How strict was the training in Song Shenzong's time: soldiers would rather fight than avoid training.

1086, Song Shenzong, who was determined to carry out military reform, died the year before. At this time, the empress dowager and the old party ministers who opposed the political reform were in power. The "Xining Reform" promoted by Wang Anshi and Song Shenzong was thus abolished. As an old party member, Su Zhe (Su Shi's younger brother) wrote a letter to the imperial court with the admonition rank of right minister, the content of which was to reduce the daily training intensity of the imperial army in various places. Minister You secretly looked at the Taoist Imperial Army. Since being appointed as a general, he has practiced martial arts day and night, and his sword, spear, crossbow and combat power are twice as strong as before. But since I tried it at the edge of the year, I haven't seen the effect of defeating the enemy. Soldiers are used to it. Stop the military. As for. To win every battle, you have your own way, and you must not ignore it. When I went to visit, I heard that all the soldiers were going to go down, and they all taught late. The new recruits may not have a day off, so the foot soldiers are suffering terribly. /kloc-at the age of 0/8, Sybil fought and soldiers rushed to the battlefield from Neixian County, not because they liked teaching. Pay attention to the military first, and send officials to read it every year. Tin is rich and moves quickly, and the scholar's heart is like it. I think people who are so generous today are not as good as those who work first, and those who work hard are as old as before. I think they are suspicious ... There are several reasons why Su Zhe thinks that the training intensity should be reduced: First, at present, military training is forbidden once in the morning and once in the evening, which is unbearable for many recruits. In recent years, the war in the west has continued, and the imperial army has been actively and enthusiastically transferred to the battlefield because it can train less. Second, when Zongshen was in office, the training was very hard. That's because the training situation is reviewed every year, and the rewards and officials of training are unambiguous. Since there are not so many rewards, the training intensity will naturally be reduced. Thirdly, Su Zhe thinks that ancient generals, such as Wang Jian and Li Mu, usually kill cows and drink alcohol, and only when soldiers enjoy enough conscience and want to fight can they be invincible. Like the imperial army now, it is usually exhausted. What's the use in real war? Su Zhe was a wise man in the old Party, but his views on military affairs are still quite out of place today. In fact, he represented the opinions of a large number of ministers in power at that time. 1087, Xixia sent messengers to ask for the land of Wuzhai such as Lanzhou. Urged by Sima Guang and Su Zhe, the old party ministers, the Song Dynasty gave up countless hard-earned lands in Zongshen period in vain in order to "surrender" Xixia. The biggest reason for the weak military performance in the Song Dynasty was by no means the lack of horses, but the fact that these civil servants had been aiding and abetting for hundreds of years, and finally there was no hope during the reign of Hui Zong. The imperial army of the Song Dynasty pushed the time forward for decades. 1038, Li Yuanhao, the leader of the Tangut regime in the Song Dynasty, broke away from the Song Dynasty and claimed to be the emperor. Of course, the Song Dynasty could not tolerate it, so it went to war. What shocked the officials and ministers of Song Dynasty happened: Song Dynasty stationed 300,000 troops in Shaanxi alone, but faced with Xixia's/kloc-0,000,000 troops, it suffered three major defeats: Sanchuankou, Haoshuichuan and Dingchuanzhai, and Song Jun lost tens of thousands in each battle. They are the most elite imperial guards. Since 1004, there has been no war in the Song Dynasty for more than 30 years. The conflict with Xixia made the ruling and opposition parties in the Song Dynasty realize that they could not defeat not only Liao, but also Xia Huan, Dali, Jiaotoe and other neighboring small countries. The army cannot change. At that time, the military problems in the Northern Song Dynasty were obvious to all. The main problems are as follows: first of all, we should be alert to the self-esteem of generals, because we are a dynasty that carries out military coups. We don't trust military commanders, but we don't trust civilian officials. In short, it is necessary to minimize the possibility of concentrating the control of the army in one hand. Therefore, the 300,000 troops in the Northern Song Dynasty could not defeat Xixia's100,000 people: because these 300,000 people were scattered on the Fourth Road. Xixia always concentrated his forces to attack all the way, but he had the advantage of strength. Second, the problem of redundant soldiers leads to poor training. The Song Dynasty had the largest army in the history at that time, and its military expenditure remained above 80% of the total fiscal expenditure for a long time. However, the accumulation of quantity has caused the decline of quality. Song Jun recruits bandits, refugees and criminals as soldiers, and it is also stipulated to retire at the age of 60, so when the war broke out, these old, weak and sick people drove away young people who could have fought together. During the period of 1040, troops were reviewed in Weizhou, Northwest Theater. It was found that among the 350 commanders, less than 100 can pull a strong bow with two fights with one stone (one stone is about 60 kilograms), and even less than one can use a crossbow. In fact, this situation is good, because apart from the war zone, the mainland army has no training at all, and even weapons are not issued. Third, the original "over-defense law" in the Song Dynasty brought about the disconnection between operational command and training. The original policy of the Song Dynasty was to transfer soldiers when nothing happened, which was a good thing, because marching itself was also a kind of training, but the problem was that the soldiers were transferred, but the generals did not follow, so the final result was that soldiers would stay with their soldiers for a long time. When the war broke out, the soldiers were not familiar with the general's orders, and the general was not familiar with the soldiers' strength. Therefore, since 1069, the military reform measures of Wang Anshi's political reform (now generally called "Xining political reform") mainly have the following points: First, the original retirement age of militia Song Jun was reduced from 6 1 year, but actually he could not retire at 6 1 year, and he would be regarded as a cheap slave from Xining. Other vacancies in the army have also been discovered. Initially, Song Jun cavalry had 400 people as a battalion (or headquarters) and infantry had 500 people as a battalion. But in fact, many battalions are not satisfied. The first battalion of cavalry often has only a few dozen people, and the infantry battalion has only a hundred people. In the past, these battalions were completely supplied by the state. The ministers of the old party opposed disarmament, believing that it would lead to chaos and public safety problems. However, the number of people in Song Jun decreased from 1 160000 to 858000. Of course, the decline in the number of regular troops does not mean that there are fewer people participating in the war. With the implementation of the Garbo Law, the Song Dynasty began to train the militia and encouraged the people to develop "archers" (armed immigrants from abel tamata) to defend themselves in wartime. Facts have proved that the archers in Shaanxi are even more powerful than the imperial army in the mainland. And what does the old party think these militia should do in case of rebellion? So I object. Second, set up martial arts (military schools) and implement the "general theory of art of war." Wu Xuecheng understands, what is the "Art of War"? Sun Tzu's art of war can be understood as the integration of training and actual combat. In the past, Song Jun was in charge of training and actual combat respectively, which led to the disconnection between training and actual combat. Training has gradually become a ritual or simply abandoned, and the generals who command actual combat are separated from the army, and their ability to lead troops cannot be improved. The Art of War destroyed the original command system of Song Jun, and set up more than 100 "generals" in the national army, with an average of about 6,000 people in charge. These generals are in charge of the training of the army at ordinary times and command the army to fight in wartime. So the problem of "not knowing soldiers" was solved. Third, formulate unified national training standards, train troops nationwide and reward training. During the reign of Song Shenzong, a unified "proofreading grid" was distributed throughout the country, that is, training passwords, and the techniques of step shooting, riding and shooting, infantry and instant combat were summarized into a thousand-word formula, which was required to be recited by everyone in the army. In addition, the armed forces all over the country generally set up training venues to conduct large-scale training throughout the country. Training formula Song Shenzong and Wang Anshi's political reform, it should be said that in the past ten years, Song Jun's combat effectiveness has indeed been strengthened, and it has gradually regained the initiative in the war with Xixia, and the war against toe has also been successful. Although Yuanfeng No.5 Route Army failed to intercept the summer due to logistical reasons, and Song Jun was also beaten out of the water by Xixia in those years, this time it was able to take the initiative to send troops to hundreds of thousands of Xixia, which has proved the progress of the army's organization and training ability. The civil servants in the imperial examination attributed this failure to the fact that the coach chosen by Song Shenzong did not use civil servants, but used eunuch Li Xian. But in fact, Li Xian was well-known for his military affairs at that time, and the one on his head was the leader of the Fifth Route Army. The accusation of civil servants against him is pure discrimination. During Song Shenzong's period, the training of the whole army was a relatively successful aspect of the whole political reform, and Song Jun's combat effectiveness did show signs of being thoroughly remoulded during Zongshen's reign. But after his death, these military reform measures were still liquidated by the old party literati. The rewards in training have been cut, the unified "proofreading" training code has been abolished, the Garbo rule has been abolished, and martial arts has been abolished ... Now, looking at that history, we will feel that Song Jun has not always been weak, and the civil service group in the Song Dynasty seems to be deliberately weakening the combat effectiveness of the army. Later, in the era of Song Huizong, no one could resist the invasion of 8 jin j, and the responsibility was not only on the emperor, but also on the actions of the civilian group. Most of the old party's criticism of Xining's political reform is not completely unreasonable, but most of them are opposed for the sake of opposition. In fact, they can't come up with any better reform suggestions, and they can only restore everything before the political reform. At the beginning of the political reform, Zong Shen asked Wang Anshi a question: You said that political reform was necessary for survival, so why did our ancestors continue to this day without political reform for a hundred years? Wang Anshi thought about it and answered: first, because there were no large-scale natural disasters, and second, because Yi Di was not rampant. All in all, it is luck. So in the Jingkang period, luck began to get worse. References:

A preliminary study on the military training of the regular army in the Song Dynasty, a study on the art of war of generals in Xining Reform, and an analysis of the role of Xining Reform in Song Shenzong.