What are the remaining problems to be solved when applying for coal mine closure?

Jin Peng mining machinery is illustrated with Chongqing as an example. 1998, the state decentralized five mining bureaus directly under the central government, namely Songzao, Nantong, Yongrong, Tianfu and Zhongliangshan, to Chongqing for management. From 2000 to 2006, with the approval of the National Leading Group for Enterprise Merger, Bankruptcy and Re-employment, six state-owned coal enterprises, including Shuanghe Coal Mine of Yongrong Mining Bureau, Zengjiashan Coal Mine, Yangliuba Coal Mine of Tianfu Mining Bureau, Lindong Coal Mine of Chongqing, No.2 Mine of Qijiang of Chongqing and Zhongliangshan Mining Bureau, successively went bankrupt according to the document the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China 1 1. Except Zhongliangshan Mining Bureau, the management of retirees and the social functions of "three supplies and one industry" in the other five bankrupt units have not been transferred to local management. Bankruptcy expenses of coal enterprises are accrued according to 10 year, and most coal mines have expired. At present, the expenses incurred are paid by the main enterprises that implement policy bankruptcy. In recent years, the coal industry has been affected by multiple factors, and 70% of coal enterprises in China have suffered losses. Due to the poor resource conditions of Chongqing coal mine, the mining cost is high. Due to the influence of the national environmental protection policy, the market share of traditional thermal power is declining year by year, making it more difficult to bear the problems left over from bankruptcy, which has given the mining area a safe, stable and harmonious development.

Main problems left by policy bankruptcy coal mine

Taking Chongqing as an example, Shuanghe Coal Mine of Yongrong Mining Bureau, which was the earliest bankrupt in 2000, has been nearly 15, and Zengjiashan Coal Mine of Yongrong Mining Bureau, which went bankrupt in 2006, has been nearly 9 years. With the passage of time, the problems left over are becoming more and more serious.

First, the bankruptcy fund gap is large. The state-owned coal mines in Chongqing that are closed down and bankrupt by policy shall be charged with bankruptcy expenses by the state according to relevant regulations. However, because the actual payment period of bankruptcy funds is much longer than the payment period approved by the state, the actual bankruptcy expenditure items are more than the approved expenditure items, the actual bankruptcy payment standard is higher than the approved payment standard, the central financial subsidy funds have been used up, and the bankruptcy funds gap is serious.

Six state-owned coal mining enterprises in Chongqing failed to transfer social functions such as "three supplies and one industry" and retirement management to local management when they went bankrupt. The required maintenance funds were 94 million yuan per year, which was paid in advance by the central government 10 to 20 1 16 years, and the central government funds had been used up. Since 20 1 1, this fund has been paid in advance by the main enterprises that implement policy bankruptcy, and has accumulated more than 300 million yuan so far.

In addition, with the introduction of relevant national and local policies, the original bankrupt enterprises have incurred new expenses, mainly including: the difference between the personal accounts of retirees' medical expenses in bankrupt enterprises18.35 million yuan/year; The relief fund for the survivors of employees who died in bankrupt enterprises is 34.68 million yuan/year. Since the bankrupt enterprise has cancelled its account, these two new expenses are borne by the surviving state-owned coal mines.

Second, the community maintenance and operation costs of bankrupt coal mines are high. Because bankrupt coal mines are relatively independent industrial and mining communities, most of them are far away from cities, and their production and living systems are self-contained. Every year, a lot of manpower and material resources need to be invested in management and maintenance to maintain the normal operation of the community. After the financial subsidy expires, there is no stable and reliable source of this part of operating funds. According to preliminary accounting, the annual operating expenses of bankrupt coal mine communities in Chongqing reach 32.83 million yuan/year, including 3.486 million yuan/year for hospitals, 9.562 million yuan/year for power supply, water supply, heating and public services1414,200 yuan/year, and 5.64 million yuan/year for retired management institutions.

Third, there are many historical debts of the "three supplies and one industry" facilities. Due to many historical debts, obsolete houses, dilapidated pipe networks and incomplete electricity meters in most bankrupt communities, the property management of living communities can not meet the management standards of ordinary urban residential communities, and local governments are unwilling to accept them. According to the transfer standard of "three supplies and one industry", a lot of money is urgently needed for upgrading and transformation. Taking Chongqing as an example, if the management of water, electricity and public houses in the state-owned key coal mines in this city meets the transfer conditions, it needs to invest 965.4380+09 million yuan, including 65.4380+24 million yuan of water supply facilities, 530 million yuan of power supply facilities and 265 million yuan of gas supply facilities.

suggestion

Properly handling the problems left over from bankrupt coal mines is not only related to the sustained and healthy development of the coal industry, but also to the social harmony and stability of the mining area. It is urgent for the relevant state departments to issue relevant policies and measures as soon as possible to solve them.

The first is to completely solve the problem of bankruptcy fund gap. It is suggested that the original expenses of bankrupt coal mines should be re-approved to solve the gap caused by exceeding the service life, improving the standard and changing the scope. The central government will give a one-time supplementary subsidy to the recurrent expenses, the funds of retired management institutions, and the cost gap of pension, medical insurance and enterprise-run society. The expenses of the following years are approved year by year, incorporated into the central and local financial budgets, and paid according to the facts every year.

The second is to appropriately subsidize the community operating expenses of bankrupt coal mines. It is suggested that the central government should fully approve the operating expenses of the bankrupt coal mine community to the local government, and the local government should incorporate the operating expenses required by the bankrupt coal mine community into the local financial budget according to the relevant policies and regulations, and pay them according to the facts every year.

The third is support.

Transfer of "three supplies and one industry" Because the bankrupt state-owned coal mine is a decentralized enterprise, the current state-owned coal mine is difficult to operate and has serious losses, and it is unable to bear the cost of reforming logistics facilities. It is suggested that the central government should refer to the transfer policy of "three supplies and one industry" of central enterprises and fully allocate funds to upgrade the logistics facilities such as "three supplies and one industry" of bankrupt coal mines to make up for historical debts and make them meet the transfer conditions as soon as possible; At the same time, the central government gives a large proportion of financial support, and the local finance pays "three supplies and one industry". It is suggested that Chongqing be the pilot city of this policy.