Excuse me, is the new rural insurance introduced by the state less paid by the insured under 60 years old or must be supplemented by 15 years?

According to the Social Insurance Law, which came into effect in July, 20 1 1, China's social pension insurance projects are divided into five independent pension insurance projects: civil servant pension insurance, institution employee pension insurance, urban enterprise employee pension insurance, unemployed resident pension insurance and farmer pension insurance. In these projects, apart from civil servants and employees of public institutions, who does the state subsidize the most? Based on the new rural endowment insurance system (hereinafter referred to as "new rural endowment insurance"), this paper compares the lifelong financial subsidies of micro-individuals (employees of urban enterprises, unemployed urban residents and farmers), determines the main flow and the largest beneficiary groups of government-subsidized social security funds, discusses the fairness among them, and puts forward policy suggestions to improve the new rural endowment insurance system.

Note: As most cities in China have not established the old-age insurance plan for urban residents, unemployed urban residents generally participate in the basic old-age insurance project for urban enterprise employees as flexible employees.

First, the status of China's new rural social endowment insurance system

In September 2009, the State Council issued "Guiding Opinions on Launching the Pilot Project of New Rural Social Endowment Insurance" (Guo Fa [2009] No.32, hereinafter referred to as "Opinions"), establishing a new rural endowment insurance system combining individual contributions, collective subsidies and government subsidies to ensure the basic livelihood of rural residents in their later years. According to this document, the current pension calculation formula is as follows:

Basic pension = basic pension+personal account pension

These include:

(1) The basic pension standard determined by the central government is 55 yuan per person per month, and all localities can raise the basic pension standard according to the actual situation. According to the economic development and price changes, the state adjusts the national minimum standard of basic pension for new rural insurance in a timely manner. We assume that the country raises the minimum standard of basic pension according to the inflation rate g.

(2) Personal account pension consists of individual contributions, collective subsidies and financial subsidies. We assume that the individual payment standard is 100 yuan per year (the minimum payment standard), the collective does not subsidize (the state does not force collective organizations to pay fees), and the local government subsidizes 30 yuan every year (the minimum subsidy standard). We assume that individual contributions and local government subsidies will increase according to the inflation rate G every year.

(3) Personal account pension is the amount of personal account storage divided by the number of months. At present, the amount stored in personal accounts bears interest every year with reference to the one-year deposit rate of RMB in financial institutions announced by the People's Bank of China. The standard of calculating the number of months is determined according to the life expectancy of urban population, my retirement age, interest and other factors, and is determined by the State Council. The current calculation month is 139.

From this, we can draw the calculation formula of basic pension:

Among them, P is the basic pension, that is, the pension received in the first month after retirement, I is the nominal interest rate, G is the inflation rate, and N is the payment period.

Two, the main differences between the basic old-age insurance for urban enterprise employees and the new rural social endowment insurance

First, the protection objects are different. The old-age insurance system for employees of urban enterprises (hereinafter referred to as "urban insurance") is mainly for employees of urban enterprises, flexible employees of useless units and some rural land-expropriated personnel; Rural social endowment insurance is mainly for adult farmers with low payment ability.

Second, the implementation efforts are different. The basic old-age insurance for urban workers is compulsory according to the relevant laws and regulations of national social security, and both employers and employees must pay according to the regulations; Rural social endowment insurance emphasizes the principle of voluntariness, which is guided by the government and voluntarily participated by farmers.

Third, the financing structure is different. The main payer of the basic old-age insurance for urban workers is the employer (all individual contributions are included in the personal account of the old-age insurance, belonging to individuals and not participating in the redistribution of the rich and the poor). The main payer of rural social endowment insurance is the government, which gives certain financial subsidies when individuals participate in the insurance payment, and issues basic pension and personal account pension according to 55 yuan per person per month.

Fourth, the payment and treatment standards are different. The enjoyment of pension insurance benefits is directly linked to payment, and paying more and enjoying more is the basic principle. The old-age insurance for urban workers adopts the mode of "high payment and high security", while the rural social old-age insurance follows the principle of "low payment and low treatment". Take Xiamen, Fujian Province as an example. 20 10, the pension insurance payment of employees in this city ranges from 48 12 yuan to 24,060 yuan. The average monthly pension for employees in Xiamen is about 1.800 yuan, while the minimum annual pension for urban and rural residents is 1.000 yuan, and the average monthly pension is around 200 yuan.

From this perspective, the two pension insurance projects have their own characteristics. The endowment insurance for urban workers is aimed at people with higher income; Rural social endowment insurance is aimed at low-income people and has certain social welfare nature.

Third, the rationality analysis of the new rural insurance system

Below, we analyze the new rural endowment insurance system from two aspects: First, its rationality. Can the new rural endowment insurance system bring enough pensions to farmers? The second is fairness. Compared with other old-age insurance projects, what is the state's subsidy for new rural insurance projects? This section will discuss the first question, and the next section will discuss the second question.

Below, we assume that:

(1) The initial age for receiving a pension is 60. According to the Opinions, elderly people with rural household registration who have reached the age of 60 and do not enjoy the basic old-age insurance for urban workers can receive a monthly pension.

(2) Payment period 15 years. According to the Opinions, if the collection age exceeds 15 years, the payment shall be made annually, and the accumulated payment shall not be less than 15 years. This article is calculated according to the minimum payment period 15 years.

(3) The inflation rate G is equal to the nominal interest rate I, at which time the real interest rate is zero.

(4) At present, new farmers have five annual payment standards (100 yuan, 200 yuan, 300 yuan, 400 yuan and 500 yuan). In this paper, it is assumed that in the first year of endowment insurance, the individual account payment is 100 yuan/person, and the government subsidizes 30 yuan, totaling 130 yuan. In the next few years, the payment amount of individual accounts of endowment insurance and the amount of government subsidies will increase according to the inflation rate G.

Fourth, the analysis of the rights and interests of pension insurance projects

We compare a farmer, an urban resident and an employee of an urban low-income enterprise: farmers participate in the new rural insurance, and urban residents participate in the basic old-age insurance for urban employees as flexible employees; Enterprise employees participate in the basic old-age insurance for urban employees. The reason for studying the employees of low-income enterprises in cities and towns is that the basic old-age insurance system for employees in urban enterprises in China has a certain income redistribution function, and the employees with the lowest income receive the most subsidies (from interpersonal transfer payments and government financial subsidies) when receiving pensions. It should be pointed out that employees of urban enterprises, unemployed people in urban areas and farmers all set up personal accounts for old-age insurance when participating in the insurance. Considering that the personal account of endowment insurance is owned by individuals and can be inherited, we think that this part of funds will not be redistributed between the rich and the poor, so it is not included in the research scope of this section, that is, this section only studies the basic pension among the basic pensions.

(1) assumption condition

1, payment regulations. As shown in Table 2, the payment rates and payment bases of farmers, residents and employees of low-income enterprises are different. Among them, employees in low-income enterprises refer to employees whose income is lower than or equal to the lower limit of the payment base (60% of local social wages in the previous year) and must pay according to the payment base. Assuming that when urban residents and urban employees participate in the insurance, the local average social wage last year is 3,000 yuan/month, then the payment base of urban residents is 3,000 yuan/month (the payment rate is 12%), and the payment base of low-income enterprise employees is 1800 yuan/month (the payment rate is 20%). Assume that the average wage growth rate of employees is 5%; The annual increase of the basic pension funded by the government and paid to farmers is 50% of the wage growth rate in the same period.

2. Pension plan and payment method. As shown in Table 3, the calculation and distribution methods of basic pensions for farmers, residents and enterprise employees are different.

(2) Model calculation

According to the above assumptions, we can calculate the annual contributions and pension payments of the future three groups of people, as shown in Table 4.

Note: (1) The payment stage is characterized by the payment of funds as the investment cost, so it is represented by a negative number.

(2) From the second year after receiving the pension, the pension will be increased year by year, and the increase rate will be 50% of the wage growth rate (this assumption is in line with the actual situation of pension adjustment in China).

According to the data in Table 4, we can use the net present value method to judge the state subsidies to three groups of people. If participating in the basic old-age insurance is regarded as a long-term investment, the payment is equivalent to the investment stage in the long-term investment, while the employee retirement pension is the stage in which the long-term investment gains income. It can be concluded that the net present value of participating in the endowment insurance project is:

( 1)

Among them, Bt is the pension amount for T years, Ct is the payment cost amount for T years, n is the total life of the insured from participating in the endowment insurance to death (which can be divided into two stages, one is the payment stage at work and the other is the pension collection stage after retirement), and r is the discount rate. The above items are known, from which we can find out the net present value (NPV) of the insured.

(3) Calculation results

According to the formula (1) and table 4, we can calculate the net present value of three groups of people at different discount rates (see figure 1).

From the figure 1, we can find that:

(1) When the discount rate is lower than 5.5%, the order of net present value from high to low is: urban residents, employees of low-income enterprises and farmers.

(2) When the discount rate is higher than 5.5% and lower than 7%, the order of net present value from high to low is: urban residents, farmers and employees of low-income enterprises.

(3) When the discount rate is higher than 7%, the order of NPV from high to low is farmers, urban residents and employees of low-income enterprises.

For the above results, we believe that:

First, the net present value of urban residents is always higher than that of employees in low-income enterprises, which means that the government has given more preferential policies to urban residents, which is reasonable. Considering that most of the urban residents who participate in the insurance are individual industrial and commercial households and flexible employees, the government gives these people a large preferential policy, which on the one hand reflects the incentive for low-income groups to participate in the insurance, on the other hand, it can also promote more people to solve the employment problem through flexible employment and avoid their worries about providing for the elderly. From the operational level, because urban residents have the willingness to participate in insurance, if there is no certain policy inclination, this group of people will not be attracted to participate in insurance.

Second, in most cases, the net present value of farmers is the lowest, which means that farmers receive the least financial subsidies. In addition, in the above model calculation, we assume that the life expectancy of the three groups of people is 80 years old. According to the data of the fifth national census, in 2000, the average life expectancy of urban residents in China was 75.2 1 year, and the rural population was 69.55 years old. If the life expectancy of farmers is lower than that of urban residents, then the gap between farmers' net present value and residents is even greater.

Main conclusion of verb (abbreviation of verb)

As mentioned above, China's basic old-age insurance system is fragmented, with no wealth transfer between projects and no redistribution function between the rich and the poor. This system objectively causes the cost of urban insurance reform and the fund gap to be borne by urban workers themselves, that is, the pension of urban retired workers is borne by urban employees, and farmers do not bear the reform cost, which is beneficial to farmers. Of course, the current new rural endowment insurance system also has many problems:

1, the local financial burden is too heavy.

(1) basic pension. At present, the basic pension determined by the central government is 55 yuan, and local basic pension standards can be raised on this basis where conditions permit. The central government fully subsidizes the minimum standard basic pension in the central and western regions, and 50% in the eastern region. The standard of basic pension is determined by provincial finance according to local financial resources. In this way, even the minimum pension can't be guaranteed in areas with tight finances, but the standard of basic pension can be greatly raised in areas with rich finances (see Table 4), which increases the income gap between regions.

(2) Personal account pension. As a supporting subsidy paid by individual accounts, the local government needs to subsidize at least every farmer 30 yuan every year. This part of the funds is often shared by the provincial and county-level finances, resulting in a heavy financial burden at the county level. Taking Jiangxi Province as an example, the provincial finance bears 24 yuan, and the county (city, district) finance bears 6 yuan. For severely disabled people in rural areas, the provincial and county (city, district) governments all pay the minimum old-age insurance premium of 100 yuan, with the provincial financial burden of 80% and the county (city, district) financial burden of 20%. Because the higher the amount of farmers' contributions, the higher the local government subsidies, which may lead to the low enthusiasm of local governments to promote farmers' insurance contributions.

2. The local financial burden is unbalanced and unfair.

Different from the urban enterprise endowment insurance system, the rural social endowment insurance system requires the insured to participate in the household registration. Due to the great difference in the proportion of agricultural population among provinces in China, the proportion of agricultural population in China was 53.4 1% at the end of 2009. In backward provinces (such as Tibet, Guizhou, Gansu and Yunnan), this indicator is above 65%, while the agricultural population in developed provinces and cities such as Shanghai and Beijing is only 65.438+05%. Some large agricultural provinces will pay great financial costs because of the large agricultural population, while some municipalities or industrial provinces will only pay very low financial funds because of the small agricultural population.

3. The subsidy is too low.

As mentioned above, each farmer can receive a basic pension of 828 yuan per year, and both husband and wife can receive 1656 yuan per year. Compared with the per capita net income of rural families in China, which is 20 1 1 (6977 yuan), the pension income of husband and wife only accounts for 23.74% of the per capita net income of families, which is far lower than the minimum pension standard insurance of the International Labour Organization (not less than 40% of the annual average income of the working population). Although this practice is in line with the implementation principle of "low level and wide coverage" of the new rural insurance. However, in the long run, to coordinate urban and rural development, truly solve the problem of rural old-age care, and make consumption the main driving force for China's economic growth, we should actually and gradually improve the level of substitution. At present, the replacement rate of endowment insurance for urban workers in China is around 60%. Since the income ratio of urban and rural residents has reached 3.33 ∶ L, even considering the traditional security factors such as farmers' land security, the replacement rate of rural residents' basic pension (basic pension+personal account pension) should not be less than 50%. Considering the unique function of social security in regulating income distribution and interest relationship, promoting social harmony, and gradually narrowing the gap between urban and rural social endowment insurance system in terms of financing and treatment level, the replacement rate of rural social endowment insurance should be further improved.

The World Bank first adopted and introduced the poverty line of "per person per day 1 USD" in the World Development Report 1990: Poverty. The latest update of the World Bank was in March 2008, which raised the international poverty line to 1 day and 1.25 USD at 2005 prices. In the index analysis of 13 Asian developing countries conducted by the Asian Development Bank in 2008, the average national poverty line used was 1 day 1.35 USD. We believe that the minimum level of pension should not be lower than the internationally recognized poverty line. If we adopt the standard of 1.5 USD/day, then the minimum monthly pension standard should be at least above 300 yuan.

4. Some regulations are unfair.

First, the current model is based on "quantity subsidy", which is easy to cause Matthew effect. At present, the payment standard of the new rural endowment insurance is set at 100 yuan, 200 yuan, 300 yuan, 400 yuan and 500 yuan, where individual contributions are more and local government subsidies are more (see Figure 2). We believe that each farmer's economic situation is different, and the rule of "pay more and subsidize more" will cause Matthew effect among farmers. The richer the rich, the poorer the poor.

Second, the pension is not linked to the insurance period, which is easy to cause moral hazard. The new rural social endowment insurance system stipulates that farmers can voluntarily participate in the insurance, which is not mandatory. Therefore, most farmers may choose not to pay after paying 15 years, which will inevitably lead to a low level of pension payment in the future and it is difficult to maintain the living expenses in their later years. At present, some provincial and municipal social security departments have seen this problem and supplemented and improved it. For example, the Opinions on the Implementation of Social Endowment Insurance for Urban and Rural Residents in Hangzhou issued in February, 20 10 stipulates that the endowment insurance for urban and rural residents consists of three parts: basic pension, personal account pension and pension with payment years, among which the monthly standard of pension with payment years is calculated and paid in sections according to the principle of long payment and more. We believe that this practice can be implemented nationwide.

5. It is unfair between people.

First, the subsidies for farmers are relatively small. As mentioned above, the government has certain financial subsidies to urban residents, farmers and employees of low-income enterprises, but the amount of subsidies to farmers is the lowest. Farmers with the lowest income receive the least social security subsidies, which violates the basic principle of financial fairness.

Second, some urban residents have become the "sandwich layer" and "forgotten corner" of social security. It can be seen from the calculation in this paper that the government has implemented a greater policy inclination for urban residents to participate in insurance, and the preferential degree even exceeds that of farmers. However, some urban residents still can't enjoy it because the payment amount is too high. For many older unemployed people, the annual payment of more than 4,000 yuan is a very high threshold. For these people, the new rural endowment insurance system of "low payment and low enjoyment" may be the most suitable, but because of their urban household registration status, they cannot participate in the new rural endowment insurance and become a "sandwich layer".

6. Setting up the old-age insurance system according to the crowd will cause new unfairness.

At present, China's pension insurance projects are divided into several independent pension insurance projects. However, people's identity will change. Therefore, a large number of people switch between various old-age insurance systems every year, which increases the management cost for society, increases the risk and cost of personnel flow for individuals, and in turn restricts the normal flow of personnel between different social roles, which is also beneficial to society. We don't think it is necessary to establish three sets of old-age insurance systems for farmers, urban residents and urban workers respectively, but we should unify them into a complete system. Because in the final analysis, farmers and urban residents are only low-income groups.

In addition, the fragmentation of the system will inevitably lead to the "blind area" covered by the system. At present, many urban elderly residents over the age of 60 can neither enjoy urban insurance nor enjoy the new rural insurance. Take Kunming as an example. By the end of 2009, the urban resident population in Kunming was 19 1270, of which 14 1000 had all kinds of social old-age security, and nearly 500,000 people were not included in the overall social basic old-age insurance. Most of these people lost their jobs when they were young, or the payment period has come.

7. The system connection is not clear.

At present, migrant workers flow frequently. They may settle in cities and become citizens, or they may return to the countryside. If they participate in the basic old-age insurance for urban workers in the enterprise and enjoy the treatment of urban insurance, then they don't have to participate in the "new rural insurance"; Do not meet the conditions for enjoying urban insurance benefits, such as the accumulated payment is insufficient 15 years, and the accumulated payment of urban insurance can be transferred to the "new rural insurance" personal account according to the relevant regulations, and the pension can be received according to the provisions of the "new rural insurance". When migrant workers transfer from urban insurance to new rural insurance and receive new rural insurance pension, the employer's contribution during their work in the city is ignored. In other words, if the payment period is the same, the basic pension is exactly the same for migrant workers who have worked in cities for many years and farmers who have lived in rural areas all their lives. This is obviously unfair to migrant workers who have worked hard outside for many years.

In short, China's new rural social endowment insurance system has been initially established nationwide and achieved good implementation results. However, compared with the old-age insurance system for employees in urban enterprises, there are still many problems in the new rural social old-age insurance system, which need to be further adjusted and improved in fairness and rationality.

Further reading: How to buy insurance, which is good, and teach you how to avoid these "pits" of insurance.