What obstacles did Britain set up when China and Britain misjudged the Hong Kong issue?

At that time, Nan Zhou met with Margaret Thatcher in Hongkong.

1984 65438+1From October to September, as the head of the Chinese delegation, he participated in the 8th to 22nd rounds of Sino-British talks on the Hong Kong issue and initialled the Sino-British Joint Statement on the Hong Kong issue on behalf of China; 1990 to 1997, president of Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong Branch-Nan Zhou, an outstanding diplomat of New China and a witness to the history of Hong Kong's return.

"Dictation: Looking Back at Feather Scarves" (edited by Zong, published by Qilu Bookstore), which will be published in June, reveals the difficulties in Sino-British negotiations on the Hong Kong issue and the twists and turns on the road to Hong Kong's return. On the eve of the anniversary of Hong Kong's return to China 10, I felt more deeply after reading this book.

The British side is moving forward step by step, and we will not give in.

The eighth round of talks began to discuss the first agenda, that is, the arrangement after 1997. All the debates in this regard focus on the fundamental issue of national sovereignty. In the subsequent rounds of negotiations, the British policy can be summarized in one sentence: step by step. They constantly hit China's bottom line, trying to damage China's interests and sovereignty, so as to maintain that Britain can continue to control Hong Kong's political situation to the maximum extent after the return of Hong Kong.

We talked about our 12 policy, and the British side adopted "circuitous tactics". When each round of negotiations talked about a certain issue, he took out a few pages and said, we are not opposed to your policy, but what is our understanding? His understanding is very different from ours. His understanding is to undermine your sovereignty.

The controversial issues cover a wide range, so here are only a few more important aspects.

For example, the relationship between the central and local governments. In our draft agreement document, it is stated that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is directly under the Central People's Government. Although Hong Kong is a special zone, it is only a local government, which is a part of our territory, that is, it is directly subordinate to it. The British side actually asked to cross it out. Not affiliated with the central government, but affiliated with your British imperial government? No, you can't cross it out So the two sides argued. We say "a high degree of autonomy" and he demands "complete autonomy". If there is "complete autonomy", the central government can't control it at all. Hong Kong has their potential. If you agree with them, they can do whatever they want. One day when the time is ripe, we can't interfere in declaring "independence". We are talking about "a high degree of autonomy", not "complete autonomy". He also said that if "full autonomy" fails, "maximum autonomy" is needed. What does "maximum autonomy" mean? What is the substantive difference between this and "complete autonomy"? The British can't say it. The British side not only wants to delete the words "the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is directly under the central government", but also wants to stipulate that "other places" outside Hong Kong, including the central government, have no veto power over Hong Kong affairs. We knocked him out, too We refused. I said: China's policy of "a high degree of autonomy" has a wide connotation and cannot be relaxed any more.

For another example, the British side said that on June 30, 1997, political and administrative power was directly handed over to the SAR government, without going through the Central People's Government, but bypassing the Central Government, and there was a "private transfer". I said, no! Hong Kong was taken away from China by Britain. According to the Sino-British agreement, it should naturally be returned to the China government. What does it mean that Britain wants to bypass the central government? After all, we just don't want to return Hong Kong to China, but we still want to give people the impression that Hong Kong is an independent political entity, which is of course not allowed. So on the evening of June 30th, 1997, you can see that after the handover ceremony, we will give the SAR Government a high degree of autonomy.

Another example is diplomatic issues. Diplomatically, we say that Hong Kong is a special zone and a region of China. Any country that has diplomatic relations with China can set up a consulate general or consulate in Hongkong, because the embassy can only be located in the capital. Now, many countries have embassies in Beijing and consulates general in big cities with many business expatriates, such as Shanghai and Guangzhou. However, the British side did not agree, and asked Britain to set up a high commission office instead of a consulate general in Hong Kong. Pakistan is a Commonwealth country and Tanzania is also a Commonwealth country. I have worked in these countries and know this situation. Other countries are called embassies, but Britain has set up high commission offices in Commonwealth countries to show its special status. I immediately retorted: What are your intentions in bringing this up? Is it necessary to turn the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region into a member of the Commonwealth or a quasi-Commonwealth? After listening to my criticism, I saw Evans, the head of the British side, whispering with several members next to him. After discussion, they gave the answer. He said: Some of our countries also have commercial commissioners. I said, this is nonsense. The Commercial Commissioner is the Commercial Commissioner of the Commercial Office, which is a unit under the Embassy and has nothing to do with the High Commissioner. You can't fool us like this. Evans thought it wouldn't work and agreed to set up a consulate general in Hong Kong.

"King Wen is angry and peaceful."

There is a bigger problem, that is, while implementing a "high degree of autonomy", the central government should retain the necessary rights. First of all, it is proposed that national defense and diplomacy must be directly managed by the central government and not included in "a high degree of autonomy". In that case, we have the right to station troops. The British side denied it in every way, saying that it would not station troops. After the garrison, Hong Kong people were frightened and wanted to emigrate. I said, how can this happen? You can station troops, why can't we station troops? He said: We are different! Britain is 108,000 miles from Hong Kong. In case something happens, we can't come. But you're here. There is no need to station troops in Hong Kong. You only need to have troops in Guangzhou and Shenzhen. This is another absurd logic. The British side also said that if foreign countries invade Hong Kong, they should seek the opinions of the Hong Kong government and the Chief Executive of the SAR in advance. He agreed, and so did the Legislative Council. You can come here for a while and go back immediately if you have no task.

This is another big debate involving sovereignty. During the negotiation, on behalf of China, I made it clear that this issue has been discussed many times, and your opposition to the garrison is unreasonable. The central government is responsible for Hong Kong's defense and must station troops in Hong Kong. Garrison is the embodiment of sovereignty, which is natural. Whether Britain agrees or not, China will not give in on this issue. In addition, the garrison has both advantages and disadvantages to the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. I hope that the British side will adopt a cooperative attitude and stop making troubles unreasonably. Comrade Xiaoping's attitude towards this is also very firm. As early as1April, 984, when he was reviewing the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Request for Instructions on the Plan of Talks with the British Foreign Secretary on Hong Kong", he personally approved the garrison rule: "The garrison rule in Hong Kong must be adhered to and cannot be compromised."

When we struggled with the British at the meeting, we made a mistake. Probably in May of 1983, some big media in Hong Kong sent some reporters to various venues to find this leader, that leader. Some leaders did not participate in the negotiations on the Hong Kong issue and were not familiar with the situation. When the National People's Congress was in session, a reporter approached one of our leaders, who didn't know much about the situation. The reporter asked: Hong Kong people are afraid of stationing troops. Is your central government going to station troops in Hong Kong? The leader casually replied: No garrison! If that's what you mean. The next day, the headlines of major newspapers in Hong Kong reported that a leader said there was no need to station troops in Hong Kong, which was the opinion of the China government.

Just then, Comrade Xiaoping received the Hong Kong delegation. This matter was reported to Xiaoping in advance on the same day, and Comrade Xiaoping was very angry. When the reporter was leaving, he was about to go out. Xiaoping said, hey! Come back! Come back! Wait a minute! I still have something to say. When you go out and send me a message, just say XXX is talking nonsense. You gave me a rumor. How can Hong Kong not station troops? Garrison is the embodiment of sovereignty. Why can't China station troops in Hongkong? Britain can station troops, but we can't station troops on our own territory after sovereignty is restored. Is it reasonable in the world? Garrison is at least a symbol of sovereignty. Without this power, how can we resume the exercise of sovereignty? We must station troops! Comrade Xiaoping flew into a rage

As soon as he came to work the next morning, Evans called and said that he had an urgent appointment on orders from the government. I thought: Is it related to this matter? It's really this thing. Evans was very nervous. As Han Yu of the Tang Dynasty said, he was a little tongue-tied and guilty. Evans said, I heard that Mr. Deng Xiaoping said in the Great Hall of the People yesterday that Mr. X and Mr. Y were talking nonsense, and the British side was very concerned about this. Evans dare not name the specific person. He said that Mr. Deng's speech caused a great shock in all walks of life in Hong Kong. The British authorities in Hong Kong are still afraid of this problem. I hope the China government will seriously consider whether it is necessary to station troops in Hong Kong. I said, stop talking. We've talked about it many times. This is the resumption of the exercise of sovereignty. National defense is under the central control, and it is necessary to station troops in Hong Kong. Comrade Deng Xiaoping lost his temper. What are you talking about? He said: The government instructed me to express this attitude. I said: Go back and say that China's position is firm and there is no room for discussion! He left and never dared to mention it again.

Later, I said it was called "King Wen's anger ruled the world".

Difficult negotiations on the entry of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group into Hong Kong

12 round of talks was held on1April, 984 1 1 day, and the Sino-British Hong Kong negotiations began to enter the second agenda, that is, the arrangements before 1997. The core issue of this agenda is what Xiaoping said: to ensure the stability of Hong Kong during the transition period, so as to achieve a smooth transition. Xiaoping was afraid that they would create chaos during this period and needed a joint Chinese-British organization to enter Hong Kong. If we have any questions, we can discuss them there. If the two sides cannot reach an agreement, the problem will be reflected to a higher level, that is, the foreign ministries of the two countries or the two governments will solve it. The purpose is to implement the Sino-British Joint Declaration and ensure the smooth return of Hong Kong.

We drew up a draft according to Xiaoping's meaning, the original name was "Draft of the Sino-British Joint Commission", which was handed over to the British side at the negotiating table. The British side was shocked when they saw it. I didn't expect China to have such skill. Then the British began to resist, but they didn't agree. They said that if you set up a "joint committee" to settle in Hong Kong, wouldn't that mean that Hong Kong was under the control of China and Britain before 1997? We have repeatedly explained to them that the Joint Commission is not in charge of "* * *", but only responsible for implementing the Sino-British Joint Declaration and dealing with major issues that straddle 1997, but no matter how we explain it, it just won't work. We call it a transition period, but they don't admit that there is a transition period. Secondly, they said that there was absolutely no need to set up a Sino-British Joint Committee. The two countries have governments, foreign ministries and embassies, and we can talk about anything. Why set up a joint organization? They are particularly afraid that the joint organization will become the "second power center" after entering Hong Kong. If Hong Kong people have any lawsuits or problems, they will go to the Joint Commission instead of the Hong Kong Government. The left said no, the right said no, and the negotiations were deadlocked.

During this period, Comrade Xiaoping met with British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe and said: I hope you will reconsider the necessity of this matter, which will do you no harm. If we don't want the Sino-British Joint Commission to enter immediately, we can hold meetings in London, Beijing and Hong Kong in turn in the first few years. However, the British side believes that it is still impossible and emphasizes that it is not necessary. Later, we said, is that a change of name, not a joint Committee, but a joint group? Not yet. The British still don't allow it in.

After the end of mid-June 16 rounds of negotiations, the British side still refused to set up a permanent body in Hong Kong and set up a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group. At this time, Jeffrey Howe is about to visit China again. I thought about it and told our delegation that the British Foreign Secretary would come soon. How to break this deadlock? Britain's worry is nothing more than fear that we will interfere in its daily administrative affairs. Let's make it clear that the task of this institution is not to interfere in the daily administrative affairs of the Hong Kong Government. Its task is mainly to study, discuss and decide on issues related to a smooth transition in accordance with the provisions of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. In addition, we can also take care of the time, enter one or two years later, and let it exist for one or two years after 1997.

We went to Comrade Xiaoping and reported the above ideas to him. Comrade Xiaoping thought for a moment and said: it is necessary to stay, the name can be changed, and the time of stay can be relaxed sooner or later. We can give and take, but we must move in. It doesn't matter whether you enter or cancel after two years. You try to negotiate a result according to this plan. Then Comrade Xiaoping said that the time for formulating the Basic Law should be advanced, not later than 1990, and it would be better to do so earlier, instead of waiting until 1993 for promulgation. This is not only conducive to stabilizing the situation in Hong Kong, but also conducive to China's participation. Because the British side has indicated that after the promulgation of the Basic Law, China and Britain will strengthen close cooperation. Comrade Xiaoping went on to say: In the transitional period, we should pay attention to five Don 'ts: First, don't shake the status of the Hong Kong dollar. Second, don't abuse the income from land sales. I'm worried that the Hong Kong government will sell all the land and spend all the income on administrative expenses. In the future, when the SAR Government opens its doors, there will be no money left. Third, do not increase the financial burden of the future SAR government, such as arbitrarily increasing the salaries and pensions of government staff, or undertaking some large-scale and inappropriate infrastructure projects. Fourth, don't let British capital take the lead in transferring funds. 5. Don't impose a set of Hong Kong governance team on the SAR Government. The first four are economic and the last one is political. Afterwards, it was proved that Comrade Xiaoping's views on Hong Kong were accurate, profound and far-sighted.

The next day, July 28th, Jeffrey Howe and his party arrived. At noon, I arranged a meeting, presided over by me, and invited Corrida (former British ambassador to China and adviser to Margaret Thatcher). Editor's note) Waiting for someone to have lunch. I played this card at that lunch, and I said: Now it has reached such a moment that this problem needs to be solved early. We thought it over carefully and put forward a plan. The joint team must be stationed in Hong Kong, and the stationing time can be postponed unless the tasks are clearly defined. The agreement was formally signed at the end of 1984, and you can stay outside for three years. 1985, 1986, 1987. In the fourth year 1 988+1October1. In order to take care of you, two and a half years after 1997 ended in 2000. I said: This is China's last plan. If you don't accept, we will withdraw our plan, and you will be responsible for the consequences of withdrawal.

Corrida said in his memoirs that he was flying and the jet lag had not come back. He was sleepy when he was eating. Hearing this, he suddenly woke up and realized that China was going to have a showdown and had to take it seriously. After lunch, Collida immediately ran from Building 2 to the building where they lived, and reported the situation to Foreign Secretary Jeffrey Howe and Governor Youde. Hearing this, Jeffrey Howe said, Don't talk in the house. Let's go out and talk to a tree. It was July, and the sun was blazing, and the heat was unbearable. There is a vivid description in Jeffrey Howe's memoirs. After Corrida reported my words, Geoffrey Howe thought that this was the bottom line of China, and it could not be delayed or deadlocked any longer. But Youde disagreed, saying that to force China to make greater concessions, it was best to abort the joint team. But he is a minority, and most people still think it may break down, so they should send a report to London immediately and make suggestions. So Colimma didn't attend the meeting that afternoon, and we thought he might run back to the embassy to send a telegram. The next day, Ji Pengfei invited him to dinner. I just called him back after drinking a mouthful of soup. I thought I called back, and it did. Margaret Thatcher agreed to reach a compromise with us, but only hoped that the British representative would strive for a better result. Even better, this team was stationed in Hong Kong later. We said 1988. Later, they proposed to postpone it to 1993 until the agreement was signed. We flatly rejected their unreasonable demands. We proposed that the joint group should end in June 65438+10 1 2000, but they didn't do it either. They wanted to postpone it until 2002. We also refused. They can't help it, but they can't pay the bill with Thatcher. Thatcher asked for a little later. Finally, half a year is allowed, and it is determined that the joint team will be stationed in Hong Kong from July 1988 to June 1, instead of delaying it to June 1993 as requested by the British side. So an agreement was reached.