After reading the annual report of real estate enterprises, I found several terrible changes.

In April, a number of annual reports were disclosed.

In previous years, when we interpret the annual report, we often disassemble the financial data and business model of the enterprise to interpret it. For example, the annual report data of a real estate enterprise shows its profitability, solvency, operating ability and return ability to shareholders.

The expansion of various business models in the annual report-development, agent construction, commerce, technology, property and operation-shows the imagination of the future development of this real estate enterprise.

In fact, there are many interesting things in the annual report. I have thought of some titles, such as:

After the robotization of Country Garden, the construction site was empty.

Although Evergrande, which built the car, doesn't have a car yet, it sticks out its "fangs" at a double valuation.

Vanke's pig farm war ...

These are all talking about the diversification of housing enterprises.

But after reading the annual report, I found that the main business income of these pigs, cars and robots is still selling houses. However, these diversification has not received any real big benefits, and the biggest role at present is to improve the valuation.

But you can also see that we are seriously raising pigs, building Vanke, Evergrande and Country Garden. ...

In the near future, it is not impossible for us to eat Vanke braised pork made by Country Garden China robot at the dining table.

Even many housing enterprises are doing things other than real estate such as logistics, commerce, long-term rental apartments, hotels, ice and snow vacations, and have invested huge sums of money to do these things.

The core reason is that you will know after reading the annual report.

Whether it is Vanke with contract sales of 700 billion yuan, Country Garden with contract sales of 570 billion yuan, Sunac with contract sales of 575.2 billion yuan, or Evergrande with contract sales of 507.25 billion yuan, the core is that the gross profit margin and net interest rate of these real estate weathervanes have declined to varying degrees.

The saddest example is Yuzhou Real Estate. In 2020, the contracted sales reached 65.438+004967 billion yuan, the revenue in 2020 was 65.438+004.165.438+0 million yuan, the gross profit was 479 million yuan, and the net profit returned to the mother was 65.438+0.65438+0.7 million yuan.

100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Reasoning with who? Although it has a lot to do with carry-over, we can also see how poor the internal management of Cosmic Real Estate is.

However, this is not the most serious.

In 2020, the average net profit rate and average return on equity of the top 100 real estate enterprises are only 1 1. 1% and 15.9% respectively. The real estate industry has gradually entered the era of stock, and the era of making big money and quick money in the real estate industry has passed.

Then looking for the second growth curve is the desire of major housing enterprises for future increment.

After reading the annual report, many financial bigwigs in Weibo began to say that real estate was no good, because the growth of real estate, like the curve above, had reached the turning point of growth.

Indeed, profit margins have begun to narrow. Increasing income or not is a common picture in annual reports. In addition to some real estate companies whitewashing the annual report, many people should also feel that real estate is indeed becoming less and less profitable when people live in houses without speculation.

2

In the era of not making money, the first thing that real estate enterprises do next is to get dividends, and the real estate tycoons have surprisingly consistent ideas about the future.

Even Yu Liang of Vanke said in the annual report: Real estate has entered the era of management bonus, and the real estate industry should learn from the manufacturing industry.

Sun Hongbin of Sunac said: Now is the heyday of excellent real estate enterprises.

Then, in addition to the outstanding leading real estate enterprises to eat dividends, how do other real estate enterprises play?

After reading more than a dozen annual reports, I have come to a pessimistic conclusion more and more: from 202 1, it may be a new watershed, and housing enterprises have solidified beyond our imagination. Starting from this year, the possibility of jumping out of the dark horse is getting smaller and smaller.

Why do you say that?

First of all, let me show you a picture, which is a list of three red lines from the latest annual report to the end of 65438+February in 2020.

In this list, you can see that the government has drawn a red line: everyone is also "trying to reduce debt and improve cash flow". Many housing enterprises have turned from red to yellow or even from red to green, but many housing enterprises have not got rid of the third line and the debt ratio is still very high.

Note: The "three red lines" are: after excluding advance payment, the asset-liability ratio is greater than 70%, the net debt ratio is greater than 100%, and the short-term cash debt ratio is less than 1 times.

According to the situation of stepping on the line, the real estate enterprises are divided into four grades: red, orange, yellow and green, which correspond to four situations: all three indicators exceed the standard, two indicators exceed the standard, one indicator exceeds the standard and all three indicators do not exceed the standard.

Greenland, Huaxia Happiness, Taihe and other enterprises have not released their annual reports.

Since there are still so many leading real estate enterprises stepping on the line, what is the significance of formulating three red lines?

We have to admire the foresight of the rulemakers:

Each document stipulates the growth limit of interest-bearing liabilities.

three

We all know how housing enterprises develop: simply speaking, it is land acquisition-product design-construction-sales-delivery-fund recycling.

But if developers only rely on the money earned from selling houses to develop real estate, there may not be a real estate giant like Biwan Hengrong. So how do developers actually expand?

Some people say it is product standardization, some people say it is brand reputation, and some people say it is development strategy. In fact, there is another core: borrowing money to buy land.

Housing enterprises borrow money to get land-start construction-sell-pay back the money. I simply drew a picture to feel how the real estate enterprises actually flow:

In the eyes of some developers, a project is basically over when it is sold to the end. Because there will be no big capital discrepancy in this project, the cash flow has already moved to other projects.

Then the key to the expansion of housing enterprises lies in the ability to borrow money.

A developer boss in the industry once said: The ceiling we develop is my leverage ratio. In recent years, many housing enterprises have expanded hundreds of billions, and this is how the crazy high turnover comes.

However, since the promulgation of the three red line rules last year, the gameplay in the real estate market has completely changed.

This shows that when you step on different lines, you get less credit, less money you can borrow, and the cost of borrowing money increases. If you can't get the land without money, the number of projects to be started and sold will definitely decrease accordingly. I drew another picture:

Without money, the original positive feedback cycle was broken into negative feedback cycle, and the original snowball game disappeared:

The three red lines have become three mountains on the financing road of housing enterprises. The higher the red line, the harder it is to get money, which completely stifles the method of high-leverage expansion of housing enterprises. By reducing leverage to slow down real estate, this is the supply side of the "real estate speculation."

Without leverage, it is more difficult for housing enterprises to expand by leaps and bounds. Therefore, in the future, housing enterprises may never be able to change the expansion law, because the credit standards brought by the three red lines are the shackles of housing enterprises.

Speaking of this, the owners of real estate enterprises who just broke through 1000 billion may have to sweat: fortunately, they have entered the 100 billion threshold club.

However, the Matthew effect of head housing enterprises will become more and more obvious. In the future, Top 100 housing enterprises may follow the 28 th rule and gradually erode 80% of new home sales in the country.

This is not an alarmist, but a necessity for future development. There are only two types of housing enterprises that may survive in the future. One is the giant housing enterprises that are too big to fail, or they should not be called housing enterprises-but service providers: they not only develop real estate, but also manufacture automobiles, robots, logistics and services and engage in various other industries.

The other is "small but beautiful" real estate enterprises like Renheng, Binjiang, Wei Yong and Wanhua, which make products seriously.

I sincerely hope that there will be more enterprises that make good products.