Marble: Why has this country been stable for a long time, but it has been mired in it in recent years?

This country has been stable for a long time, but it has been deeply involved in civil war in recent years. What is the reason?

Syria has been in the flames of civil war since 20 1 1. The opposition and Bashar government fought for the sovereignty of this country for five years, tens of thousands of people were killed, millions of people were displaced, and the whole country was full of holes.

The Syrian civil war has also triggered a wide range of international influences. With the passage of time, not only Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern powers have stepped in one after another, but among the world's four major powers, except China, the United States, Europe and Russia are all actively or passively involved.

So, why did the Syrian civil war break out?

In many people's understanding, the Syrian civil war was implicated by the Arab Spring movement. Since the democratic movement broke out in some towns in Tunisia on February 20 10, people in some Arab countries have taken to the streets to demand the overthrow of their dictatorial regimes. In this process, riots broke out in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia, which has always been rich. As a member of the Arab world, it is normal for Syria to be affected by this anti-dictatorship movement.

But this is just the fuse. Flies don't bite eggs that haven't been sewn. If there were no major problems in Syria, there would be no so-called democratic revolution. For example, Jordan, a typical autocratic monarchy, is basically unaffected by the revolution. Even a country that broke out in a "revolution" eventually intensified into a full-scale civil war. Except Libya, there is only Syria.

Therefore, it is not enough to explain the causes of the civil war in Syria only by the "Arab Spring" and the resistance to the authoritarian government. According to Yun Shijun, the outbreak of the civil war in Syria is closely related to the changes in Syria's internal political structure and the geopolitical pattern in the Middle East.

First, the internal political structure. There is a very obvious difference between Syria and other Arab countries: it is a Shia country in power!

Friends who have seen the cloud series Geopolitics: Decoding Islam must know that Shiites are mostly Iranians, while Arabs generally worship Sunnis.

Of course, this division is only general, and not all Arabs necessarily believe in Shiites. But on the whole, because Sunnis account for the vast majority of the population, it is natural for most Arab countries to take power.

However, this model has deviated in Iraq and Syria. Although the ruling forces of these two countries are both Arabs, they all belong to Shiites.

Iraq is easy to understand. It is adjacent to Iran and was ruled by the Iranian regime for a long time in history. The Arabs here (especially in the core areas of the two river basins) are deeply influenced by Iran, so most people respect Shi Ye. When the Sunni Saddam regime is in power, it is possible to hold power by virtue of its autocratic power. However, after Saddam Hussein's regime was overthrown, it is not surprising that Shiites, who account for the majority of the population and occupy the core areas of the two river basins, turned around with their population and resource advantages.

But Syria is different. Although Syria is also an Islamic country (Muslims account for more than 85% of the total population), among them, Sunnis account for 68% of the total population and Shiites only account for 20%. As the ruling class in Syria, Shiite Alawites only account for 1 1.5% of the total population. Not only is it far worse than Sunnis, but it is even worse than Christianity as a minority religion in China (14%).

The Alawites' marginal position in population is in sharp contrast with their absolute political superiority. This structure means that unstable genes naturally exist in Syria. As Alawites are the ruling class, the class contradictions in Syria are inevitably stained with obvious sectarian colors. In other words, there are not only differences based on interests between the ruling class and the ruled class, but also obvious cultural differences. The existence of this difference has seriously aggravated the gap between classes and greatly narrowed the strategic space for political compromise between classes.

Because of this, when Egypt, Tunisia and other countries are facing revolution, the people can cooperate with a faction within the system, expel the old power holders through their hands, and complete political reorganization in the form of redistribution of upper and lower power-in other words, contradictions can be resolved within the current system.

In Syria, because there is not enough Sunni power in the system (power is basically controlled by Alawites), the game between Sunni people and the Alawites in power cannot be completed within the system (there is a lack of ties between the people and the government). In this case, Sunnis had to form another force outside the system, trying to realize their own interests by destroying the old system. When the game within the system becomes a conflict between the old and new systems, the possibility of civil war naturally increases greatly.

But that's it?

Still can't!

Of course, the political structure in which the Syrian minority dominates the majority determines that the risk of civil war is relatively high. But this is only a little risky, and it doesn't mean that there will be a civil war.

At this point, China is the most typical of the Qing Dynasty. The Qing Dynasty was a typical regime in which minorities ruled the majority, but it successfully extended its rule for 267 years. Although there were many anti-Qing, anti-Manchu and anti-Han forces in this period, most of them disappeared and did not have a fundamental impact on the rule of the Qing Dynasty.

Syria used to be like this. Before the outbreak of civil strife, the political pattern of Alawites ruling Sunnis had lasted for more than half a century. During these long years, Syria has been a very stable country under the rule of father and son Assad-Bashar. Although the Sunnis are dissatisfied, they have not said that they have intensified to the point of fighting civil war with Alawites.

So, is it because the internal economic difficulties in Syria have aggravated social contradictions? Not exactly. On the eve of the civil war, Syria was indeed a relatively backward country in the Middle East-but it has been like this for decades. Since we can come safely before, it makes no sense that the contradiction has suddenly intensified to this extent in the past year or two!

To sum up, whether it is the influence of the Arab Spring, the defects of the political structure or the economic difficulties, these can certainly be favorable conditions for the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, but they are not the direct reasons for the outbreak of the civil war. According to Yun Shijun, the outbreak of the civil war in Syria is closely related to the changes in the geopolitical pattern in the Middle East.

Because of Syria's special humanistic and political structure, there are naturally two self-identity orientations at the official level: Arab identity based on ethnic origin and Shiite identity based on sects.

For a long time in the past, the Syrian government emphasized its Arab identity. It is not only the main founding member of the Arab League, but also merged with Egypt and Yemen in the 1950s and 1960s to form the United Arab Republic, dedicated to the Arab unification movement. To this day, the name of the Syrian ruling party is still the Arab Baath Socialist Party. In view of Iran's Shia suzerain status and the thousand-year-old feud between Iran and Arabia, the behavior of the Syrian ruler clearly shows that his feelings for the Arab nation are far better than those of Shiites.

The reason why the Syrian government chose this way is based on its own interests:

The first is to stabilize internal rule. As a political power based on minority sects, the ruling foundation of the Syrian government is naturally unstable. In this case, diluting the sectarian identity and advocating the Arab national identity will help to bridge the differences in humanistic characteristics between Alawite rulers and Sunni people and help to maintain the rule. (It is this logic to admire the Manchu family after entering the customs. ).

External interests are also obvious:

Syria's neighbors or similar countries, including Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and even Palestine, are all Sunni Arab countries. If Syria advocates Shiite identity, it is equivalent to artificially creating a gap with these neighboring Arab neighbors, which in itself will make Syria's surrounding environment deteriorate sharply and fall into the dilemma of being attacked on all sides.

In addition, Syria needs the help of its neighbors and allies to safeguard national security. Among Syria's neighbors, there are two deadly enemies: Turkey and Israel. Needless to say, Syria was defeated by Israel in five Middle East wars. Today, the territory of the Golan Heights, which is vital to the capital Damascus, is still in Israel's hands. Turkey, on the other hand, has always dreamed of returning to the Middle East. Geopolitical relations determine that if Turkey really does this, Syria will bear the brunt.

Syria's national strength and military strength are no match for Israel and Turkey. To safeguard national security, we must rely on the support of neighboring Arab countries. This determines that it must be as consistent as possible with Arab countries in cultural identity.

Moreover, in the last section "Geopolitics 83: Why Syria Hates the United States", Yun Shijun once said that Syria has always wanted to control the Canaan lowlands where Israel and Lebanon are located, which will not only open Syria's strategic channel to the Mediterranean, but also integrate the richest geopolitical plates in the Middle East (Nile Valley, Canaan Region and Two River Basins). By then, Syria, as a crescent moon and even the geographical center of the Arab world, will greatly benefit. In the specific operation process, whether it is to control the Canaan lowlands or to integrate the Arab world in the Middle East, it is necessary to win the approval of Arabs.

In short, the geopolitical pattern in the Middle East determines that Syria needs to strive for Arab identity and dilute sectarian differences, whether it is good neighbors, defending the enemy or developing.

However, with the evolution of the current situation, the geopolitical pattern in the Middle East has changed:

The first is the opposition between Saudi Arabia and Syria. Originally, Saudi Arabia and Syria were both Arab countries and should live in harmony. However, in the previous "Geopolitics: Saudi Arabia Series", Yun once said that most of Saudi Arabia's territory is desert Gobi, and its exploitable value is extremely low. This country is where it is today because of oil. Once the oil runs out, Saudi Arabia will collapse overnight. Therefore, after Saudi Arabia becomes rich, it must use the oil dividend to expand abroad, seize some high-quality geographical plates for industrial and agricultural development, build a sustainable economic system, and maintain the long-term operation of the country. However, the relationship between geography and humanity determines that invading Syria and Iraq is the most realistic choice. Driven by this interest, Saudi Arabia and the Syrian government have fundamental conflicts of interest. Even after the beginning of the civil war in Syria, Saudi Arabia not only directly led the GCC countries to turn against the Syrian government, but also directly assisted IS and strongly confronted the Syrian government.

Secondly, Egypt's retreat and decline.

Syria and Egypt were once very close. The reason why the two countries do this is because they hope that the North and the South will attack each other, wipe out the "heresy" stuck in Israel's throat, and control the central strategic passage of the crescent land in the Canaan lowland in their own hands, which is of great benefit to both Egypt and Syria.

However, after five wars in the Middle East, Israel became stronger and stronger, especially after Israel captured Egypt's Sinai Peninsula several times, which threatened the Suez Canal, which is vital to Egypt's economy. After repeated failures, Egypt gradually realized the reality, gave up the idea of destroying Israel and opening the Canaan passage, and turned to seek compromise with Israel in exchange for its withdrawal from Sinai Peninsula and a truce with itself.

The direct consequence of this change is that Syria was abandoned and had to fight alone with Israel. After Egypt withdrew, Syria could not fight back in the confrontation with Israel. Not only did it fail to support the Palestine Liberation Organization, but its influence on Lebanon, a traditional sphere of influence, was greatly weakened, and the Golan Heights was also occupied by Israel. To some extent, this is equivalent to Egypt selling Syria's interests to Israel for its own security.

The deterioration of the situation does not stop there. After the Arab Spring, Egypt experienced social unrest. Not only was it unable to perform its duties as the leader of the Arab League and maintain the order in the Arab world, but it was bought by Saudi Petrodollars because it was in urgent need of money, so that it ignored Saudi attempts to overthrow the Syrian government. This makes Egypt's value to Syria almost disappear.

Finally, Iraq's discoloration. Iraq is an important eastern neighbor of Syria and an important supporter of Syria. In Saddam's time, Iraq was a Sunni country. However, with the fall of Saddam Hussein, Shiites became the mainstream in the new central government of Iraq, and the sectarian tendency of the whole country also turned to Shiites and gradually moved closer to Iran.

Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq are the three strongest countries in the Arab world and Syria's largest foreign aid in the Arab world. As a result, now, one is self-absorbed, one is directly opposed and the other is turned to Shiites. In this case, the Syrian government emphasizes that the value of Arab national identity is not great.

On the contrary, the value of Shia identity has gradually become prominent.

Originally, even if the external value of Arab national identity has been lost, the Syrian government will not necessarily abandon it-after all, this identity is still very useful for winning the hearts of the people and maintaining political stability.

Saudi Arabia and Turkey, two Sunni countries, persistently infiltrated the idea of attacking Syria from the north and the south, which led to the obvious strengthening of the Sunni sectarian identity of ordinary Syrian people.

The Syrian government is unable to reverse this situation. With the growing antagonism, the weak Alawite government in Syria can only seek support from the outside world in order to protect itself.

Egypt is no longer in power. Among the local forces in the Middle East, only Iran and Iraq have certain strength and are willing to support Syria. Iran has always had geopolitical conflicts with Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and its geopolitical relations with Syria are also relatively close. Through this kind of Lian Heng, it can be regarded as one of the ways to maintain political power.

In terms of sects, Iran is the Shia sovereign state, and the Iraqi central government has also turned to Shia-led. Since Syria is close to them, its Shia attribute will naturally become clearer.

This forms an infinite loop. The use value of Arab national identity is gone. Turkey and Saudi Arabia identify with Sunnis and dig corners in Syria. As a last resort, the Syrian government turned to Shia Iran and Iraq for assistance, which in turn further intensified its sectarian conflict with Sunnis. This internal and external contradiction accumulated to a certain extent, coupled with the three unstable factors mentioned above in Syria, triggered the Syrian civil war.

The outbreak of the civil war in Syria attracted the intervention of the United States.

In the last section, "Geopolitics: Why Syria deeply hates America", Yun Shijun analyzed the origin of the dispute between Syria and America. It is said that the United States has always hated the Syrian government. Now that Syria is in a civil war, the United States should take advantage of the fire and rob the Bashar regime in one fell swoop.

But in fact, the United States has not done so. Although the United States has indeed taken some measures, such as recognizing the opposition, promoting sanctions against the Bashar government, and conniving at IS, on the whole, these measures are not strong. Don't say that the United States didn't fight directly as it did in Afghanistan and Iraq. Even in the Libyan war, the United States did not do much to delimit the no-fly zone and provide equipment to the opposition.

I hope my answer is helpful to you!