of woven bags, igniting the wood piled up next to them and emitting black smoke. Because the factory director and workers put out the fire with the acidic water in the wastewater pool, the strong oxidant sodium chlorate reacts with the acid to generate a large amount of chlorate, and chlorine will explode at 40℃. The first loud noise was that chlorate exploded when heated. Because 2,4-dinitroaniline was piled up in the material preparation workshop at the same time, it exploded under the impact of high temperature and high pressure gas, resulting in the second loud noise, which led to the destruction of the factory and the death of people.

Prevention: strictly implement the national regulations on the safety management of hazardous chemicals. According to the relevant national regulations, hazardous chemicals with conflicting chemical properties cannot be stored in the same room. Adventure chemical plant illegally packed strong oxidant sodium chlorate with organic substances and stored it in the same workshop, which caused hidden dangers of accidents and caused great disasters.

Third, the main points of answering questions

1. Direct and indirect causes

Direct cause:

(1) Because the main fan and local fan of the mine are not turned on, the underground ventilation is poor, resulting in local gas accumulation;

(2) The coal seam in this mine is dry, and the coal dust is explosive. Dust prevention measures such as sprinkling water are not taken in the mine, which leads to the accumulation of coal dust underground;

(3) The management of underground initiating explosive devices and power generation equipment is chaotic, the electric detonator is improperly stored, and the cable has a bright joint, so that when the cable is dragged, the bright joint touches the foot line of the electric detonator, causing the detonator to explode (i.e. the ignition source), which in turn leads to the explosion of gas and coal dust.

Indirect cause:

(1) Mine managers and special operators (including gas inspectors) do not have safety qualifications, which violates the relevant provisions of the Mine Safety Law, the Safety Production Law and the Coal Mine Safety Regulations;

(2) The gas inspector neglected his duty and missed the inspection in the empty class;

(3) the mine safety management is insufficient, which is manifested in many aspects, such as:

(1) The safety management system is not perfect, such as there is no pre-shift meeting and handover system. ;

(2) The phenomenon of "three violations" is serious, such as frequent illegal shooting that has not been corrected. ;

(3) The underground materials are placed in disorder;

④ The level of safety awareness and safety management from the mine manager to the workers is not high, which reflects the lack of safety education and training.

(4) The local safety production supervision and management departments and coal mine safety supervision departments are not well supervised.

Deal with suggestions

(1) According to Article 8 1 of the Law on Work Safety, the main person in charge of the mine shall be investigated for legal responsibility according to the facts and circumstances:

(two) according to the "safety production law" article ninetieth, according to the facts and circumstances, shall be investigated for the legal responsibility of the relevant person in charge of the mine, management personnel and other employees;

(3) According to Articles 82 and 93 of the Safety Production Law, the mine was given administrative punishment;

(4) The local safety production supervision and management departments and coal mine safety supervision departments have failed to supervise effectively and timely stop the illegal acts of mine managers and special equipment operators who take up their posts without a license, and should be investigated for administrative responsibility.

3. Suggestions for measures

(1) The safety production supervision and management department shall examine the qualifications of coal mines in accordance with relevant laws, regulations and systems, and resolutely ban small coal mines that are illegal or do not have safe production conditions;

(2) The safety production supervision and management department shall, in accordance with relevant laws and regulations, effectively supervise and inspect the safety production of coal mines under construction;

(3) Strengthen coal mine safety management, including establishing and improving the responsibility system for production safety and other necessary safety rules and regulations, safety operation procedures, etc. , and strictly enforced;

(4) Strengthen the safety education and training of the principal responsible persons and all employees of mining enterprises. Mine managers and special operations personnel shall obtain qualification certificates according to law before taking up their posts;

(5) Strengthen mine ventilation and gas management, and take sprinkler measures to prevent gas accumulation and coal dust accumulation;

(6) Strengthen the management of initiating explosive devices and electrical equipment, and put an end to the phenomenon that cables use open joints.

Fourth, the main points of answering questions

1. Direct cause

Unsafe state of (1) object

① "three in one": the production workshop, warehouse and workers' dormitory are in the same building;

(2) Raw materials, finished products, wastes and flammable items are placed at will;

(3) There is no minimum fire fighting equipment such as fire hydrant and fire extinguisher in the building;

(4) There are no fire exits and emergency exits, and many doors and windows are welded to death by iron bars.

(2) people's unsafe behavior

(1) in the workplace where there are many flammable items, overtime workers smoke and throw cigarette butts;

(2) In an emergency, the way to escape by jumping off a building is wrong.

2. Indirect causes (management reasons)

(1) Wang Mouyi:

The above direct reasons are all caused by Wang's neglect of safety production and chaotic safety management.

(2) Shipai Town and Hotan Management Area:

Many foreign-funded and "three-for-one-supplement" enterprises in the town and its management area have management confusion: the safety management organization is absent or not perfect, the design, construction and commissioning of the factory building have not been audited by the safety authorities, the layout is unreasonable and the safety facilities are not complete; There are no strict safety production measures and rules and regulations, and violations of operating procedures are common; There are many hidden dangers in workplace accidents. It shows that the supervision and management of production safety is not in place.

3. Person in charge

(1) The person directly responsible is overtime worker Liang;

(2) The responsible leaders are Wang Mouyi and Wang Mouer; The leaders in charge of production safety in Shipai Town and Tanabe Management Zone and the main person in charge of the government;

(3) Principal responsible person: Wang Mouyi, the leader in charge of production safety in Shipai Town and Tianbian Administrative District, and the principal responsible person of the government.

4. Corrective and preventive measures

(1) Xingye Garment Factory:

Change the "three in one" phenomenon; Establish and improve safety management institutions or set up full-time and part-time personnel; Establish and improve the safety system and operating procedures; Eliminate hidden dangers of workplace accidents; Strengthen safety education and training.

(2) Shipai Town and Hotan Management Area:

Correctly understand the safety production management policy, pay full attention to safety production while developing the economy, ensure sufficient personnel and time, strengthen the supervision and management of safety production in all aspects, and strengthen the investment in safety production.

Key points of verb (verb abbreviation)

1. Direct cause

Unsafe state of (1) object

(1) The strong oxidant and reductant in the 4 # silo are mixed and contacted, resulting in a strong redox reaction and heat accumulation, which leads to fire, combustion and explosion;

② The overall layout of Qingshuihe Reservoir Area is unreasonable, and facilities such as inflammable, explosive and highly toxic chemical dangerous goods warehouses, livestock and food warehouses and liquefied petroleum gas storage tanks are concentrated in areas that do not meet the requirements of safe distance between residential areas and traffic roads;

③ No fire water.

(2) people's unsafe behavior

Warehouse keepers and porters only decide the storage location and storage mode according to the size of the remaining space in the warehouse, and the situation of mixed storage and mixed loading is more common. In the process of loading and unloading dangerous goods, standardized procedures are not followed.

2. Indirect causes (management reasons)

(1) Anmao Company:

(1) In order to defraud the business license for storage and transportation of dangerous chemicals, in the feasibility study report submitted to the municipal government, dry goods and groceries that do not meet the safety requirements are deliberately closed as dangerous goods warehouses that meet the safety requirements, and illegally changed into dangerous chemicals warehouses;

(2) Failing to store dangerous goods according to the approved regulations and seriously mixing them with various chemical dangerous goods. It happens from time to time that the goods are temporarily designated for storage in the warehouse after arrival.

(3) after receiving the notice of fire hazards, it fails to make rectification according to the requirements of the notice and fails to eliminate major hidden dangers.

(2) Shenzhen Municipal Government and relevant departments

① The municipal government failed to review the overall layout of Qingshuihe warehouse area according to the relevant national safety regulations;

(2) The municipal government did not strictly examine the tender report of Anbang Dangerous Goods Company according to the relevant safety laws and regulations promulgated by the state, and approved the establishment of Anbang Dangerous Goods Company with the Reply on the Establishment of Shenzhen Anbang Dangerous Goods Storage and Transportation CompanyNo. [1990]688;

(3) The Municipal Public Security Bureau failed to strictly examine according to the regulations, and issued Guangdong Explosive Storage Permit, Toxic Storage Permit and Shenzhen Explosive Dangerous Goods Transfer Permit to Anmao Dangerous Goods Company, which legalized the company's operation of civil explosives without the safety conditions stipulated by the state; The Fire Department of the Municipal Public Security Bureau did not carry out any supervision and rectification after issuing the Notice of Fire Hazard Rectification.

④ The Municipal Public Security Bureau illegally participates in the operation of Anmao Company, and its subordinate explosive dangerous goods service company holds 20% shares of Anmao Company.

3. Person in charge

(1) The person directly responsible is the main person in charge of Anmao Company;

(2) The responsible leaders are Shenzhen Municipal Government and Municipal Public Security Bureau;

(3) The principal responsible persons are the principal responsible persons of Anmao Company and the relevant responsible persons of Shenzhen Public.

4. Corrective and preventive measures

(1) Relocation and rational layout of dangerous goods warehouse;

(2) Store chemicals according to their compatibility and relevant regulations and standards;

(3) Shenzhen Municipal Government and relevant departments:

(1) The Municipal Public Security Bureau puts an end to corruption and has no interest relationship with any company;

(2) Examining and approving the general layout of bidding, certification and storage places for hazardous chemicals, and strictly implementing relevant laws, regulations and standards;

③ Strictly check the implementation of laws and regulations by the relevant units of hazardous chemicals, and verify the rectification after issuing the rectification notice of fire hazards.