Why did Zhuge Liang of Liu Bei lose to Cao Cao again? Where is the deep root?

The Shu-Han regime perished in 263 AD, while Wu Dong perished in 280 AD. Compared with Wu Dong, the geographical conditions of Shu Han are more dangerous, and it is easier to defend than to attack. Moreover, it is recognized in history that Zhuge Liang is good at governing the country, and Shu is also the most organized of the three countries. In the complicated confrontation, it seems that it should not perish before Wu Dong, so it is necessary for us to explore and analyze the deep-seated reasons why Shu Han perished first among the three countries.

1. The people's opposition is an important factor that determines the success or failure of the war. At the end of the Han Dynasty, when the 400-year history of the Han Dynasty was still deeply rooted in the hearts of the people, Emperor Xian of the Han Dynasty was still a very important banner. Cao Cao seized the opportunity to help the vassals unify northern China. Liu Bei, relying on his special status as a Han clan and the slogan of "revitalizing the Han clan", set out to win Jingzhou and Yizhou successively. In 220 AD, Cao Pi usurped the Han Dynasty to establish the Cao Wei regime. In 223 AD, Liu Bei died in Baidicheng after the Yiling War. It has been more than 40 years since the demise of the dynasty in 263 AD, so by this time in the late dynasty, people's hearts were no longer thinking about Han, and this advantage of the regime at the beginning of the founding of the People's Republic of China had long since ceased to exist.

2. Guan Yu's fiasco in the battle of losing Jingzhou and Yiling led to Zhuge Liang's famous Longzhong pair failing to realize its great strategic intention. Since then, the Shu-Han regime has gone downhill from its peak. Although Zhuge Liang, Jiang Wei and others worked hard to support the situation of Shu and Han, they have laid the groundwork for the demise of Shu and Han regime more than 40 years later. In fact, the alliance between Sun and Liu has always been a headache for Cao Cao. From Battle of Red Cliffs in 208 AD to 2 19 AD, Sun Quan successfully captured Jingzhou, which was the honeymoon period of the Sun-Liu Alliance. Sun Quan lent the strategic location of Jiangling to Liu Bei and married his sister. However, Cao Cao often fought on two fronts, and Liu Bei finally won Hanzhong successfully, which also had a lot to do with Sun Quan's sending troops to Hefei to contain Cao Cao's main force. If we boldly assume that Guan Yu flooded the Seventh Army in Xiangyang, the wavering Cao Cao will almost move the capital, Liu Bei will lead Yizhou's army to Qinchuan, and Sun Quan will lead Jiangdong's army to Huainan and Xuzhou, so that Wan Li will attack on all fronts and take advantage of the situation to encroach on Cao Wei, which can completely achieve the situation that the Central Plains is shaken and the people's hearts have changed greatly. It is really dangerous for Cao Cao to deal with several armies at the same time, which is exactly what Zhuge Liang's Longzhong wants to achieve. Unfortunately, Sun Quan's selfishness broke the good situation at this time. When Guan Yu's main force and Cao Cao fought in Xiangfan, they sent troops to sneak attack Jingzhou from behind, killed Guan Yu and his son, and destroyed the Sun-Liu alliance. By the way, the battle of Yiling was ostensibly the victory of Wu Dong, and the geographical pattern of tripartite confrontation was established from then on. But in essence, it was a war in which both Wu and Shu suffered, which made Shu weak and Wu solitary, and Cao Wei established an absolute advantage over Wu and Shu.

3. Although Yizhou is one of the largest states in the thirteen states at the end of Han Dynasty with the most dangerous terrain, it is the only state ruled by Shu and Han. At that time, Soochow occupied three southeast States, Yangzhou, Jingzhou and Jiaozhou, while Cao Wei owned Kyushu in the north, so the Shu-Han regime was the weakest among the three countries. The essence and origin of Chinese civilization are in the northern Central Plains, and Yizhou is a relatively backward area, so the strength of Han Shu regime is far less than that of Cao Wei, who occupied the Central Plains for many years. Here, we are just comparing strength. The total strength of Shu Han was less than 65,438+10,000, which was only one fifth of that of Cao Wei, who sent troops directly to pacify Shu Han, with nearly 200,000 troops. In addition, judging from the laws of China's history, except for Zhu Yuanzhang's Ming Dynasty, the whole country was basically unified by the north and the south.

4. In the late Shu and Han dynasties, the talents in the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China gradually withered in the later period, and there was a serious shortage of talents. Therefore, there is an idiom that there is no general in Shu, and Liao Hua is the pioneer. Cao Wei is located in the Central Plains, with vast territory and rich resources, and talents are constantly emerging from generation to generation. Therefore, Cao Wei far surpassed Shu Han in the quality and quantity of talents. The difference between Zhuge Liang and Cao Cao is that he attaches great importance to the moral character of talents and even values virtue over talent. Therefore, almost all the talents promoted by Zhuge Liang are politically clean, but few are first-class talents. In addition, in the Han Shu regime, there are many people who were killed and abolished like Wei Yan and Li Yan. In fact, everyone knows that Guo Jia's life style is not very good, and he was accused by detained Chen Qun. However, Cao Cao promoted and reused him in an eclectic way, which made great contributions to Cao Cao's unification of the north. In addition, Zhuge Liang and Liu Bei both used a lot of old Jingzhou employees and some foreign talents. For example, Jiang Wan and Fei Yi, who came to power after Zhuge Liang's death, were both old subordinates of Jingzhou, while Jiang Wei was from Liangzhou. The local talents in Yizhou have not been well developed and cultivated, which not only caused the shortage of talents in the later period, but also caused deep internal contradictions.

Before the war, Shu Han was not prepared militarily and psychologically. Since the Shu-Han general Wang Ping repelled Cao Shuang in 244 AD, Cao Wei hasn't attacked the Shu-Han border for almost 20 years, and the strategic policy of Cao Wei has always been Wu before Shu, so the Shu-Han monarch and his subjects didn't really make serious preparations for Cao Wei's invasion. At that time, before the crusade, many ministers, including Wargo, wrote to express their opposition, and only Zhong Hui supported the crusade against Shu. In the end, Cao Wei, who held the power of Cao Wei, pushed the pack, adjusted the strategic policy, and determined the correct plan to destroy Shu first and then Wu. Before sending troops, he tried his best to create the momentum and illusion of preparing to attack Wu Dong. Even the famous Shu-Han star Jiang Wei was cheated and didn't prepare for the battle in time. Later, even if Jiang Wei made some remedies and adjustments after discovering it, Hanzhong quickly fell because of the slow response to political corruption, and Jiang Wei was almost trapped in the northwest by Wargo.

6. Political corruption in the later period of Shu-Han Dynasty, especially after the death of Jiang Wan and Fei Yi, Jiang Wei led troops to preside over the Northern Expedition for a long time, and there was no minister in the court who could influence Liu Chan. Liu Chan also gradually began to reuse some courtiers and even treacherous courtiers, and finally formed a situation in which Liu Chan was ignorant and Huang Hao seized power. Even Jiang Wei, who mastered the military and political power of Shu Han, dared not enter the DPRK casually, and finally went to the northwest to wasteland to avoid disaster. In fact, even though Zhuge Zhan, Zhuge Liang's son, was promoted by Liu Chan, he was a mediocre man. When fighting against the invasion of Wargo's army, someone once correctly advised him to hold the dangerous place and wait for the reinforcements of Jiang Wei's main force, so it would be very dangerous for Wargo's army to be attacked. Unfortunately, he was eager to make contributions and rushed to send troops. As a result, the whole army was wiped out. Since this war, Wargo has been marching into Chengdu nonstop. As we all know, after Liu Chan surrendered to Cao Wei, there was a famous allusion of "being happy but not thinking about Shu", which shows the degree of ignorance of Liu Chan.

7. The political contradictions within the Shu-Han regime have always been fierce, especially the historical contradictions between local forces and foreign forces in Yizhou have always been deep. When Liu Bei plundered Yizhou, the main role was the troops and talents brought by Jingzhou, which naturally formed a foreign power group. Although Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang used some indigenous people in Yizhou to win people's hearts after pacifying Yizhou, most of them were honest officials or local officials, so it was difficult for them to enter the central authority of Shu Han. In the late Shu and Han dynasties, due to the gradual decline of talents from foreign power groups, Yizhou local forces began to rise and grow, and this contradiction was further aggravated. Therefore, when Wargo's army captured the gates of Chengdu, the Shu-Han regime was not at the end of its tether, and at least there were some resistance forces, which could wait for Jiang Wei's main force to come back to reinforce and clear the way. However, the Shu-Han regime is full of surrender arguments, and no local power in Yizhou is willing to fight for Shu-Han to the death. There is a need to add a situation here. After the demise of Shu Han, Si Mazhao moved all foreign forces out of Yizhou in order to consolidate his rule in Yizhou, which shows that he clearly saw this problem.

8. After Zhuge Liang died in Wuzhangyuan in 234 AD, the famous Jiang Wei has been the mainstay of the later Shu and Han dynasties. Especially after the assassination of Fei Yi in 253 AD, his military and political power began to expand gradually and he became a general of Shu Han. He was once General Cao Wei who defected to Shu Han during Zhuge Liang's first Northern Expedition. Zhuge Liang admires him very much, and he also has considerable ability and talent. He has always been grateful to Zhuge Liang for his kindness to meet him and inherited Zhuge Liang's legacy. He presided over the Northern Expedition of Cao Wei for nine times from 247 to 263, but the effect was very little, and he lost his limited national strength, resulting in the situation that the soldiers were exhausted and the people were trapped, which accelerated the process of the demise of Shu Han. In fact, the reason for doing this is very simple. From the overall situation, it is definitely not worth the loss.

9. Jiang Wei made a serious mistake in tactical arrangement. Hanzhong is an important gateway to Yizhou. Without Hanzhong, there would be no Yizhou. Hanzhong was originally a place that was easy to defend but difficult to attack. At that time, both Cao Cao and Liu Bei made great efforts to win it. Since Liu Bei left Wei Yan to guard Hanzhong in 2 19 AD, Shu Han has always placed heavy troops in the peripheral strongholds to defend the enemy, instead of throwing the enemy into the hinterland of the plain. In 244 AD, Cao Shuang, a general of Cao Wei, personally led 65,438+10,000 troops to attack Hanzhong, and Wang Ping, a general of Shu Han, successfully defended Hanzhong with less than 30,000 defenders. However, after Jiang Wei mastered the military and political power, he thought that the previous methods could defend the enemy, but he could not achieve greater victory. If we introduce the enemy into the hinterland of Hanzhong and then send troops from four strongholds to attack and harass, we can achieve the goal of destroying the enemy. In fact, a relatively weak country should adopt a more cautious defense policy, instead of taking such gambling-style adventure tactics. His tactical method can deal with the enemy with weak strength, but if he meets an enemy with several times stronger strength, it is tantamount to letting the tiger out of the mountain. Moreover, Jiang Wei has been actively organizing the Northern Expedition for a long time, which is a typical example of heavy attack and defense. He didn't assemble heavy troops in Hanzhong, and finally dragged them to the northwest to open up wasteland. As a result, due to the disparity of troops, Zhong Hui was able to quickly occupy Hanzhong, which made Shu Han fall into a great passive position from the beginning of this campaign.

10, Soochow did not rescue Shu Han completely in time. There are also two reasons for this. On the one hand, Cao Wei made a scene to send troops to Wu Dong before going to Shu Han, which made Wu Dong dare not make a move. On the other hand, the troops stationed at the border of Shu and Wu are really watching the situation, trying to take advantage of the chaos to annex part of the land of Shu and Yizhou, instead of sincerely helping Shu and Han resist the enemy. Therefore, Luo Xian, the general of Shu and Han Dynasties, saw their intention and refused them entry into the war. In fact, even if Soochow sent troops to Huainan to contain Cao Wei at this time, it would be of little significance. Because Cao Wei has been operating in the north for many years, he has an overwhelming advantage over Wu Dong and Han Shu, and his strength can fully cope with two-front operations. Although the failure of Soochow rescue was a factor in the demise of Shu Han, it was not very important, so I put it in the last one.